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Abstract 
 
Psychopathy is a disorder characterised by emotional dysfunction, difficulties in 
interpersonal relationships, and antisocial behaviour (e.g. Hare, 1993; Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 
2005). People with psychopathy are thought to be callous and selfish, but they may also be 
charming and likeable. They are therefore considered to be adept at manipulating and 
deceiving others, with significant negative consequences for them. This thesis aimed to 
examine how psychopathic personality traits translate into specific aspects of everyday social 
behaviour. Thus, a range of experimental, scenario-based tasks was developed in order to 
compare prosocial responding and moral judgment in people high and low in psychopathic 
traits. These tasks were designed to manipulate contextual factors, such as the costs of 
behaving prosocially, or the extent to which people deserved a particular outcome. With 
respect to prosocial behaviour, the findings revealed that the high psychopathic trait 
participants behaved less prosocially than the low trait participants when they stood to gain 
or lose. The experimental manipulations in these studies were found to elicit patterns of 
behaviour in both trait groups that were similar in direction, but not necessarily in magnitude. 
For instance, the high trait groups demonstrated some sensitivity to others’distress, but at a 
lower threshold to the low trait group. With respect to moral judgment, the high and low 
trait groups were found to make comparable choices in moral reasoning, such as making 
more utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas involving physical harm than in those involving 
social harm. Despite these selective group differences, the high trait participants were 
consistently less emotional than the low trait participants in the experiments involving moral 
judgment, as well as in those involving prosocial behaviour. The findings of the experimental 
studies were considered in the context of the prominent cognitive and emotional models of 
psychopathy. One theoretical framework that was particularly pertinent in relation to the 
current findings draws a distinction between cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy, 
and posits that psychopathy is characterised by intact cognitive empathy and impaired 
emotional empathy. The clinical implications and possible contributions of these findings to 
psychopathy remediation were considered.  
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Part 1: Literature Review 
 
Introduction to literature review 
 
Psychopathy is a disorder characterised by emotional dysfunction, difficulties in 
interpersonal relationships, and antisocial behaviour (e.g. Hare, 1993; Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 
2005). In order to provide a thorough overview of the construct of psychopathy, the 
literature review will firstly describe the associated clinical features, developmental trajectory, 
and issues surrounding assessment and diagnosis (Chapter 1). It will then introduce 
aetiological models of psychopathy and briefly discuss remediation (Chapter 2).  
 
As discussed below, empirical work has typically involved the use of abstract experimental 
tasks, such as lexical decision-making tasks and neuroeconomic games. This has led to 
significant contributions towards understanding the concept of psychopathy and the range 
of associated deficits. However, there is a paucity of work examining the implications for 
everyday types of social interactions. A valuable direction of research may thus be to focus 
on the types of commonplace situations and contexts in which psychopathic traits are most 
likely to manifest. This is particularly important since psychopathy has significant negative 
consequences, both for directly affected individuals and for society as a whole (Kiehl & 
Hoffman 2011). Thus, the main focus of the present thesis is the ways in which psychopathic 
traits translate into subtle aspects of everyday social performance. In order to examine the 
ways in which this has previously been investigated, Chapter 3 will review the literature 
pertaining to prosocial behaviour and Chapter 4 will review the literature pertaining to moral 
reasoning.  
 
In view of the limited work investigating psychopathy and everyday social behaviour, the 
present thesis involved the development of a range of novel experimental tasks. Following 
the literature review, a series of experimental studies comparing groups high and low in 
psychopathic traits using these tasks will be presented. 
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Chapter 1: Conceptualising psychopathy 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The concept of psychopathy is pervasive in society. Informally, people may use the term 
‘psychopath’ to describe people who have had a notably negative influence on the lives of 
others. These may include notorious fictitious characters such as Hannibal Lecter from ‘The 
Silence of The Lambs’, serial killers such as Ted Bundy, political figures such as Adolf Hitler, 
and more commonplace individuals such as ex-partners and employers (Blair, Mitchell & 
Blair, 2005). Within the research literature, psychopathy is described as a condition 
characterised by a “distinctive cluster of behaviours and inferred personality traits, most of 
which society views as pejorative” (Hare, 1993). Psychopathic behaviours include violence 
and other antisocial acts such as stealing, lying or cheating. Psychopathic personality traits 
include egocentricity and a lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse. Psychopathy is associated with 
significant costs, both for those with whom they directly interact and for society (Kiehl & 
Hoffmann, 2011).  
 
In spite of the costs to society and the deleterious characteristics associated with 
psychopathy, people with psychopathy have often been conceptualised as likeable, funny and 
charming company (Cleckley, 1941). This paradoxical presentation indicates that those with 
psychopathy may take advantage of others and cause catastrophic damage in the name of 
self-interest, whilst often going undetected and appearing to be fully functional. This paradox 
led to the coining of the phrase “the mask of sanity” (Cleckley, 1941).   
 
The present chapter will introduce the clinical features of psychopathy and review the issues 
surrounding assessment and diagnosis. The merits of examining psychopathy in the general 
population will be discussed, and a continuum approach to conceptualising psychopathy will 
be presented.  
 
1.2 CLINICAL FEATURES OF PSYCHOPATHY  
 
One of the earliest accounts of psychopathy was written by Harvey Cleckley in the seminal 
work “The Mask of Sanity” (Cleckley, 1941). He developed a psychopathic profile on the 
basis of a series of clinical interviews. This profile consisted of 16 core psychopathic 
characteristics: (1) superficial charm and good intelligence; (2) an absence of delusions and 
17 
 
other signs of irrational thinking; (3) an absence of nervousness or psychoneurotic 
manifestations; (4) unreliability; (5) untruthfulness and insincerity; (6) a lack of remorse and 
shame; (7) inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour; (8) poor judgment and a failure to 
learn by experience; (9) pathological egocentricity and incapacity for love; (10) general 
poverty in major affective reactions; (11) specific loss of insight; (12) unresponsiveness in 
general interpersonal relations; (13) fantastic and uninviting behaviour with drink and 
sometimes without; (14) suicide threats rarely carried out (15) impersonal, trivial and poorly 
integrated sex life, and (16) failure to follow any life plan.  
 
In view of this broad range of traits and behaviours, psychopathy has been conceptualised 
as a multifaceted disorder rather than a unitary construct (e.g. Patrick, 2006). Research has 
been conducted in order to elucidate the core components of psychopathy that encapsulate 
all of these traits and behaviours. Thus, Cleckley’s 16 traits were subsequently classified into 
three distinct categories (Cleckley 1976). The first category pertains to positive psychological 
adjustment. This brings together psychopathic characteristics such as the absence of 
delusions, nervousness or suicidality and the capacity for charm and intelligence. The second 
category pertains to chronic behavioural deviance. This brings together psychopathic 
characteristics such as antisocial and uninviting behaviour, unreliability, sexual promiscuity 
and a failure to plan for the future. The final category pertains to emotional and interpersonal 
deficits. This brings together psychopathic characteristics such as insincerity, a lack of 
remorse and shame, limited emotional responsivity, egocentricity, and deficits in 
interpersonal relationships.  
 
The most prominent contemporary account of psychopathy was developed by Robert Hare 
(1980). On the basis of Cleckley’s work (1976) and his own clinical impressions, Hare devised 
a checklist of 20 psychopathic characteristics. Subsequent factor analysis of these 20 
characteristics revealed two distinct factors, interpersonal/affective and impulsive/antisocial 
(Harpur, Hare & Hakstian, 1989). The items of the checklist pertaining to the 
interpersonal/affective factor are: (1) superficial charm; (2) a grandiose sense of self-worth; 
(3) a propensity for pathological lying; (4) a propensity for manipulation; (5) a lack of remorse 
or guilt; (6) shallow affect; (7) callousness/lack of empathy, and (8) a failure to accept 
responsibility for one’s own actions. The items of the checklist pertaining to the 
impulsive/antisocial factor are: (9) a need for stimulation/a proneness to boredom; (10) 
parasitic lifestyle; (11) poor behavioural control; (12) early behavioural problems; (13) lack 
of realistic, long-term goals; (14) impulsivity; (15) irresponsibility; (16) juvenile delinquency, 
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and (17) revocation of conditional release. The final three further items failed to load on 
either factor: (18) promiscuous sexual behaviour; (19) numerous short-term marital affairs, 
and (20) criminal versatility.   
 
Although the two factors on the psychopathy checklist are thought to be highly correlated, 
it has been argued that they measure separable components of psychopathy (Harpur et al., 
1989; Blair et al., 2005). A revised version of the original checklist was developed in order to 
account for both factors. This revised version of the psychopathy checklist (PCL-R; Hare, 
1991) is the most widely used tool for clinical assessment and empirical research.  
 
Subsequent research suggested that psychopathy may not have been adequately represented 
by Hare’s two factors. Instead, Cooke and Michie (2001) proposed a three-factor 
conceptualisation of psychopathy, further subdividing the interpersonal/affective factor in 
order to account for an ‘arrogant and deceitful interpersonal’factor and a ‘deficient affective 
experience’factor. However, this three-factor conceptualisation of psychopathy has been 
criticised on both statistical and conceptual grounds, and neither the two-factor nor the 
three-factor approach accounts for all the characteristics associated with psychopathy (Hare 
& Neumann, 2008). Thus, the most recent conceptualisation of psychopathy posits that the 
range of characteristics fall within four separable factors (Hare & Neumann, 2008). These 
four factors represent a subdivision of the interpersonal/affective factor as well as a 
subdivision of the antisocial/impulsive factor. This latter subdivision describes both 
antisocial behaviours such as delinquency or criminality, in addition to characteristics relating 
to lifestyle choices, such as impulsivity, failure to plan ahead, sensation-seeking behaviour 
and sexual promiscuity. Taken together, although there is some disagreement about the 
precise number of components and corresponding characteristics in psychopathy, there is 
broadly a consensus that psychopathy is chiefly typified by emotional, interpersonal and 
behavioural deficits.  
 
The core components of psychopathy reviewed above were identified on the basis of clinical 
interview (Cleckley, 1941; Hare, 1980). There is a substantial body of empirical evidence 
supporting an association between psychopathy and each of these core components. With 
respect to emotional deficits, a range of studies has found that people with psychopathy have 
reduced physiological responsivity to aversive or emotionally salient stimuli (e.g. Lykken, 
1957; Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997; Vaidyanathan, Hall, Patrick & Bernat, 2011; 
Anderson, Stanford, Wan & Young, 2011). With respect to deficits in interpersonal 
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relationships, a range of studies has linked psychopathy with a propensity for reduced 
cooperation (Johnson, Hawes & Straiton, 2014; Rilling, Glenn, Jairam et al, 2007; Mokros, 
Menner, Eisenbarth et al, 2008) and for increased manipulation and deception (e.g. Babiak 
& Hare, 2006; Seto, Khattar, Lalumiere & Quinsey, 1997; Nathanson, Paulhus & Williams, 
2006; Rogers & Cruise, 2014). Finally, with respect to behavioural difficulties, psychopathy 
has been extensively linked with violence (e.g. Hare, 1999; Raine & Sanmartin, 2001), sexual 
promiscuity (e.g. Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Knight & Guay, 2006), and substance 
abuse (Smith & Newman, 1990).  
 
1.3 DEVELOPMENTAL TRAJECTORY 
 
To what extent does psychopathy emerge in childhood? The development of research tools 
such as a ‘youth version’of the psychopathy checklist (Forth, Kosson & Hare, 2003) and self-
report measures of psychopathic traits in childhood (e.g. Anderson, Hodgins & Tengstrom, 
2007) facilitated the examination of psychopathy in children. These tools have been found 
to tap into the factors identified as core components of psychopathy (Neumann, Kosson, 
Forth & Hare, 2006). Studies using these measures revealed that high-scoring children 
demonstrated a greater propensity for violence, had an earlier onset of antisocial behaviour, 
and had more significant issues with alcohol and substance abuse than low-scoring children 
(e.g. Kosson, Cyterski, Steuerwald, Neumann & Walker-Matthews, 2001). However, these 
tools are only appropriate for children aged 12-18, and are most typically used to investigate 
psychopathy in adolescents who have already been institutionalised for juvenile delinquency. 
This offers a very limited insight into the emergence of psychopathic traits in childhood.  
 
Psychopathy in children has been more thoroughly investigated by examining the potential 
relationship between psychopathy and conduct disorder. According to the fifth edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), conduct disorder is “a repetitive and persistent pattern of behaviour in 
which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are 
violated”. Conduct disorder is typically characterised by aggression towards people and 
animals, destruction of property, theft, deceitfulness and/or serious violations of rules. 
Onset may take place in either childhood or adolescence. The distinction between child and 
adolescent-onset conduct disorder is thought to be particularly significant, since the two 
types are associated with very different trajectories of antisocial behaviour (Frick &Viding, 
2009). For instance, a number of studies have found that conduct problems that begin in 
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childhood are more likely to persist into adulthood and to increase in severity than those that 
begin in adolescence (Frick & Loney, 1999; Moffitt, Caspi, Harrington & Milne, 2002). 
Studies have also found childhood versus adolescence-onset conduct disorder to be 
associated with impulsivity (McCabe, Hough, Wood & Yeh, 2001; Silverthorn, Frick & 
Reynolds, 2001) and difficulties with emotional regulation (Moffitt, Caspi, Dickson, Silva & 
Stanton, 1996), both of which are characteristic of adult psychopathy. Most importantly, 
early-onset conduct disorder is associated with a callous and unemotional interpersonal style 
characterised by a lack of guilt and empathy and a proclivity for taking advantage of others 
(Frick & Viding, 2009). It has thus been proposed that children with conduct disorder should 
be grouped on the basis of the presence or absence of callous-unemotional traits. The 
subgroup of children who are classified as conduct disordered with callous-unemotional 
traits show substantial overlap with psychopathy, since they demonstrate the characteristic 
emotional impairments and interpersonal difficulties associated with psychopathy in addition 
to violent and antisocial behaviour (Christian, Frick, Hill, Tyler & Frazer, 1997; Frick, 1998; 
Frick & White, 2008; Frick & Viding, 2009). Taken together, the evidence suggests that 
psychopathy may manifest in childhood and persist into adulthood.  
 
1.4 PSYCHOPATHY AND GENDER 
 
A range of studies has found psychopathy to be more prevalent in men than in women (e.g. 
Verona & Vitale, 2006). For instance, men to meet more of Hare’s psychopathy checklist 
criteria than do women (Warren, Burnette, South et al., 2003; Weiler & Widom, 1996; Forth, 
Brown Hart & Hare, 1996). They also score higher on self-report measures of psychopathy 
have (e.g. Cale & Lilienfeld, 2002; Hamburger, Lilienfeld & Hogben, 1996). Thus, 
psychopathy has been found to manifest more commonly in men than in women, both in 
incarcerated and non-incarcerated populations (Verona & Vitale, 2006).  
 
In spite of a higher prevalence of psychopathy in men, psychopathy is thought to predict 
similar patterns of antisocial behaviour in males and female prisoners. For instance, in one 
study, women with high PCL-R scores were more likely to reoffend and to commit 
institutionalised infractions than those with low scores (Hare, Clark, Grann & Thornton, 
2000). It has thus been considered important to examine psychopathy across both genders. 
However, there may be some differences in how psychopathy manifests in men versus 
women. For instance, when striving to achieve a particular goal, men with psychopathy tend 
to con people and to be physically violent, whereas women with psychopathy are reported 
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to be flirtatious and manipulative (Nicholls & Petrila, 2005; Forouzan & Cooke, 2005; Strand 
& Belfrage, 2005). With respect to the propensity for antisocial or criminal behaviour 
associated with psychopathy, men tend to be imprisoned for assault, murder or sexual 
violence, whereas women tend to be imprisoned for fraud, theft or arson (Lanctot & Leblanc, 
2002; Forouzan & Cooke, 2005). Taken together, both men and women may present with 
psychopathy, but the prevalence is higher for men and gender may influence the ways in 
which psychopathic characteristics manifest.  
 
1.5 ASSESSMENT & DIAGNOSIS  
 
1.5.1 Relationship between Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder 
How is psychopathy diagnosed? Disorders are typically diagnosed using a formal 
classification system such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-V) or the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-
10). There are currently no diagnostic criteria for psychopathy, although DSM-V does 
contain diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder, which has some overlap with 
psychopathy. For instance, antisocial personality disorder is characterised by a propensity for 
criminal activity, deception, impulsivity, and a tendency to disregard the safety of themselves 
and others. However, it is thought that only a subset of those diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder would meet the criteria for psychopathy.  
 
Although both syndromes are characterised by aggressive behaviour, an important 
distinction is made between the aggression displayed by people with antisocial personality 
disorder without psychopathy, and those with antisocial personality disorder and 
psychopathy. Aggression is considered to consist of two main subtypes, reactive and 
instrumental (e.g. Dodge & Coie, 1987). Reactive aggression refers to impulsive, hostile 
reactions to perceived threats, dangerous situations or provocations (Glenn & Raine, 2007). 
These are emotional reactions, initiated without consideration for any potential goal or 
purpose (Blair et al., 2005). By contrast, instrumental aggression refers to non-provoked 
aversive actions intended to gain resources or intimidate or dominate others (Patrick, 2004; 
Poulin & Boivin, 2000). Instrumental aggression is considered to be controlled, purposeful, 
premeditated and goal-oriented (Glenn & Raine, 2009). A substantial body of evidence has 
linked psychopathy with instrumental rather than reactive aggression (Glenn & Raine, 2009; 
Cornell, Warren, Hawk, Stafford, Oram et al., 1996; Blair, 2001; Walsh, Swogger &Kosson, 
2009). Thus, the non-psychopathic subset of those with antisocial personality disorder are 
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more likely to display reactive aggression, whereas the psychopathic subset of those with 
antisocial personality disorder are more likely to display instrumental aggression (Blair et al., 
2005). Crucially, only this instrumentally aggressive subset is thought to demonstrate the 
characteristic emotional impairment associated with psychopathy (Blair et al., 2005). This is 
supported by evidence suggesting that those with psychopathic antisocial personality 
disorder have a higher distress tolerance than control participants, whereas those with non-
psychopathic antisocial personality disorder have a lower distress tolerance than control 
participants (Sargeant, Daughters, Curtin, Schuster & Lujuez, 2011).  
 
The literature pertaining to conduct disorder provides further evidence that people with 
people with psychopathy represent a subset of those with antisocial personality disorder. 
When the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder present prior to the age of 18, 
a diagnosis of conduct disorder is given. The evidence reviewed above suggests that two sub-
groups of conduct disorder exist, one with callous-emotional traits, and one without. Thus, 
the subset of conduct disordered children presenting with callous-unemotional traits is 
thought to correspond with the subset of antisocial personality disorder adults presenting 
with psychopathy (Frick & Viding, 2009).  
 
1.5.2 The use of the Psychopathy Checklist in diagnosis of psychopathy  
In view of the absence of clinical criteria, a diagnosis of psychopathy is typically made using 
of the PCL-R (Hare, 1991). For an individual to receive a psychopathy diagnosis, an extensive 
review of their records and a semi-structured interview is carried out. This determines the 
extent to which they meet each of the checklist’s criteria. They are awarded a score of 0, 1 or 
2 per checklist item, with higher scores denoting more severe psychopathy (Hare, 1991). The 
PCL-R has been extensively validated in a number of cross-cultural samples, and 
demonstrates strong inter-rater reliability and internal consistency, and strong concurrent, 
construct and discriminant validity (Hart & Hare, 1989; Harpur et al., 1989; Hare, Harpur, 
Hakstian, Forth & Hart, 1990). This has led to it being referred to as the ‘gold standard’in 
psychopathy research (Vitacco, Neumann & Jackson., 2005).  
 
However, the PCL-R is not without limitations. One key limitation is that it was designed to 
assess psychopathy within criminal or forensic psychiatric settings, rather than in community 
settings. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, an individual can only score 
above threshold on the PCL-R and receive a diagnosis of psychopathy if they have engaged 
in criminal activity. However, it has been argued that criminal or antisocial behaviour is a 
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symptom, or “downstream correlate”of psychopathy, rather than a diagnostic criterion 
(Skeem & Cooke, 2010). Thus, these behaviours may represent an aspect of the psychopathic 
profile, but they are not specific to psychopathy (Cooke & Michie, 2001; Cooke, Michie, 
Hart & Clark, 2004).  
 
Secondly, the emphasis that the PCL-R places upon behavioural aspects of psychopathy is 
thought to underplay the emotional and interpersonal contributions (Blackburn, 2007). As a 
result, people with profound emotional and interpersonal difficulties, who do not have a 
history of antisocial behaviour, are unlikely to meet the PCL-R threshold for psychopathy. 
This is particularly problematic since the emotional and interpersonal components of 
psychopathy are thought to be more diagnostically useful and more specific to the construct 
of psychopathy (Skeem & Cooke, 2010).  
 
Thirdly, the PCL-R fails to account for the vast proportion of people with psychopathy who 
are not institutionalised, and who are likely to function successfully outside of prison 
(Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). Research in relation to 
the ‘successful psychopath’is increasingly recognised as an important line of inquiry (e.g. 
Mullins-Sweatt, Glover, Derefinko, Miller & Widiger, 2010; Gao & Raine, 2010; Hall & 
Benning, 2006). Successful psychopaths may engage in behaviours that are not formally 
illegal, but that nonetheless breach social norms and violate the rights of others. They may 
achieve personal or professional successes by using covert and nonviolent means (Gao & 
Raine, 2010), but typically at the expense of friends, family and colleagues (Hall & Benning, 
2006). Thus, the manifestation of psychopathic traits may be either adaptive (successful 
psychopaths) or maladaptive (incarcerated, unsuccessful psychopaths). This is consistent 
with the evidence to suggest that psychopathic traits may be advantageous in certain 
professions. For instance, people with psychopathy have been considered to be shrewd 
businessmen and women (Babiak & Hare, 2006), and research has shown that psychopathy 
is more prevalent in corporate samples than in community samples (Babiak, Neumann & 
Hare, 2010). People with psychopathy also tend to excel in fields such as surgery and law 
(Dutton, 2012), which is thought to be linked to the capacity to remain calm, unemotional 
and detached. 
 
Taken together, although the PCL-R has had a significant impact on psychopathy research, 
the findings may have limited scope for translating into the general population (Hall 
&Benning, 2006). Conducting research within the general population represents an 
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important opportunity to broaden the current conceptualisation of psychopathy without the 
potentially confounding influence of criminality (Kirkman, 2002). 
 
1.5.3 Continuum Approach 
Another key limitation of the PCL-R is that the diagnosis of psychopathy is binary; 
individuals are judged to be either psychopathic or non-psychopathic on the basis of whether 
or not their scores reach a particular cut-off point. However, there is increasing evidence to 
suggest that psychopathy is better conceptualised as the extreme end of range of personality 
traits lying on a continuum (e.g. Hare & Neumann, 2008; Marcus, John & Edens, 2004). 
Thus, a substantial body of recent research has investigated psychopathy by comparing 
groups high and low in psychopathic traits (e.g. Long & Titone, 2007; Salnaitis, Baker, 
Holland & Welsh, 2011; Anderson, Stanford, Wan & Young, 2011; Gordon, Baird & End, 
2013). 
 
A number of self-report measures have been developed in order to measure psychopathic 
personality traits. Two commonly used questionnaires are the Levenson Primary and 
Secondary Psychopathy Scale (LPSP; Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995) and the Self-
Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP; Hare, 1985). These tools were designed to reflect the two-
factor structure PCL-R. They thus contain questions pertaining firstly to 
emotional/interpersonal characteristics such as low empathy and narcissism, and secondly 
to behavioural characteristics relating to violence and lifestyle choices. Whilst the LSPS and 
SRP do adopt a continuum approach and examine psychopathy in the general population, 
research as suggested that these measures do not adequately tap into the core emotional and 
interpersonal components of psychopathy (e.g. Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006; Williams & 
Paulhus, 2003; Benning, Patrick, Salekin & Leistico, 2005).   
 
One tool that is thought to address this limitation is the Psychopathic Personality Inventory 
(PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). This is a self-report questionnaire containing 187 
statements on a 4-point, Likert-type scale ranging from ‘false’to ‘true’.  Higher PPI scores 
indicate a greater level of psychopathy, and the total score is a measure of global psychopathy. 
This total score may be broken down into 8 subscales, each of which pertains to a different 
component of psychopathy: (1) Machiavellian egocentricity; (2) social potency; (3) 
coldheartedness; (4) carefree nonplanfulness; (5) fearlessness; (6) blame externalisation; (7) 
impulsive nonconformity, and (8) stress immunity.  
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These subscales broadly cohere with the characteristics that were considered to be important 
to the construct of psychopathy by Cleckley (1976) and Hare (1991). Factor analysis has 
revealed that these subscales can be classified into two factors (PPI-1 and PPI-2; Benning, 
Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen & Krueger, 2003). In contrast with the measures described above, 
these factors are thought to adequately map onto the emotional/interpersonal and the 
behavioural components of psychopathy. Some concerns have been raised about the 
reliability and validity of PPI-2 (Miller & Lynam, 2012). Nonetheless, PPI-1 and the total 
score have been found to have strong internal consistency, test-retest reliability (Lilienfeld & 
Andrews, 1996), convergent validity and criterion validity (Miller & Lynam, 2012). The PPI 
is also significantly correlated with the PCL-R (Poythress, Edens & Lilienfeld, 1998). 
 
One important strength of this measure is that it was validated in a non-institutionalised 
sample and is considered to be an appropriate measure of psychopathic traits in the general 
population. Thus, as a tool that measures psychopathic traits along a continuum within the 
general population, the PPI addresses both of the PCL-R’s limitations reviewed above. All 
studies in the present thesis screened participants for psychopathic traits with a short form 
of the PPI (PPI-SF; Lilienfeld & Hess, 2001). This 56-item subset of the PPI has been found 
to have good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .85) and correlates well with the full 
version of the PPI (r=.90; Lilienfeld & Hess, 2001).  
 
1.6 SUMMARY 
 
In summary, psychopathy is a multifaceted disorder characterised by deficits in emotional 
processing, difficulties with interpersonal relationships and a propensity for antisocial 
behaviour. It is associated with substantial costs, both for individuals and for society. 
Diagnosis presents significant challenges; whilst people with psychopathy are thought to 
represent a subset of those diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, there are no 
clinical diagnostic criteria specific to the construct of psychopathy. As a result, clinical 
settings and research studies typically use Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist as a diagnostic tool. 
However, this tool is thought to overemphasise the contribution of antisocial behaviour, and 
to underplay the emotional and interpersonal aspects of psychopathy. It may not be 
appropriate for non-institutionalised populations, and may provide limited insights into 
successful, adaptive manifestations of psychopathy. Thus, alternative measures such as the 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory have been developed in order to measure psychopathic 
traits in the general population. This measure is also in keeping with the increasingly 
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dominant conceptualisation of psychopathy as a collection of normally distributed 
personality traits lying on a continuum. In view of this conceptualisation, the studies in the 
present thesis adopted a continuum approach in order to compare groups high and low in 
psychopathic personality traits in the general population.  
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Chapter 2: Aetiological models 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
What causes psychopathy? And what are the mechanisms that give rise to the characteristic 
emotional, interpersonal and behavioural deficits? When considering causation, the 
contributions of genes and environment, or nature versus nurture, should be taken into 
account. These causal factors can in turn lead to changes in the structure and function of the 
brain. These brain changes may result in differences in broad faculties such as cognition and 
emotion which are thought to underpin psychopathic traits. Thus, there may be a complex 
pathway from causal factors to psychopathy (see Figure 2.1).  
 
The present chapter will focus on psychopathic aetiology, considering each aspect of this 
pathway. The postulated genetic and environmental causes will be reviewed. Since 
psychopathy has been linked to changes in brain function, cognition and emotion, these 
three aspects will be reviewed in turn. Finally, the evidence in relation to remediation will be 
briefly discussed.  
 
Figure 2.1: Pathway from causal factors to psychopathy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 GENETIC BASIS OF PSYCHOPATHY 
 
Increasingly, research has been conducted in order to investigate the potential genetic 
contributions to psychopathy. However, this presents a significant challenge, since the 
disorder is characterised by a complex range of traits and is unlikely to be entirely 
underpinned by one gene, or even by a small number of genes (Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 2005). 
Instead there may be genes associated with specific traits that increase the risk of developing 
psychopathy; this genetic predisposition may be in turn mediated by environmental factors 
(Plomin, DeFries McClearn & McGuffin, 2008). Two methods are commonly used in 
Genes Cognition 
Psychopathy Brain 
function 
Environment Emotion 
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behavioural genetics in order to disentangle genetic and environmental contributions to 
complex disorders such as psychopathy: molecular approaches and twin studies. 
 
Molecular approaches involve techniques such as linkage analysis and allelic association 
(Plomin et al., 2008). These methods are used to screen the human genome and identify 
candidate genes, variants of which result in diverging patterns of behaviour. A number of 
fMRI studies have linked genes involved in serotonin transportation with amygdala activity 
in response to threat-related stimuli such as fearful and angry faces (Hariri, Mattay, Tessitore 
et al., 2002; Hariri, Drabant, Munoz et al., 2005; Hariri & Holmes, 2006, Brown & Hariri, 
2006; Finger, Marsh, Buzas et al., 2006). Other studies have posited that the genes that 
encode for serotonin metabolism modulate aggressive behaviour (Popova, 2006; Raine, 
2008). Further research work has also shown an association between specific genes and 
impulsive, sensation-seeking behaviour (Benjamin, Li, Patterson et al., 1996; Ebstein, 
Novick, Umansky et al., 1996) and substance abuse (Lovinger & Crabbe, 2005). This work 
suggests that psychopathic traits, such as aggression and emotion dysfunction, may be 
partially underpinned by specific genes. 
 
Turning to twin studies, this approach aims to separate the contributions of genes, shared 
environment, and non-shared environment. Thus, twin studies compare monozygotic 
(identical) twins, who share 100% of their genes, with dizygotic (fraternal) same-sex twins, 
who share 50% of their genes.There may be some subtle differences in shared environment 
for these two groups, particularly in view of the similarity in physical appearance for 
monozygotic twins. Nonetheless, by recruiting large samples of twins in which each pair has 
shared a womb, is the same age and has been raised simultaneously, the shared environmental 
influences are thought to be comparable (Plomin et al., 2008). This means that if the 
monozygotic pair of twins are more similar to one another than the dizygotic pair, this is 
likely to reflect an increased genetic contribution. Twin studies have suggested that antisocial 
behaviour is largely heritable (e.g. Rhee & Waldman, 2002). Moreover, one study compared 
groups of antisocial children and found that antisocial behaviour was under considerable 
genetic influence, but only in the subset of children presenting with callous-unemotional 
traits (Viding, Blair, Moffitt & Plomin, 2005). Similar results have emerged with adolescent 
samples (Larsson, Andershed & Lichtenstein, 2006). Other work has found that 
monozygotic twin pairs have PPI scores that are more highly correlated than dizygotic twin 
pairs (Blonigen, Carlson & Patrick, 2004). Twin studies have also suggested that genes may 
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influence people’s empathic emotional responses to others (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson & 
Emde, 1992; Davis, Luce & Fraus, 1994; Rushton, 2004; Knafo & Plomin, 2006).  
 
Taken together, the research evidence suggests that the characteristics associated with 
psychopathy may be largely driven by genetic factors (Larsson et al., 2006; Blair et al., 2005). 
Nonetheless, psychopathology is typically thought to arise from an interplay between genes 
and environment (e.g. Tsuang, Bar, Stone & Faraone, 2004). Thus, the potential role of 
environmental factors in the development of psychopathy will now be considered.  
 
2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
 
To what extent is psychopathy caused by the environment in which people develop? There 
is a substantial body of literature linking various early environmental stressors with antisocial 
behaviour later in life. This evidence has focused on three key factors: birth complications, 
early relationships, and early adversity.  
 
With respect to birth complications, studies have shown that babies who experience anoxia, 
forceps delivery or pre-eclampsia, all of which can in some cases cause brain damage, are 
more likely to behave violently as adults (e.g. Raine, 2002). However, it is unclear whether 
birth complications are associated with psychopathy, or only with the antisocial aspects of 
the disorder. Moreover, Blair et al. (2005) claim that birth complications may give rise to 
hostile, emotional reactions to triggering events (reactive aggression) but not necessarily to 
controlled, premeditated, goal-oriented antisocial actions (instrumental aggression). By 
contrast, the evidence suggests that psychopathy is associated with instrumental rather than 
reactive aggression (e.g. Glenn & Raine, 2009). There is thus a lack of evidence implicating 
birth complications as causally involved in the range of deficits associated with psychopathy.  
 
With respect to early relationships, attachment theory posits that children need to develop a 
secure bond with their primary caregiver in order to form meaningful relationships later in 
life (Bowlby, 1982). Psychopathy has been linked with difficulty in forming these attachments 
(e.g. Hare, 1991) and difficulties in interpersonal relationships are considered to be a core 
component. Moreover, it has been argued that insecure attachments lead to an incapacity to 
respond empathically to others, which in turn leads to antisocial behaviour (Blair et al., 2005). 
Thus, studies have found a relationship between unhealthy, insecure attachments in infancy 
and aggressive behaviours and violent offending (Saltaris, 2002; Lyons-Ruth, 1996). 
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However, it is thought that the emotional dysfunction characteristic of psychopathy may be 
more likely to give rise to attachment difficulties than to result from them (Blair et al., 2005). 
Thus, whilst there is most likely an association between psychopathy and early attachments, 
the extent to which insecure attachments are causal is unclear.  
 
Turning to early adversity, this includes factors such as parental antisocial behaviour, neglect, 
maltreatment and inconsistent discipline (e.g. Blair et al., 2005). To what extent is early 
adversity a psychosocial risk factor for the development of psychopathy? The literature is 
somewhat inconsistent. Some studies have found that early adversity predicts higher PCL-R 
scores (e.g. Koivisto & Haapsala, 1996; Marshall & Cooke, 1999; Graham, Kimonis, 
Wasserman & Kline, 2012). One study found that childhood maltreatment was more 
common in psychopathic offenders than in non-psychopathic offenders or in non-offenders 
(Kolla, Malcolm, Attard et al., 2013). However, this study also found that high PCL-R scores 
were associated with instrumental aggression, whereas childhood maltreatment was 
associated with reactive aggression. This led the authors to conclude that instrumental 
aggression was specific to psychopathy, but that psychopathic individuals could also display 
reactive aggression when they had experienced childhood maltreatment. This is further 
supported by a study of antisocial behaviour in children which found that early adversity was 
linked to aggressive acts for those without callous-unemotional traits, but not for those with 
callous-unemotional traits (Hawes, Brennan & Dadds, 2009). Finally, one study drew a 
distinction between ‘successful’and ‘unsuccessful’ psychopathy. ‘Unsuccessful psychopaths’, 
who were classified according to whether they had a prior criminal conviction, had a higher 
incidence of childhood maltreatment than ‘successful psychopaths’, who did not have a prior 
conviction (Gao, Raine & Schug, 2011).  
 
The postulated relationship between childhood maltreatment and unsuccessful psychopathy 
is also consistent with a body of literature that differentiates between primary and secondary 
subtypes of psychopathy (e.g. Karpman, 1941). Whilst both subtypes present as 
phenotypically similar, primary psychopathy is thought to be underpinned predominantly by 
genetic factors, whereas secondary psychopathy is thought to arise following traumatic 
environmental experiences such as childhood abuse or neglect.. There is also research 
evidence suggesting that as a result of early experiences of maltreatment, people with 
secondary psychopathy present with greater trait anxiety, social withdrawal, and emotional 
disturbance than those with primary psychopathy (Skeem, Johansson, Andershed, Kerr & 
Louden, 2007). Finally, it has been posited that people with primary psychopathy tend to 
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demonstrate narcissistic personality traits such as dominance, grandiosity, egocentricity and 
entitlement (Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld & Cale, 2003). By contrast, borderline 
personality traits such as hostility and emotional difficulties are considered to be hallmarks 
of secondary psychopathy (Blackburn, 1996). Thus, although there is considerable overlap 
between primary and secondary psychopathic traits (e.g. Porter, 1996), there are some 
distinctions between their personality profiles. This is further evidenced by studies suggesting 
that ‘Successful psychopaths’ are more likely to present with primary psychopathy (e.g. Ross 
& Rausch, 2001). For these individuals, psychopathic traits are adaptive and enable them to 
manipulate, deceive or coerce others in order to achieve their own ends. By contrast, 
institutionalised or ‘unsuccessful psychopaths’ are more likely to present with secondary 
psychopathy. People with primary versus secondary psychopathy are also thought to differ 
with respect to their remediation. As compared to ‘primary psychopaths’, ‘secondary 
psychopaths’ are thought to be more receptive to treatment, since their antisocial behaviour 
is interpreted as an adaptive response to environmental distress (Skeem et al., 2007). 
 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that an interplay of both genes and environment may 
predispose people to develop psychopathy. To paraphrase, “genes load the gun, and 
environment pulls the trigger”. However, research investigating environmental factors has 
predominantly focused on the development of antisocial behaviour. A sufficiently extreme 
environment is likely to lead to a range of difficulties later in life, including psychopathic 
traits. Nonetheless, further research should be conducted in order to elucidate what specific 
environmental factors might cause the emotional dysfunction that is central to the construct 
of psychopathy.   
 
Thus far, a range of factors thought to cause psychopathy has been considered. These factors 
may manifest at the level of brain function, cognition, and emotion. These are not competing 
theories, but rather different perspectives from which the deficits associated with psychopath 
could be explained. These perspectives will now be considered in turn.  
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2.4 BRAIN FUNCTION AND PSYCHOPATHY 
 
The combination of genetic and environmental influences that cause psychopathy may lead 
to observable differences in brain function. A substantial body of evidence has implicated 
specific brain regions and brain neurochemistry (see Blair, 2001; Blair et al., 2005; Michael, 
Minzenberg & Siever, 2006; Raine & Yang, 2006; Blair, 2006 for a more extensive review). 
The evidence has consistently pointed to two regions in particular, the prefrontal cortex and 
the amygdala. Turning firstly to the prefrontal cortex, this region is located in the most 
anterior portion of the brain and has extensive connections with other brain regions. It is 
considered to be the most evolved brain region, and has been associated with high-level 
cognitive control over thoughts, actions and emotions (Arnsten, 2009). The prefrontal cortex 
has been conceptually divided into a number of subregions, each of which is thought to be 
involved with particular cognitive processes (Siddiqui, Chatterjee, Kumar, Siddiqui & Goyal, 
2008). For instance, some studies have linked the lateral prefrontal cortex with working 
memory (Duncan & Owen, 2000), with adapting behaviour in response to task demands 
(Macdonald, Cohen, Stenger & Carter, 2000) and with representing past events, current goals 
and future predictions (Miller, 2000). Other studies have linked the medial prefrontal cortex 
with the capacity to attend to demanding cognitive tasks, to spatial memory and to conflict 
resolution (Spinella, Yang & Lester, 2004).  
 
The prefrontal subregion of particular interest in relation to psychopathy is the orbitofrontal 
cortex (e.g. Damasio, 2000). This region is thought to play a role in representing and 
anticipating rewards and punishments in relation to actions (Schoenbaum, Takahashi, Liu & 
McDannald, 2011). Studies have shown that lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex can impair 
the capacity to respond appropriately to aversive conditioning (e.g. Rolls, 2004). This has in 
turn been linked to poor impulse control, to risky decision-making, to irresponsibility, and 
to diminished emotional responding (Winstanley, Theobald, Cardinal & Robbins, 2004; 
Hornak, Bramham, Rolls et al., 2003).  
 
Many of the impairments seen following orbitofrontal damage are consistent with those seen 
in psychopathy (e.g. Peschardt, Morton & Blair, 2003; Hare, 1993; Blair et al., 2005). Thus, a 
range of studies has been conducted in order to investigate orbitofrontal cortex function in 
psychopathic individuals more directly. For instance, some studies have used a gambling task 
that has been associated with orbitofrontal function and found that psychopathic 
participants consistently made disadvantageous choices (Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard and 
Blair, 2002; Blair, Colledge & Mitchell, 2001). This was linked to a specific deficit in adapting 
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behaviour in response to negative feedback (i.e. losing money), rather than to a general 
inability to adapt behaviour and apply rules flexibly. Studies that provide evidence in support 
of this selective deficit have used tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and 
demonstrated that psychopathic individuals are able to learn new rules and adapt their 
responses accordingly (Hare, 1984; LaPierre, Braun & Hodgins, 1995). Research evidence 
has also found that both people with psychopathy and those with orbitofrontal lesions show 
impaired empathic responding to others compared to control participants or those with non-
frontal lesions (Shamay-Tsoory, Hariri, Aharon-Peretz & Levkovitz, 2010). Finally, 
neuroimaging work has found that people high in psychopathic traits show decreased 
orbitofrontal cortex activity in response to emotionally provocative stimuli (Blair, 2010).  
 
Turning to the amygdala, this is a limbic structure located deep within the temporal lobes 
that is thought to play an important role in emotional processing (Amunts, Kedo, Kindler et 
al., 2005). It is thought to be particularly involved in the acquisition and expression of fear 
(e.g. Davis, 1992; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992). The amygdala is also thought to play a role in 
the recognition of fearful facial expressions and increased activity has been found in response 
to threatening faces and situations (e.g. Blair, 2007). Moreover, one study found that the 
severity of social phobia symptoms was positively correlated with amygdala activity (Phan, 
Fitzgerald, Nathan & Tancer, 2006). A number of studies have posited that the emotional 
deficits in psychopathy may be associated with abnormalities in the amygdala (e.g. Blair, 
2007). For instance, studies have shown that psychopathic individuals demonstrate reduced 
amygdala activity in response to emotional stimuli (Kiehl, Smith, Hare et al., 2001) and to 
aversive conditioning (Birbaumer, Veit, Lotze et al., 2005). Other studies have found that 
participants with high PPI scores showed reduced amygdala activity in response to emotional 
facial expressions (Gordon, Baird & End, 2004). In addition to functional changes in 
amygdala activity, research studies have also found that psychopathic individuals had 
structural abnormalities in the amygdala in comparison with control participants (Yang, 
Raine Narr, Colletti & Toga, 2009; Boccardi, Frisoni, Hare et al., 2011). These structural 
abnormalities may even be exacerbated for ‘unsuccessful psychopaths’as compared to 
‘successful psychopaths’ (Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga & Narr, 2010).  
 
This research evidence suggests that abnormalities in the amygdala and the resulting deficits 
in fear processing and reduced aversion to punishment may contribute towards impaired 
decision-making and behavioural control for those with psychopathy. Reduced aversion to 
punishment may mean that they are less deterred by the prospect of imprisonment, which 
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may in turn make them more prone to criminal convictions (Yang et al., 2010). Finally, there 
is a substantial literature demonstrating interconnections between the amygdala and the 
orbitofrontal cortex (e.g. Amaral, Price, Pitkanen & Carmichael, 1992; Carmichael & Price, 
1995). On the basis of this, Blair et al (2005) suggested that in psychopathy, orbitofrontal 
cortex development may be disrupted as a result of a lack of afferent input from the 
amygdala.  
 
Taken together, there is significant body of evidence to suggest that there may be differences 
in brain function in people with psychopathy individuals, and that the amygdala and the 
orbitofrontal cortex may be particularly implicated. It is nonetheless important to note three 
caveats. Firstly, the literature reviewed here represents the most consistent research findings, 
but brain structure, activity and connectivity is highly complex. Psychopathic deficits are thus 
unlikely to be confined to abnormality in two circumscribed regions. Secondly, psychopathy 
is a multifaceted disorder and people with psychopathy may therefore present with different 
manifestations that vary in severity. They are thus unlikely to share identical patterns of brain 
activity and structural abnormalities (e.g. Yang et al., 2010). Finally, any putative differences 
in brain function are not necessarily causal; they may instead result from lifestyle choices. 
For instance, substance-abuse is common in psychopathy (e.g. Smith & Newman, 1990), and 
has been linked to impaired performance on tasks assessing orbitofrontal cortex functioning 
(Bechara, Dolan, Denburg et al., 2001; Rogers & Robbins, 2001). Despite these caveats, the 
weight of the evidence does suggest that the deficits in psychopathy may be interpreted from 
the perspective of abnormal brain function. These deficits may also be interpreted from the 
perspective of cognitive dysfunction, which will now be considered.   
 
2.5 COGNITION IN PSYCHOPATHY  
 
A number of cognitive theories may have been postulated to account for psychopathy. Two 
particularly prominent theoretical frameworks have focused on the role of cognitive biases 
and of executive dysfunction. Turning to cognitive biases, according to a theory proposed 
by Lazarus (1991), the experience of emotion is determined by cognitive appraisal. This 
appraisal involves evaluating a situation in terms of its relationship to ‘schemata’.  These are 
personal beliefs, values, relationships, goals and expectations that are based around personal 
experience. The outcome of this appraisal determines the nature of the emotion. For 
instance, consider the following example. A woman in her early twenties boarded a bus late 
at night. A man boarded the bus at the next stop and sat on the seat directly beside the young 
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woman, despite the fact that the bus was almost completely empty. He stared at her for 
extended periods of time, and she thought she could feel his hand against her leg. The woman 
may have rapidly appraised the situation in terms of her knowledge and beliefs about the 
world and herself. She may have come to the following conclusions: (a) late-night travel can 
be unsafe; (b) there was nobody else on the bus; (c) the man was behaving suspiciously and 
may have posed a threat, and (d) she was likely to be physically weaker than him and did not 
have any sort of weapon; she would thus most likely be easily overpowered in a fight. 
Following this appraisal, the woman was likely to have experienced fear.  
 
Since schemata are based upon personal experience, they may be subject to cognitive biases 
or distortions (Blackburn, 2005). These distortions include overgeneralising on the basis of 
one experience or only focusing on the negative aspects of a situation. Cognitive distortions 
have been posited as a mechanism by which emotional dysfunction arises. Thus, Blackburn 
(2006) proposes that psychopathy results from specific maladaptive beliefs about the self and 
the world, such as “I am stronger than others and deserve to succeed more”, “people are 
weak and stupid and should be exploited”or “cheating will help me to get ahead”.  These 
can give rise to distorted self-evaluations and attributions about causality, and reduced 
empathy for others (Fernandez & Marshall, 2003). Some studies have found that in 
comparison with control participants, psychopathic individuals reported different beliefs and 
made different causal attributions about others, and concluded that this may relate to 
cognitive distortions (e.g. Widom, 1976; Klass, 1980; Serin, 1991). However, there is a paucity 
of evidence to suggest that deviant schemas predict deviant behaviour (Blackburn, 2007), 
and few studies have examined psychopathic schemata directly. Moreover, the key 
assumption of this framework is that cognitive appraisals lead to emotional responses 
(Lazarus, 1991). However, there is conflicting evidence suggesting that emotion occurs as an 
automatic response to a triggering event, and that cognitive reasoning is constructed post-
hoc if necessary (Haidt, 2001). Taken together, there is some evidence suggesting that 
psychopathic traits, such as reduced empathy and a propensity for antisocial behaviour, could 
be explained by cognitive distortions, but further empirical work is needed.  
 
Turning to executive function, this refers to the regulation and control of cognitive processes 
(e.g. Elliott, 2003). This is thought to be involved in active behavioural control as opposed 
to automatic or habitual responses. Thus, situations that involve planning, decision-making, 
error-correction, troubleshooting, novel sequences of actions, or those that require strong, 
habitual responses to be overcome are thought to require executive rather than automatic 
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processes (Norman & Shallice, 1986). For instance, a familiar route to work may be relatively 
automatic and require little attention or advance planning. By contrast, taking a new route to 
work, updating a familiar route in light of unexpected roadworks, or taking public transport 
on a day that the car needs repairs may all involve executive function. There is some debate 
in the literature with respect to the precise number of executive functions (e.g. Baddeley, 
1986; Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Petrides, 2000). However, the evidence broadly indicates the 
involvement of some key skills, such as the capacity to shift attention between tasks 
(cognitive flexibility), monitoring and updating information (working memory) and 
behavioural control (inhibition; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson et al., 2000).   
 
Whilst theories have not explicitly linked psychopathy to executive dysfunction, it is 
noteworthy that psychopathic tendencies include features such as impulsivity, poor 
behavioural control and failure to plan ahead (e.g. Hare, 1991). All of these features could be 
accounted for by executive dysfunction. Moreover, as described above, the prefrontal cortex 
has been extensively linked to executive function (e.g. Stuss & Knight, 2002), and the orbital 
portion of the prefrontal cortex is thought to function abnormally in psychopathic people 
(Mitchell et al., 2002; Blair et al., 2001; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010; Blair, 2010). It is thus 
important to consider potential executive deficits in relation to psychopathy.  
 
Neuropsychological paradigms have been developed in order to tap into the aspects of 
executive function referred to above. Cognitive flexibility has been examined using tasks 
such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Trail-Making test. These tasks require 
participants to detect, understand and adapt to new rules. Studies have found those with 
psychopathy to be unimpaired on these tasks (Hare, 1984; LaPierre, Braun & Hodgins, 1995; 
Pham, Vanderstukken, Philippot & Vanderlinen, 2003). Some studies have recruited 
executive tasks and found that people with psychopathy fail to adapt their behavioural 
strategy in response to negative feedback (e.g. losing money in a gambling task). However, 
this is thought to relate to insensitivity to punishment rather than cognitive inflexibility 
(Mitchell et al., 2002; Blair et al., 2001).  
 
With respect to working memory, this has been examined using tasks that require participants 
to manipulate information that they are temporarily holding in mind. For instance, one 
measure of working memory often used in the research literature is the ‘digits 
backward’subtest from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 
1997). This task involves participants listening to sequences of numbers and repeating them 
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in reverse order. Very limited work has examined working memory capacity in psychopathy. 
However, one study found that high PPI scores were not associated with impaired 
performance on the ‘digits backward’test (Sellbom & Verona, 2007).  
 
Finally, inhibition has been examined using tasks such as the Stroop colour-word 
interference test, in which participants read colour-words (e.g. red, blue, green) printed in 
incongruently coloured ink (e.g. the word ‘red’written in blue ink). This incongruity is 
thought to interfere with the capacity to state the colour of the ink and to ignore the colour 
word. This interference results in slower response times, whereas failures of inhibition result 
in higher error rates. Despite the fact that psychopathy is associated with impaired 
behavioural inhibition (e.g. Hare, 1991), the evidence in relation to inhibition as measured 
by executive tasks is mixed. One study reported that those with psychopathy make more 
errors on the Stroop test than control participants (Pham et al., 2003). By contrast, other 
studies have found psychopathic performance comparable to control participants in terms 
of both the number of errors and the level of interference (Dvorak-Bertsch, Sadeh, Glass, 
Thornton & Newman, 2007; Hiatt, Schmitt & Newman, 2004; Smith, Arnett & Newman, 
1992).  
 
Taken together, the evidence in relation to executive deficits in psychopathy is somewhat 
mixed and no comprehensive executive theory has been formalised. Moreover, it is unclear 
whether deficits in inhibition truly represent executive dysfunction. For instance, inhibition 
may occur as a way of avoiding negative experiences. A range of studies has found that 
aversive conditioning and sensitivity to punishment is impaired in psychopathy (Peschardt 
et al., 2003; Blair et al., 2004). Thus, psychopathic individuals may primarily lack the 
motivation rather than the capacity to inhibit their behaviour. The evidence reviewed 
therefore suggests that psychopathy is unlikely to be adequately explained from a cognitive 
perspective; emotional accounts of psychopathy will therefore now be considered. 
 
2.6 EMOTIONAL THEORIES OF PSYCHOPATHY  
 
In view of the emotional dysfunction associated with psychopathy, a wide range of emotional 
theories have been put forward. However, three theoretical frameworks may be particularly 
pertinent. Thus, the fear dysfunction, violence inhibition mechanism and lack of emotional 
empathy hypotheses will be reviewed in turn. 
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Proponents of the fear dysfunction hypothesis (e.g. Patrick, 1994; Lykken, 1995; Cleckley, 
1976) posit that psychopathic tendencies arise as a result of a deficiency in the processing 
and modulation of fear. This model assumes that moral socialisation and the development 
of prosocial behaviour occur as a result of punishment (e.g. Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989). 
Thus, people are punished in response to particular actions, experience fear, and no longer 
engage in the actions that led to the punishment. By contrast, people with psychopathy are 
thought not to experience fear in response to punishment and may thus continue to engage 
in actions that lead to it. This is supported by the empirical studies of psychopathic responses 
to punishment reviewed above (Peschardt et al., 2003; Blair et al, 2004). The fear dysfunction 
hypothesis is also supported by the evidence suggesting that in psychopathy, brain regions 
associated with fear processing, such as the amygdala, are thought to function abnormally 
(e.g. Blair, 2010; Kiehl et al., 2003; Birbaumer et al., 2005’Boccardi et al., 2011). Moreover, 
fearful stimuli have been shown to elicit diminished physiological responses in comparison 
to control participants (e.g. Lykken, 1957; Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997; Vaidyanathan, 
Hall, Patrick & Bernat, 2011; Anderson, Stanford, Wan & Young, 2011).  
 
An account of psychopathy in terms of fear dysfunction is also consistent with a broad 
biopsychological theory of personality. Gray (1970) proposed that for most people, 
behaviour is inhibited in response to negative stimuli such as anticipated punishment or 
boredom. Conversely, behaviour is activated in response to positive stimuli such as 
prospective rewards. By contrast, psychopathic individuals are thought to seek reward 
without fear of punishment (Gray, 1970).  
 
The fear dysfunction hypothesis may therefore account for the emotional dysfunction and 
associated behavioural problems that characterise psychopathy. However, the core 
assumption of this hypothesis is that moral behaviour and socialisation develop as a result 
of punishment and conditioned fear responses. This assumption has been called into 
question (Blackburn, 1988; Blair & Morton, 1995), since the developmental literature has 
suggested that moral socialisation is instead achieved by fostering empathy (Hoffman, 1984).  
 
Thus, parenting that draws a child’s attention to the impact of their actions on others is 
thought to be more effective than harsh, punitive or authoritarian parenting methods that 
rely on punishment (e.g. Baumrind, 1983; Blair et al., 2005). This latter parental style may in 
fact have an adverse influence on moral socialisation (Brody & Shaffer, 1982), which 
contradicts the fear dysfunction hypothesis. In view of this contradiction, psychopathy my 
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not be adequately accounted for by the fear dysfunction hypothesis. Theoretical frameworks 
that focus on the role of empathy may be more appropriate.  
 
The violence inhibition mechanism (VIM) is one such theoretical framework. It was 
developed in acknowledgement of the evidence reviewed above suggesting that empathy is 
important for the development of moral socialisation. Blair (1995) noted that many non-
human social animals are thought to have a mechanism that regulates aggression. This 
mechanisms is thought to mediate responsiveness to distress cues in other animals. For 
instance, Lorenz (1966) observed that when dogs are attacked, they often bare their throats 
as a sign of submission; this results in the opponent ceasing their attack. Blair (1995) 
proposed VIM as a functionally similar mechanism in humans. Thus, when people perceive 
non-verbal distress cues (such as facial expression or the sound of tears), this triggers an 
empathic, emotional response. This may in turn contribute to behavioural change (such as 
withdrawal of aggression or intervening to help).  
 
This empathic mechanism was posited to be involved in the development of morality. In 
particular, VIM was thought to be a prerequisite for the development of a) moral emotions 
such as sympathy, guilt and remorse, b) the inhibition of violent action, and c) the capacity 
to distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions (see Chapter 4 for further 
review of moral reasoning). Impairments in these domains have been extensively 
demonstrated by psychopathic individuals; an impairment in VIM has thus been posited to 
contribute to the development of psychopathy (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 2005). Moreover, 
VIM is consistent with the literature reviewed above pertaining to a lack of physiological 
responsivity, and the emergence of instrumental aggression (Blair et al., 2005). Finally, VIM 
is consistent with other theoretical frameworks that highlight the importance of emotional 
processes for guiding behaviour (e.g. Damasio, 1994).  
 
However, there are some limitations. VIM describes empathic responding to non-verbal cues 
denoting distress, such as vocal tone or facial expression. This corresponds to one aspect of 
social behaviour but may not account for richer, more complex social cues. These might 
include social information pertaining to awkwardness, discomfort, an understanding of 
others needs and preferences and the subtle implications of what people say or do. Moreover, 
one of the most intriguing aspects of psychopathy is the capacity to appear charming, likeable 
and funny (Cleckley, 1976) whilst behaving antisocially and being motivated primarily by self-
interest. This paradoxical presentation is thought to underpin the capacity for manipulation 
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and trickery in addition to intimidation and aggression. Whilst VIM accounts for the 
proclivity for antisocial behaviour associated with psychopathy, it does not necessarily 
account for this paradox. Nonetheless, VIM offers an important theoretical contribution 
which construes psychopathy as a lack of empathy. In order to account fully for the broad 
range of psychopathic traits, this empathic deficit should be examined more closely.  
 
Lack of empathy is considered to be a hallmark of psychopathy (e.g. Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 
1993). However empathy is thought to comprise two distinct components, cognitive and 
emotional. Cognitive empathy refers to the ability to represent the internal states of others 
(e.g. Frith & Happe, 1994; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf & Convit, 2007). The term is 
synonymous with concepts such as theory of mind and mentalising. Put simply, cognitive 
empathy relates to the capacity to understand what others might be thinking or feeling. By 
contrast, emotional empathy refers to the tendency to respond emotionally to the internal 
states of others, to ‘feel what they feel’ (e.g. Rolls, 1999). For instance, if a person is crying, 
understanding that this signifies that they are upset or in distress is thought to be 
underpinned by cognitive empathy. Resonating with their distress or feeling a corresponding 
experience of sadness is thought to be underpinned by emotional empathy.  
 
A range of tasks have been developed in order to assess cognitive empathy. For instance, 
false belief paradigms require participants to recognise that others’ mental representations 
about the world may be different from their own (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983). One set of 
tasks involve participants accurately identifying facial expressions or inferring emotional state 
from pictures of the eye region alone (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Raste, Hill & Plumb, 
2001). Other tasks involve reading short stories and interpreting people’s actions, intentions, 
and aspects of everyday social behaviour such as faux pas or sarcastic remarks (e.g. Channon, 
Drury, Gafson, Stern & Robinson, 2012; Channon, Pellijeff & Rule, 2005). Extensive work 
has found psychopathic individuals to be unimpaired on tasks measuring cognitive empathy 
(e.g. Widom, 1978; Blair, 1996; Dolan & Fullam, 2004; Richell, Mitchell, Newman et al., 
2003). This suggests that the capacity to understand others is intact in psychopathy. This has 
been contrasted with empathy deficits in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Whilst both 
disorders have been linked with impaired social functioning (Blair, 2008), extensive evidence 
has demonstrated that cognitive empathy is impaired in ASD (e.g. Hill & Frith, 2003).  
 
Emotional empathy is most effectively assessed using tasks that directly measure autonomic 
responses to others’distress (e.g. House & Milligan, 1976, Blair, 1999; Blair et al., 2005). A 
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range of studies has found that psychopathic individuals demonstrate reduced responsivity 
to the distress of others using measures including electrodermal responses, heart rate and 
facial muscle responses (e.g. Lykken, 1957; Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997; Blair, 1999). 
The evidence relating to emotional empathy in ASD is somewhat mixed. Research has 
suggested that individuals with ASD may be able to emotionally empathise with others, but 
only if others’internal states are made explicit (e.g. Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Roberts& Channon, 
2014). For instance, in relation to the crying example above, people with ASD may feel upset 
in response to the person crying if their distress is clearly pointed out. By contrast, people 
with psychopathy may understand that the person crying is upset, but fail to respond 
emotionally. There is some experimental evidence in support of this. For instance, one study 
found that boys with psychopathic tendencies performed as well as control participants on 
measures of cognitive empathy, but reported experiencing less fear and empathy for victims 
of aggression; boys diagnosed with ASD demonstrated the opposite pattern (Jones, Happe, 
Gilbert, Burnet & Viding, 2010).  
 
Thus, psychopathy is thought to be characterised by intact cognitive empathy with impaired 
emotional empathy (e.g. Blair, 2008). In the words of Johns & Quay (1962), “they know the 
words but not the music”. This posited dissociation is thought to facilitate the associated 
capacity for manipulation (Soderstrom, 2003). This is also consistent with the evidence 
suggesting that the suppression of antisocial behaviour, the development of moral 
socialisation and the tendency to behave altruistically may all be linked to the experience of 
emotional empathy (Blair, 1995; Hoffman, 1984; Eiserberg, 2000; Batson & Powell, 2003).  
 
Taken together, a dissociation in empathy may be the most appropriate theoretical 
framework for understanding the range of deficits associated with psychopathy. Empathy 
has been postulated to drive moral socialisation (Hoffman, 2000) and prosocial behaviour 
(Batson & Powell, 2003). A lack of emotional empathy could account for the callousness and 
lack of remorse, guilt or shame that characterises people with psychopathy. By contrast, an 
intact capacity to understand the internal states of others may facilitate a propensity for 
manipulation.  
 
2.7 REMEDIATION  
 
How is psychopathy treated? Treatment approaches have typically taken place in institutional 
settings and included a range of psychological therapies, including cognitive behavioural and 
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psychodynamic approaches (Salekin, 2002; Wong & Hare, 2005). Their success is measured 
by any reduction in psychopathic offenders’recidivism rates. However, offenders with 
psychopathy are often assumed to be untreatable and thus met with ‘therapeutic pessimism’ 
(Salekin, 2002). This is because they are thought to be able to understand the consequences 
of their actions, but to lack the capacity to emotionally resonate with the victims of their 
crimes, or to experience guilt or remorse in the aftermath (e.g. Hare, 1993). Moreover, they 
are thought to be largely insensitive to punishment, and therefore may not respond to the 
threat of future incarceration or other reprisals. Thus, studies have found that treatment was 
not only largely ineffective for people with psychopathy, it may also have promoted increased 
recidivism (Harris & Rice, 2006). These offenders were also found to be less compliant and 
more disruptive during the treatment than those without psychopathy (Ogloff, Wong & 
Greenwood, 1990). 
 
In order for treatment to be successful, it is thought that the participants must freely choose 
to engage in treatment, accept personal responsibility for their role in perceived problems 
and form a good relationship with the therapist. However, psychopathic offenders engage in 
treatment because they are mandated to do so; they typically externalise blame and do not 
acknowledge their responsibility for negative outcomes, and their interpersonal difficulties 
may preclude the formation of a successful therapeutic relationship (Hemphill & Hart, 2003). 
Fundamentally, it is thought that people with psychopathy lack the motivation to change 
their behaviour. They may view lying, cheating, manipulation and intimidation as adaptive 
strategies (Harris & Rice, 2006). Arguably, treatment approaches that focus on the 
consequences for the victim may enable those with psychopathy to adopt these strategies 
more adeptly.  
 
However, there are methodological limitations associated with many of the early studies 
investigating psychopathy treatment. For instance, the use of control groups was 
inconsistent, when control participants were included they were not properly matched with 
the treatment group, and many conclusions about the efficacy of treatment were drawn on 
the basis of single case-studies (Salekin, 2002). The findings of more recent, systematic 
research into psychopathy remediation has been moderately more promising (e.g. Olver & 
Wong, 2009). This research work has involved developing treatment approaches that target 
the needs of offenders with psychopathy more directly. For instance, in view of the literature 
highlighting the importance of forming successful therapeutic relationships (Hemphill & 
Hart, 2003), it has been suggested that making a deliberate effort to strengthen this 
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therapeutic alliance at the early stages of treatment may lead to improved outcomes for 
offenders with psychopathy (Polaschek & Cross, 2010). Moreover, Skeem, Monahan & 
Mulvey (2002) suggested that increasing the frequency and intensity of treatment leads to 
improvements for those with psychopathy that were comparable to those without 
psychopathy. Finally, a range of pharmacological treatments have been postulated to 
decrease aggression and impulsivity in people with psychopathy (Vien & Breech, 2006). 
 
Psychopathy remediation has also been examined in relation to conduct-disordered children 
with callous-unemotional traits (e.g. Dadds & Rhodes, 2008). These traits are often seen as 
precursors to adult psychopathy (e.g. Frick & Viding, 2009). It is thought that children with 
callous-unemotional traits respond best to interventions that use positive reinforcement or 
reward-oriented strategies (i.e. as a treat for good behaviour), as opposed to negative 
reinforcements or punishment-oriented strategies (i.e. disciplinary action for bad behaviour; 
Viding, Fontaine & McRory, 2012). This is consistent with the literature suggesting that 
people with psychopathy are sensitive to reward, but not to punishment (e.g. Peschardt et 
al., 2003). There is also some research investigating the treatment of institutionalised 
adolescents presenting with psychopathic traits, as measured by a youth version of the PCL-
R. One study found that an intensive treatment programme focusing on the benefits of 
developing positive interpersonal relationships to replace delinquent associations and 
activities led to some behavioural improvements (Caldwell, McCormick, Umstead & Van 
Rybroek, 2007). Taken together, the research on remediation of childhood psychopathy 
suggests that the best method of treatment may be early intervention, or ‘nipping it in the 
bud’. 
 
In summary, the remediation of psychopathy is thought to present with a number of 
challenges, and people with psychopathy have therefore traditionally been met with 
therapeutic pessimism. Nonetheless, recent research evidence provides some promising 
treatment approaches that are targeted specifically at the deficits associated with 
psychopathy. These approaches suggest that increasing the intensity of treatment, and in 
particular focusing on developing therapeutic relationships may improve outcomes for 
people with psychopathy. The evidence also highlights the importance of developing early 
intervention programmes for children presenting with psychopathic traits.  
 
2.8 SUMMARY 
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The present chapter reviewed causal factors and aetiological mechanisms that are associated 
with the development of psychopathy. The research suggests that there is a substantial 
genetic contribution to psychopathy, and that environmental factors such as early adversity 
may exacerbate psychopathic symptomatology, particularly the propensity for violence. 
Extensive work has implicated the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala, brain regions 
thought to be involved in the processing of punishment and emotion. Whilst a range of 
cognitive models of psychopathy have been proposed, emotional models may account for 
the characteristic deficits more fully. In particular, the posited dissociation between cognitive 
and emotional empathy may provide a useful theoretical framework with which to interpret 
differences in social performance in individuals high versus low in psychopathic traits. Some 
work has been conducted to examine the potential remediation of psychopathy. These 
studies have traditionally found people with psychopathy to be largely resistant to treatment. 
However, more recent work has emphasised the potential for intensive treatment 
programmes, pharmacological intervention and early intervention. This has led to more 
promising findings.   
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Chapter 3: Prosocial behaviour and psychopathy 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR  
 
Prosocial behaviour describes a range of actions that are intended to benefit other people 
(Fiske, 2004). Some of these actions, such as complying with a request or sharing (Schroeder, 
Penner, Dovidio & Piliavin, 1995), may involve one helper and one recipient; other 
behaviours such as volunteer-work or charitable giving may be intended to benefit large 
groups within society (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin & Schroeder, 2004). Both the individuals or 
groups in receipt of help and those who provide help or behave prosocially are thought to 
derive significant benefits (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). For instance, prosocial behaviour has 
been associated with increases in happiness (Ellison, 1991; Trew, 2013), with life satisfaction 
(Wheeler, Gorey & Greenblatt, 1998), with self-esteem (Gecas & Burke, 1995) and with 
improved mental health (Schwartz, Bell, Meisenhelder, Ma & Reed, 2003). The present 
chapter will review the literature pertaining to the origins of prosocial behaviour, how it 
manifests, and factors that influence it. The potential influence of psychopathic traits will be 
considered in relation to each of these aspects of prosocial behaviour.  
 
3.2 ORIGINS OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
The origins of prosocial behaviour have been considered from two key perspectives, 
evolutionary and social learning theories. Evolutionary theories describe how human beings 
as a species developed prosocial behaviour, whereas social learning theories describe how 
children gradually develop to be prosocial in adulthood. Turning firstly to evolutionary 
theories, there is evidence to suggest that the environment in which human beings developed 
provided ideal conditions for prosocial tendencies to emerge (Simpson & Beckes, 2010). 
Early humans tended to live in small groups or tribes where instabilities in the surroundings 
such as competing tribes, unpredictable climate and limited food supply required tribe 
members to collaborate in order to secure food and rear children (Richardson & Boyd, 2005). 
Active participation in cooperative groups has thus been considered to be an essential 
survival strategy for early humans (Brewer & Caporeal, 1990).  
 
By contrast, it has been posited that psychopathic traits may have developed as an alternative 
evolutionary strategy (Glenn & Raine, 2009; Glenn, Kurzban & Raine, 2011). Rather than 
cooperating with others and behaving prosocially in order to survive, people with 
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psychopathy are thought to have achieved evolutionary success in a variety of other ways. 
For instance, they may have been able to attract potential mates or gain resources via 
coercion or deception. The capacity to appear superficially charming may have enabled 
people with psychopathy to escape detection or reprimand from other tribe members. 
Impulsivity, fearlessness and a lack of empathy may have allowed them to explore their 
environment without restraint, take full advantage of presenting opportunities without 
worrying about the consequences for others and develop resilience to stress, anxiety and 
depression (Glenn, Kurzban & Raine, 2011). Taken together, the evidence suggests that most 
people may behave prosocially as a result of a collaborative evolutionary strategy; this is less 
likely to be the case for those high in psychopathic traits. Nonetheless, people with 
psychopathy may be capable of demonstrating prosocial actions that benefit others but only 
when doing so results in clear benefits for the self.  
 
Turning to the social learning theory account of prosocial behaviour, this states that 
behaviours are primarily learned through observation, and may sometimes be reinforced by 
reward or punishment (Bandura, 1977). For instance, a young boy might observe his parents 
sharing toys out between him and his siblings. The boy might subsequently share his toys 
with his sibling of his own accord; if his parents were to consequently reward him for his 
sharing behaviour, the prosocial behaviour would be positively reinforced. Alternatively, if 
the boy were to snatch the toys away from the sibling, his parents might punish him; the 
antisocial behaviour of failing to share would thus be negatively reinforced. Different types 
of rewards and punishments may be effective ways of motivating prosocial behaviour at 
different stages of development. For instance, Cialdini, Baumann & Kendrick (1981) 
proposed a three-step developmental sequence whereby prosocial behaviour is motivated by 
material rewards and punishments in young children, by both material and social rewards 
and punishments (e.g. praise or reprimand) in preadolescents, and by material, social, and 
internalised rewards and punishments (e.g. self-praise or self-criticism) in adolescents and 
adults.  
 
Social learning theory has been posited to account for the development of both prosocial 
and antisocial behaviour. For instance, a range of studies has found that antisocial behaviour 
in children is associated with harsh and inconsistent discipline, a lack of parental involvement 
and minimal supervision of the child’s activities (e.g. Loeber & Dishion, 1983). Antisocial 
behaviour may thus result from a) the absence of positive role-models and a lack of 
punishment in response to transgressions, and/or b) the presence of negative role-models 
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and a lack of reward in response to prosocial actions (Patterson, DeBaryshe & Ramsay, 1989). 
For instance, if a child witnesses a parent being physically aggressive, they may be more likely 
to behave aggressively themselves. Their own aggressive behaviour may be more likely to go 
unpunished, and any demonstrations of prosocial behaviour may be more likely to go 
unrewarded.  
 
How might social learning theory account for social behaviour in psychopathy? Firstly, 
developmental factors such as parental rejection, antisocial parents, erratic discipline and 
limited parental supervision are thought to contribute not only to antisocial behaviour in 
childhood, but also to the development of psychopathy later on in life (McCord & McCord; 
1964; Farrington, 2006; Gao, Raine, Chan, Venables & Mednick, 2010). Secondly, social 
learning theory posits that both observation and reinforcement by reward and punishment 
are involved in the development of prosocial behaviour. This has implications for 
psychopathy, which is thought to be associated with intact reward processing and impaired 
punishment processing. A range of studies has found that people with psychopathy modify 
their behaviour in similar ways to control participants in response to reward but not in 
response to punishment (Peschardt, Morton & Blair, 2003; Blair, Mitchell, Leonard, Budhani, 
Peschardt & Newman, 2004). This lack of sensitivity to punishment is consistent with the 
literature suggesting that psychopathy is associated with a limited experience of fear, anxiety 
and other aversive emotions (e.g. Birbaumer, Veit, Lotze, Erb, Hermann et al., 2005; Blair, 
2001). This in turn is likely to be linked to reduced prosocial behaviour in psychopathy.  
 
3.3 MANIFESTATIONS OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR  
 
3.3.1 Altruism 
Prosocial actions that are motivated primarily by concern for others, and involve self-
sacrifice without obvious external reward, are described as altruistic (Batson & Powell, 2003). 
These actions may be extreme, for instance sacrificing one’s own life to save somebody else, 
or more commonplace, for instance, helping an elderly man who has fallen in the street and 
consequently missing an important meeting (Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Robers& Channon, 2014). 
What motivates people to promote others’ wellbeing at the expense of their own? A 
substantial body of literature suggests that altruism is motivated by the experience of 
empathy. For instance, in one classic study (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley & Birch, 
1981), participants viewed a confederate receiving electric shocks and were given the 
opportunity to receive the electric shocks instead. The ease of escape was manipulated such 
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that for half the participants, they could leave the room after making their decision (easy 
escape) and half could not (difficult escape). Half of each escape group were in a high-
empathy condition; the remaining half were in a low-empathy condition. The findings 
revealed that the participants in the low empathy condition were more willing to intervene 
when they were unable to escape from the situation. By contrast, the high empathy group 
was equally willing to intervene regardless of the ease of escape.  
 
The postulated relationship between empathy and altruism focuses on emotional aspects of 
empathy: the capacity to “feel what others feel”. Research evidence suggests that when an 
individual is in distress, people experience a corresponding distress response. This in turn 
drives them to alleviate the individual’s distress as a means of alleviating their own distress 
response (Batson, Dyck, Brandt, Batson, Powell et al., 1988; Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004; 
Dovidio, Allen & Schroeder, 1990). In addition to promoting prosocial behaviour, a similar 
empathic mechanism has been posited to inhibit antisocial or antagonistic behaviours (Blair, 
1995). According to the ‘Violence Inhibition Mechanism’, aggression is suppressed in 
response to distress cues. Psychopathy has been extensively linked with reduced 
physiological responses to others’ distress (Blair, 1997; Crowe & Blair, 2008; Blair, 2010; 
Anderson, Stanford, Wan & Young, 2011) and an impaired ‘Violence Inhibition Mechanism’ 
(Blair, 1995). Taken together, this evidence supports a conceptualisation of psychopathy as 
a disorder of emotional empathy (e.g. Blair, 2008; Soderstrom, 2003). Thus, in view of these 
characteristic impairments, psychopathy is thought to be associated with both reduced 
altruistic behaviour and reduced suppression of aggressive behaviour.  
 
3.3.2 Reciprocity and social exchange  
The prosocial actions described above typically pertain to relatively rare occurrences: a 
person can only sacrifice their own life once, and they are unlikely to encounter the same 
person falling and requiring assistance on a frequent basis. Prosocial behaviour has also been 
examined in the context of ongoing social relationships; social interactions in which people 
take turns, return favours and cooperate are described as reciprocal. For instance, two friends 
who regularly go out for dinner may take turns to pay for each other. Reciprocal social 
interactions may also involve irregular ‘turns’; for instance, one friend who spends their 
weekend helping another move house may not be moving house themselves in the 
immediate future, but nonetheless might expect that the favour will be returned in kind. Thus, 
these “two-sided, mutually contingent and mutually rewarding processes” have been 
conceptualised as social transactions or exchanges (Emerson, 1972).  
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Social exchanges serve to develop, maintain and reinforce social relationships (Homans, 
1961; Cook & Rice, 2006).  One proposed mechanism by which this occurs is positive 
emotion. According to relational cohesion theory (Lawler & Yoon, 1996), early exchanges 
between two people lead to positive emotional responses, such as satisfaction, admiration or 
approval.  These emotional responses serve to increase the ‘cohesiveness’ or closeness of the 
relationship, which in turn increases commitment to ongoing exchanges. Thus, the 
prospective experience of positive emotion is a contributory factor in the decision to 
reciprocate in a social exchange.  
 
This coheres with evidence suggesting that decisions to behave prosocially are based on a 
cost-reward analysis (Piliavin, 1981), whereby people select whichever course of action 
minimises costs and maximises benefits. This analysis is thought to take place despite the 
fact that the value or type of the potential costs is unlikely to be directly equivalent to the 
potential benefits. For instance, consider the above example of the friend moving house. In 
this situation, the material costs of helping, such as the amount of time donated or the 
physical exertion are weighed up against intangible benefits, such as gratitude, praise, or 
potential future favours. A range of factors has been found to decrease the perception of 
cost and thereby increase incentives to behave prosocially. These include presenting the 
prosocial behaviour as an opportunity for personal development (Perlow & Weeks, 2002) 
and inducing guilt in relation to inaction (Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder & Clark). 
 
Difficulties with interpersonal relationships are considered a core feature of psychopathy (e.g. 
Hare, 1993), and individuals high in psychopathic traits are thought to derive less pleasure 
from social rewards than those low in psychopathic traits (Foulkes, McCrory, Neumann & 
Viding, 2014). Thus, when considering the costs and benefits of reciprocating, those high in 
psychopathic traits may feel that intangible social rewards are less appealing and do not 
outweigh the practical inconvenience incurred. Those high in psychopathic traits may also 
be less concerned by any potential damage to the social relationship resulting from their 
failure to reciprocate. Moreover, those high in psychopathic traits may be less susceptible to 
the factors thought to incentivise prosocial behaviour: psychopathic traits have been linked 
with a reduced tendency to be motivated by personal development (Ross & Rausch, 2001) 
and with a profound lack of guilt (e.g. Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1993; Patrick, 2005).  
 
3.3.3 Cooperation and competition  
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As described above, reciprocity involves a social exchange whereby people help each other 
and incur costs to do so. Another type of social exchange occurs when people are in 
competition over a resource or positive outcome. In this context, “letting them win” may be 
considered the most prosocial course of action. For instance, consider a situation in which 
there is one slice of cake remaining at a party, and two hungry guests. One guest might decide 
to eat the piece of cake before the other has the opportunity. They may instead choose to 
offer the other guest the cake. Another option would be to share the slice of cake between 
them. This is an illustrative example of competition over a relatively small resource, but from 
an evolutionary perspective, competing over resources in short supply such as food or a 
suitable mate may have been necessary for survival (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). From a 
contemporary Western perspective, people may often be concerned with social success or 
financial stability rather than survival, and may compete over social resources such as job 
promotions or successful relationships.  
 
These types of social exchanges, in which people are required to decide whether they wish 
to compete or cooperate, have been extensively studied using paradigms emerging from 
economic game theory. Game theory in its broadest sense describes strategic decision-
making, and in particular the strategies involved in conflict resolution (e.g. Bierman & 
Fernandez, 1993). For instance, conducting the types of cost-benefit analyses described 
above may be considered one aspect of strategic decision-making. One well-known paradigm 
with its roots in game theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The original scenario described two 
prisoners (A and B) who are in police custody and have to decide whether or not to betray 
each other in order to avoid a prison sentence. If A betrays B and B remains silent, A will be 
set free and B will serve three years in prison. If A and B betray each other, they will both 
serve two years in prison. If A and B cooperate by both remaining silent, they will each serve 
one year in prison (see Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1: Decisions and outcomes in Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
      Prisoner A       Prisoner A 
      Cooperate       Defect  
      (Remain silent)       (Betray B)    
 
 
Prisoner B 
Cooperate 
(Remain silent) 
 
 
 
Prisoner B 
Defect 
(Betray A) 
 
 
The dilemma is structured such that betrayal is the most rational choice. From A’s 
perspective, if B betrays A, 2 years in prison is preferable to 3 years in prison and betrayal is 
thus the superior course of action. If B cooperates, being set free is preferable to 1 year in 
prison, and thus betrayal is still the superior course of action. Nonetheless, the evidence 
suggests that people show a bias towards cooperation, despite betrayal being more 
economically beneficial (Hayashi, Ostrom, Walker & Yamagishi, 1999; Kiyonari, Tanida & 
Yamagishi, 2000). This suggests that people tend to favour prosocial behaviour and 
compromise at the expense of rational choice and self-interest. In the classic Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, participants’ decisions allow them only to either lose or draw. Similar findings also 
emerge in relation to alternative ultimatum games, whereby participants’ decisions allow 
them to draw or win, for instance by deciding whether to share money equally or to try and 
obtain the larger share (Nowak, Page & Sigmund, 2000). 
 
In order to examine cooperation versus competition in the context of ongoing social 
exchanges, research has been conducted using iterated versions of the prisoner’s dilemma 
and other ultimatum games, in which the game is played repeatedly between the same 
opponents. The evidence suggests that in the iterated version, players penalise their 
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opponents for betrayals and reward them when they cooperate (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; 
Fowler, 2005). This is thought to cultivate mutual cooperation, since both participants are 
motivated by a desire to protect their reputation and thus prospective benefits in future 
interactions (Adreoni & Miller, 2002). 
 
A substantial body of literature suggests that psychopathy is associated with reduced 
cooperation and greater exploitation of opponents in neuroeconomic games such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Mokros, Menner, Eisenbarth, Alpers, Lange & Osterheider, 2008; 
Curry, Chesters & Viding, 2011). This is consistent with the view that psychopathy is a 
disorder of emotional empathy (Soderstrom, 2003). Cooperation in neuroeconomic games 
may occur when people empathise with their opponent and wish to reduce any potential 
distress caused by defection. By contrast, those high in psychopathic traits may be less likely 
to demonstrate consideration for others and more likely to prioritise self-interest. This is 
supported by research evidence suggesting that when an opponent provides affective 
feedback, such as reporting sadness after being betrayed, those low in psychopathic traits 
increase their rate of cooperation. Those high in psychopathic traits persist with non-
cooperation despite this affective feedback (Johnson, Hawes & Straiton, 2014).  
 
Despite a propensity for reduced cooperation, those high in psychopathic traits are thought 
to be able to adapt their strategy such that they are more cooperative in response to iterated 
versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma than in response to one-off games (Curry, Chesters 
&Viding, 2011). This suggests that those high in psychopathic traits are not unwaveringly 
uncooperative, but instead can appreciate that occasional cooperation in the context of 
ongoing exchanges may be ultimately in their best interests. Thus, the extent to which those 
high in psychopathic traits are cooperative or competitive may be contingent upon the 
potential long-term costs and benefits of their actions.  
 
Although the Prisoner’s Dilemma provides a useful way of investigating reciprocity, 
cooperation and competition in psychopathy, the interactions between participants in these 
games are restricted to economic decision-making and do not necessarily reflect the rich and 
varied social interactions found in everyday life (Johnson, Stopka & Bell, 2002). In order to 
address this limitation, Chapters 6 and 9 of the present thesis investigated these aspects of 
prosocial behaviour by using novel tasks that describe more representative social interactions 
with a range of characters, involving a variety of costs and benefits. 
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3.4 SITUATIONAL FACTORS 
 
The evidence reviewed thus far suggests that the decision to behave prosocially partially relies 
on an analysis of the associated costs and benefits, which relate to the internal state of those 
providing help and the ways in which they feel they will be personally affected by their 
prosocial actions. External factors relating to the situation may also influence the decision to 
behave prosocially.  
 
The bystander intervention model of prosocial behaviour, initially proposed by Latane and 
Darley (1970), sets out a number of processes that must occur in order for an individual to 
provide help. The individual must firstly notice that a situation is occurring and that help is 
required. They must then assume responsibility for helping, decide on an appropriate course 
of action, and implement their decision. Factors such as the salience and severity of the 
victim’s need are thought to influence whether people accurately judge that help is required 
(Batson & Powell, 2003). One notable factor that is thought to influence whether or not the 
individual assumes responsibility for helping is the presence of other people. A substantial 
literature suggests that the greater the number of people present in a situation, the smaller 
the chance that anyone will intervene and provide help, since people tend to assume that 
somebody else will help instead (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley, 1970; Schroeder 
et al., 1995; Penner et al., 2004).  
 
Characteristics of the person requiring help may also influence the decision to behave 
prosocially. For instance, the appearance of the victim, the relationship between the victim 
and the prospective helper and the extent to which the victim is judged to be similar to the 
helper are all thought to be relevant factors (e.g. Batson & Powell, 2003; Park & Schaller, 
2008; DeBruine, 2002). One other key factor likely to influence prosocial behaviour might 
be the extent to which the victim is judged to be deserving. 
 
When a person experiences a negative outcome that is not directly related to their own 
actions, this outcome might be considered to be undeserved, and people may be motivated 
to help (Feather, 2006). For instance, if an individual needed to borrow money because they 
were recently mugged, this outcome might be judged to be undeserved, and consequently a 
friend might choose to help and lend them money. However, if they needed to borrow 
money because they had been irresponsible and spent too much, the friend might judge their 
predicament to be deserved and feel less inclined to help. Positive outcomes may also be 
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judged to be undeserved when they do not directly result from people’s efforts or merits 
(Feather, 2006). For instance, if an individual received a prestigious award on the basis of 
nepotistic connections, without working hard, a friend might judge them to be undeserving 
and be disinclined to behave prosocially towards them. On the other hand, if they received 
the award after working hard and producing high quality work, a friend may feel pleased for 
them or willing to support them in the future. 
 
To what extent might the characteristics of a situation differentially influence prosocial 
behaviour in those high and low in psychopathic traits? With respect to the salience and 
severity of others’ needs, those high in psychopathic traits may be less influenced by this 
than those low in psychopathic traits. This is consistent with the extensive evidence to 
suggest that psychopathy is associated with a lack of responsivity to distress (e.g. Blair, Jones, 
Clark & Smith, 1997; Anderson & Phelps, 2001), and thus with limited motivation to alleviate 
this distress (Blair, 1995). With respect to bystander effects, these have not been 
systematically investigated in psychopathy. On the one hand, it is possible that those high in 
psychopathic traits may be more influenced by bystander effects than those low in 
psychopathic traits. For most people, bystander effects reduce prosocial behaviour by 
increasing the ambiguity of the situation, which causes a lack of clarity about whose 
responsibility it is to help (Batson & Powell, 2003). Any reduction in prosocial behaviour 
resulting from bystander effects may be exacerbated for those high in psychopathic traits. 
These people tend to help less than those low in psychopathic traits even in unambiguous 
situations; the presence of bystanders may thus offer an opportunity to avoid any prosocial 
behaviour without fear of reprimand or criticism. On the other hand, bystander effects might 
selectively only influence people low in psychopathic traits, since people high in psychopathic 
traits may be equally disinclined to help irrespective of the presence of others.  
 
How might deservingness, i.e. the extent to which people deserve a particular outcome, 
differentially influence prosocial behaviour in those high and low in psychopathic traits? With 
respect to undeserved negative outcomes, such as the example above in which somebody 
needed money because they had been mugged, it is unlikely that those high psychopathic 
traits would experience sympathy for the characters’ predicament to the same extent as those 
low in psychopathic traits. Moreover, there is some evidence that psychopathy is associated 
with a propensity to feel actively pleased in response to others’ misfortune (Porter, Bhanwer, 
Woodworth & Black, 2014; James, Kavanagh, Jonason, Chonody & Scrutton, 2014). With 
respect to undeserved positive outcomes, psychopathy is associated with an increased 
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proclivity for transgressing and taking advantage of others (e.g. Hare, 1993). It is thus 
possible that people high in psychopathic traits would feel less negatively as compared to 
those low in psychopathic traits in relation to the actions of the undeserving prize-winner. 
Those high in psychopathic traits might in fact experience admiration for the undeserving 
prize-winner, since they themselves might behave similarly. 
 
There is very little empirical work examining deservingness in relation to psychopathy. Whilst 
some experimental tasks focusing on deservingness have been developed (e.g. Lupfer & 
Gingrich, 1999), these have a number of limitations. For instance, they describe extreme and 
highly improbable situations involving outcomes such as cancer diagnoses or winning lottery 
tickets. Moreover, they describe scenarios in which the outcomes do not result directly from 
the main character’s actions (e.g. a character’s good behaviour is unrelated to their lottery 
win). In order to address some of the limitations of previous experimental paradigms, 
Chapters 7 and 8 of the present thesis describe newly developed tasks that investigate 
deservingness in psychopathy more systematically.  
 
3.5 SUMMARY 
 
In summary, prosocial behaviour describes actions that benefit both those in receipt of help 
and those providing help. Prosocial behaviours may occur as a one-off, altruistic interaction 
or in the context of an ongoing social exchange. The propensity to behave prosocially may 
be influenced by a variety of factors, such as the associated costs and benefits, the extent to 
which the situation makes it clear that help is expected, and the extent to which the victim is 
perceived to be deserving of help. Psychopathy is associated with a reduced propensity to 
behave prosocially. This most likely reflects impairments in emotional empathy, and thus a 
lack of capacity to care about the suffering of others and a lack of inclination to alleviate 
their distress.  
 
The experimental chapters presented in this thesis will focus closely on specific aspects of 
prosocial behaviour in everyday social interactions and how performance is influenced by 
psychopathic personality traits. Chapter 5 will focus on prosocial responding and different 
types of cost. Chapter 6 will focus on reciprocal social exchanges involving different levels 
of cost. Chapters 7 and 8 will focus on how deservingness influences prosocial responding 
and reasoning about different types of outcomes. Finally, Chapter 9 will focus on 
competitiveness and cooperation.  
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Chapter 4: Moral Judgment and psychopathy 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Is it morally wrong to board a train without buying a ticket first? To steal a pen from a co-
worker? To stab someone you do not like? Most people would generally agree that these 
actions are all morally wrong, although they vary in severity (e.g. Bucciarelli, Khemlani & 
Johnson-Laird, 2008). Moral judgment pertains to the processes that occur in order for 
people to differentiate between right and wrong (Fiske, 2004). Definitions of right and wrong 
usually vary somewhat on the basis of factors such as local customs and laws, social and 
cultural norms, and parental upbringing practices. Nonetheless, the actions that are 
considered morally right are generally those that minimise harm caused to others. Thus, there 
is a relationship between moral judgment and prosocial behaviour, such that prosocial 
actions are generally judged to be morally right (Krebs & Denton, 2005). The present chapter 
will review both cognitive and emotional factors in moral judgment. The ways in which 
blame attributions are formed in the aftermath of moral judgment will also be reviewed. The 
potential influence of psychopathic traits will be considered in relation to each of these 
aspects of moral judgment.  
 
4.2 COGNITIVE FACTORS IN MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
4.2.1 Moral development 
Classic theories of moral development focus on the capacity to differentiate between right 
and wrong on the basis of learning and cognitive processes. One of the earliest theories of 
moral development was proposed by Jean Piaget (1932). Piaget’s theory described two stages 
of moral development, heteronomous and autonomous. In the heteronomous stage, children 
are thought to view morality as a set of absolute rules, ordained by authority figures such as 
parents, teachers or God, that cannot be changed or adjusted. Children in the heteronomous 
stage are also thought to judge the moral permissibility of actions on the basis of 
consequences rather than intentions. For instance, in one study, children read two stories 
about a girl cutting a hole in her mother’s dress (Piaget, 1932). In the first story, the girl 
wished to surprise her mother with some sewing and accidentally cut a large hole in the dress. 
In the second story, the girl was behaving naughtily and deliberately cut a small hole in her 
mother’s dress. Children in the heteronomous stage tended to judge the first girl’s actions to 
be less morally permissible than the second girl’s actions, despite the intentions being more 
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honourable. In the autonomous stage of moral development, children tend to make more 
relative moral judgments. At this stage they consider contextual factors and intentions in 
addition to outcomes, and are thus able to make moral judgments without depending on 
absolute rules.   
 
Another prominent theory of moral development was proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg 
(Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlberg expanded Piaget’s model to encompass three developmental 
levels, each consisting of two stages. The first level pertains to ‘pre-conventional reasoning’. 
At this level, pre-school-aged children are primarily focused upon themselves and upon their 
own needs. This level involves gaining an understanding that whichever actions lead to 
punishment are morally wrong and that whichever actions lead to reward are morally right. 
After the pre-conventional level, children move into the second level, which is characterised 
by ‘conventional reasoning’. At this level, school-aged children gradually grow an awareness 
of community norms and expectations. They learn to make an effort to secure approval and 
avoid blame and they develop an understanding of absolute rules, of the concept of duty and 
of the importance of obeying authority figures. The final level of moral development is 
characterised by ‘post-conventional reasoning’. At this level, people understand the concept 
of reciprocity, they develop a relativistic view of morality and they develop an understanding 
of abstract moral principles such as justice. There is thus some consensus between Piaget’s 
and Kohlberg’s classic cognitive theories of moral development. Broadly speaking, reasoning 
about morality is thought to become increasingly complex and nuanced throughout 
development, and absolute, black and white moral rules are thought to gradually evolve into 
relative, context-dependent moral rules.  
 
4.2.2 Moral/conventional distinction 
Two different types of rules are thought to govern behaviour: moral rules and conventional 
rules (Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng & Fessler, 2007; Turiel, 1979). Moral rules tend to prohibit 
actions that cause others physical harm, such as murder, injuring people, or stealing their 
belongings. Moral rules also prohibit actions that cause others emotional harm or distress, 
such as mocking people, committing adultery, or breaking promises. By contrast, 
conventional rules tend to prohibit actions that are socially inappropriate or defy cultural 
norms, such as wearing gender-inappropriate clothing or licking one’s plate clean at a dinner 
party. The capacity to distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions is thought 
to be a hallmark of moral development (e.g. Turiel, 1983).  
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Early work investigating the moral/conventional distinction involved presenting participants 
with a series of moral and conventional transgressions and asking them various questions 
pertaining to each transgression (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981; Nucci & Nucci, 1982). 
The findings from these studies revealed that people judged moral transgressions to be more 
serious than conventional transgressions. Moral transgressions were also judged to be 
independent of socially sanctioned rules or the assertions of authority figures, and to apply 
to all people, everywhere. For instance, murder might be considered to be universally wrong, 
irrespective of legal status, geographical location or cultural norms. By contrast, conventional 
transgressions were judged to be dependent on socially sanctioned rules, subject to the 
assertions of authority figures, and to apply to certain people in a restricted set of 
circumstances. For instance, wearing gender-inappropriate clothing might be considered to 
be more acceptable if a parent or teacher approved of doing so, and in cultures where the 
norms relating to gender-appropriate clothing differed. Finally, only justifications for moral 
rules referred to the potential for harm, to people’s rights, and to concepts such as justice. 
By contrast, justifications for conventional rules referred to maintaining social order and 
preserving local customs.   
 
4.2.3 Psychopathy and moral reasoning  
Psychopathy has been extensively linked to moral transgressions (e.g. Hare, 1993); one 
plausible explanation for this might be that the development of moral reasoning is impaired 
in psychopathy, and thus that people with psychopathy are not able to differentiate between 
right and wrong. However, the evidence relating to this claim is somewhat mixed. As 
reviewed above, during the early stages of moral development, children differentiate between 
right and wrong by learning that morally right actions are those that result in reward and 
morally wrong actions are those that result in punishment. This learning may be impaired in 
psychopathy. A range of studies has found that people with psychopathy lack emotional 
responsivity to punishment and do not modify their behaviour in response to punishment 
(Peschardt, Morton & Blair, 2003; Blair, Mitchell, Leonard, Budhani, Peschardt & Newman, 
2004). Nonetheless, this impairment seems to selectively relate to punishment; reward 
learning was found to be intact in psychopathy. This suggests that learning about the moral 
permissibility of actions on the basis of reward remains effective in psychopathy. 
 
How might the evidence relating to the moral/conventional distinction elucidate moral 
reasoning capacity in psychopathy? Early research work suggested that people with 
psychopathy did not distinguish between these two types of rules to the same extent as 
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control participants (e.g. Blair, 1995), which implies impaired moral reasoning. However, this 
research work was criticised on the grounds that it did not adequately differentiate between 
a) participants’ subjective opinions about the permissibility of various actions (i.e. what they 
would personally do) and b) participants’ judgments about what is objectively seen as 
permissible by most people in society. Previous findings (Blair, 1995) may thus represent a 
conflation of these two types of judgments (Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong & Kiehl, 2012). 
Subsequent studies have found that as compared to control participants, people with 
psychopathy make comparable judgments about the moral permissibility of various actions 
and differentiate appropriately between transgressions that involve direct physical harm and 
those that do not (Aharoni et al., 2012; Cima, Tonnaer & Hauser, 2010; Maibom, 2008).  
 
In relation to the claim that moral reasoning is impaired in psychopathy, a final consideration 
relates to absolute versus relative moral rules. Absolute moral rules are unchanging and black 
and white, whereas relative moral rules are more flexible and tend to take contextual factors 
into account. Prominent theories about the development of moral reasoning suggest that 
adherence to relative rather than absolute moral rules represents an advanced stage of moral 
development (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969; Perry, 1999). In one study, people high in 
psychopathic traits rated that they agreed with statements pertaining to relative moral values 
to a greater extent than did those low in psychopathic traits (Glenn, Iyer, Koleva, Graham 
& Haidt, 2009).  
 
Taken together, there appears to be a lack of consensus in the literature pertaining to moral 
reasoning in psychopathy, and there is insufficient evidence to assert that an impairment 
exists. The relationship between moral judgment and psychopathy may be elucidated further 
by examining the contribution of emotional factors.  
 
4.3 EMOTIONAL FACTORS IN MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
The classic theories of moral development reviewed above (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969) 
emphasise the role of cognition, whereby moral judgments are reached by a process of 
reasoning. However, these theories have been criticised for failing to account for emotional 
factors in moral judgment (Villenave-Cremer & Eckensberger, 1985). More recent work has 
conceptualised emotional factors as an important aspect of moral judgment and moral 
behaviour. For instance, moral transgressions are thought to illicit moral emotions such as 
guilt, shame and empathy (Eisenberg, 2000). Empathy in particular has been referred to as 
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the primary moral emotion (Hoffman, 2000), since the capacity to emotionally resonate with 
other people may serve to discourage any moral transgressions that cause them suffering.  
 
Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy (2000) offered an illustrative example that supported the 
assertion that moral reasoning alone could not account for moral judgment. Consider a story 
about a brother and sister who decided, as a one-off, to have sexual intercourse. They used 
two forms of contraception and they both enjoyed their night together, but decided not to 
repeat the experience. People tended to view the siblings’ decision as morally wrong. They 
initially pointed out the dangers of inbreeding, only to be reminded that two forms of 
contraception were used. They then argued that the experience might be emotionally 
damaging for the siblings, although the story made it clear that both siblings enjoyed the 
experience and did not feel distressed afterwards. Eventually, people tended to say that they 
could not explain why, but that “it just feels wrong” for siblings to have sex. Haidt et al. 
(2000) argued that current theories of moral judgment could not account for people knowing 
that an action was morally wrong without knowing why. In order to address this issue, Haidt 
(2001) proposed a social-intuitionist model of moral judgment. According to this model, 
people have an intuitive emotional response that leads to a moral judgment. When needed, 
reasoning is constructed post-hoc in order to add legitimacy to the emotion-led moral 
judgment. Thus, in the face of a moral transgression such as murder, people may initially 
experience distress or disgust which leads them to condemn the murderer’s actions. They 
may then in the aftermath of their judgment consider reasons such as the illegality of murder 
or the sanctity of life.  
 
In order to reconcile the cognitive and emotional aspects of moral judgment, Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley and Cohen (2004) propose a dual-process theory which posits that 
both factors can lead to moral judgments. When faced with a moral dilemma, intuition and 
emotion are fast, automatic, instinctive responses that lead to moral judgments on the basis 
of factors such as the potential distress for the victims of moral transgressions. By contrast, 
cognition involves slower, controlled, deliberative reasoning processes that lead to moral 
judgments on the basis of factors such as the costs and benefits associated with a particular 
course of action.  
 
Studies in support of the dual-process theory of moral judgment have typically used 
utilitarian dilemmas. Utilitarianism is a philosophical tenet stating that the most ethical course 
of action is that which results in the greatest good for the greatest number of people (Mill, 
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1863). For instance, one classic utilitarian dilemma described a situation in which five people 
are tied to a railway track, with a trolley fast approaching. There is a lever near the track 
which, if pulled, will divert the trolley onto a second track, where one person is tied. Pulling 
the lever would result in five people living and one person dying, whereas not pulling the 
lever would result in five people dying and one person living. Increased activation in brain 
regions associated with cognition and reasoning has been linked with the decision to pull the 
lever (utilitarian), whereas increased activation in brain regions associated with emotion has 
been linked with the decision not to pull the lever (non-utilitarian). This latter, ‘emotional’ 
pattern of activation increases when faced with a variant of the dilemma in which the decision 
involves whether or not to physically push somebody to their death rather than whether or 
not to pull a lever (Greene et al., 2004). The costs and benefits are the same in both versions 
of the dilemma; both versions involve allowing five people to die so that one can live or vice 
versa. However, the increased personal involvement in the second version of the dilemma is 
thought to elicit a stronger emotional response.  
 
The findings from other research work investigating utilitarian decision-making lend further 
support to the dual-process theory of moral judgment. For instance, one study found that 
increasing cognitive load selectively interfered with utilitarian decisions (pull the lever/push 
the person) but not with non-utilitarian decisions (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & 
Cohen, 2008). Another study found that participants who reported their thinking style to be 
deliberate tended to make more utilitarian decisions and those who reported their thinking 
style to be intuitive tended to make non-utilitarian decisions (Bartels, 2008). Thus, both 
cognitive and emotional factors are thought to contribute to moral judgment and to the 
resolution of moral dilemmas.     
 
4.3.1 Psychopathy and emotional factors in moral judgment   
In view of the evidence relating to the contribution of emotional factors, how might 
psychopathy influence moral judgment? The literature reviewed above suggests that moral 
emotions such as guilt, shame and empathy guide moral behaviour and prevent moral 
transgressions (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000). Psychopathy has been extensively linked 
with impaired emotional empathy (e.g. Blair, 2008) and a profound lack of guilt. This may 
underpin the increased propensity for moral transgressions in psychopathy, since the 
prospect of causing others harm is unlikely to elicit a negative emotional response. 
Differences in emotional responding in psychopathy may help to resolve the inconsistency 
in the moral reasoning literature, whereby some evidence suggests impaired moral reasoning 
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in psychopathy and other evidence suggests intact moral reasoning (e.g. Blair, 1995; Aharoni 
et al., 2012). According to the social-intuitionist model, moral judgments are made on the 
basis of emotional responses, and reasoning in support of the judgment is constructed post-
hoc. Thus, differences in moral reasoning capacity in psychopathy may be a direct 
consequence of reduced emotional responsivity (Blair, 1995). 
 
The dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2004) was proposed as a way to 
account for both the cognitive and emotional aspects of moral judgment, and a range of 
studies investigating utilitarian decision-making has provided evidence in support of this 
model (e.g. Greene et al., 2008; Bartels, 2008). According to this model, utilitarian decisions 
that prioritise maximising benefit and minimising cost (pulling the lever) are associated with 
controlled cognitive processes. Non-utilitarian decisions that minimise personal involvement 
(not pulling the lever) are associated with automatic emotional processes. There is some 
experimental evidence to suggest that people with psychopathy endorse utilitarian courses 
of action to a greater extent than control participants (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Koenigs, 
Kruepke, Zeier & Newman, 2011). This is consistent with the evidence linking psychopathy 
with intact cognitive processing and impaired emotional processing (Blair, 2008). Taken 
together, the weight of the evidence may indicate that the cognitive aspects of moral 
judgment are preserved in psychopathy, but that the emotional aspects of moral judgment 
are impaired. To paraphrase, ‘psychopaths know right from wrong but don’t care (Cima et 
al., 2010). 
 
Although the literature on utilitarian decision-making offers some important insights into 
moral reasoning in psychopathy, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this 
research. The scenarios in Greene et al. (2001)’s battery describe highly extreme dilemmas, 
such as whether or not to kill one man so that a starving group of people could eat him, or 
whether a father should sell his daughter into child pornography in order to provide for the 
rest of his family. These scenarios are unlikely to be representative of the types of everyday 
moral dilemmas that people typically need to resolve. Moreover, the design of the scenarios 
in Greene et al. (2001)’s battery was somewhat unbalanced. For instance, the participant’s 
life was endangered in some scenarios and not in others, and the number of people involved 
in each dilemma was not systematically varied. In order to address these limitations, Chapter 
11 of the present thesis compared groups high and low in psychopathic traits on a novel, 
systematically developed utilitarian paradigm, examining situations involving both physical 
and social harms. 
63 
 
 
4.4 BLAME ATTRIBUTIONS FOLLOWING MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
The literature reviewed thus far suggests that moral judgment allows people to decide on the 
right course of action for themselves and to evaluate whether others’ actions are morally 
permissible. Once another individual’s actions are judged to be morally impermissible, 
people may then determine the extent to which the individual is morally responsible for their 
actions and thus to blame for the outcome, and decide what sanctions should be imposed as 
punishment. A number of factors are thought to influence blame attributions. Shaver (1985) 
proposed a model of moral responsibility, whereby people should consider five dimensions 
of responsibility before attributing blame to an individual. These dimensions describe 
potentially mitigating factors that may reduce the extent to which an individual is morally 
responsible for their actions. The first factor is the extent to which the individual’s actions 
are causally linked to the outcome. For instance, consider an example in which an individual 
shoots and kills a person. If they shoot a target at a firing range and the bullet ricochets and 
kills a person, they may be judged to be less causally involved and thus less blameworthy 
than if they point the gun at the person and fire. The second factor is the individual’s 
awareness of the consequences of their actions. For instance, in the shooting example, if the 
individual thinks the gun is unloaded, they may be judged to be less blameworthy than if they 
know the gun is loaded. The third factor is the intentionality of the individual’s actions. If 
they drop the gun and it fires, accidentally resulting in a person’s death, they may be judged 
to be less blameworthy than if they intend to kill the person. The fourth factor pertains to 
whether or not the individual was coerced into action. For instance, if they shoot and kill a 
person because they themselves are being threatened with a gun, this may reduce the extent 
to which they are considered to be morally responsible. The final factor pertains to the extent 
to which the individual appreciates the moral wrongfulness of their actions. For instance, if 
the individual shoots and kills a person while sleepwalking, or during a psychotic episode, 
they may considered to be less blameworthy than if they shoot somebody whilst compos mentis. 
 
Another prominent model of blame attribution, the culpable control model, was proposed 
by Alicke (2000) to expand upon Shaver’s theory of blame. This model posits that both 
controlled, cognitive processes and spontaneous, emotional processes contribute towards 
blame attribution. With respect to cognitive processes, blame attribution is thought to 
involve deliberating over the extent to which the individual had personal control over their 
actions. As with Shaver’s theory, mitigating circumstances relating to causality, foreseeability 
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and intentionality are all thought to contribute to personal control considerations. With 
respect to emotional processes, blame attribution is thought to involve an automatic, 
affective reaction to any negative consequences of an individual’s actions. This spontaneous 
reaction is thought to result in greater blame attributions and in any potentially mitigating 
factors being overlooked (Lagnado & Channon, 2008). The culpable control model has some 
features in common with the dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2004), 
since both theories account for cognitive and emotional contributions to moral judgment 
and blame attribution.  
 
Once blame has been established, sanctions may be imposed on transgressors in order to 
achieve just deserts or to deter others from transgressing (Carlsmith, Daley & Robinson, 
2007). Legal sanctions may include fines or imprisonment, whereas social sanctions may 
include disapproval, criticism or exclusion (e.g. Homans, 1961; Noussair & Tucker, 2005). 
More blame-worthy actions may be met with more severe sanctions. For instance, in relation 
to the shooting example above, deliberately killing a person may be more likely to be met 
with murder charges. Unintentionally killing a person may be more likely to be met with 
manslaughter charges. Killing a person under duress may be more likely to be met with 
acquittal.  
 
How might psychopathy influence blame attributions and the imposition of sanctions? 
Psychopathy has been extensively linked with social, moral and legal transgressions (e.g. Hare, 
1993). This propensity for moral transgressions may mean that people with psychopathy 
attribute less blame and impose less severe sanctions as compared with control participants. 
A range of studies supports this assertion. For instance, studies have found that psychopathy 
is linked with greater endorsement of relative moral values (Glenn et al., 2009); people with 
psychopathy may thus consider a broader range of potentially mitigating factors when 
ascribing blame as compared to control participants. This is consistent with the culpable 
control model outlined above (Alicke, 2000); people with psychopathy may be likely to 
engage with the cognitive aspects of blame attribution but not the emotional aspects. They 
may thus be capable of deliberating potential mitigating factors and be less likely to make a 
spontaneous blame attribution. This is also consistent with the evidence relating to 
psychopathy and utilitarian decision-making, whereby those with psychopathy are thought 
to rely predominantly on controlled, deliberative cognitive processes at the expense of 
automatic emotional processes (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2011). Finally, 
psychopathy is linked with a reduced sensitivity to punishment (Peschardt, Morton & Blair, 
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2003; Blair, Mitchell, Leonard, Budhani, Peschardt & Newman, 2004). Thus, people with 
psychopathy may be unlikely to impose sanctions for moral transgressions since they view 
punishment as an ineffective deterrent.  
 
Despite the above evidence suggesting that attributions of blame may be limited in 
psychopathy, there is other work suggesting that people with psychopathy may make more 
severe blame attributions, and sanction transgressors more heavily. For instance, 
psychopathy has been linked with a tendency to be vengeful and unforgiving (Giammarco 
& Vernon, 2014). Psychopathy has also been linked with a tendency to externalise blame and 
to blame victims for their own misfortune (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Batson, Gudjonsson 
& Gray, 2010; DeLisi, Angton, Vaughn, Trulson, Caudill & Beaver, 2014). However, the 
studies that have examined blame externalisation in psychopathy have typically carried out 
in contexts where the individual with psychopathy themselves has transgressed, and blame 
externalisation has therefore served to deflect the focus of the blame (DeLisi, Angton, 
Vaughn, Trulson, Caudill & Beaver, 2014).Taken together, the evidence in relation to blame 
attribution in psychopathy is somewhat mixed, with limited work examining how people 
with psychopathy judge the moral transgressions of others.  In order to address this, blame 
attributions in psychopathy will be examined more closely in Chapter 10 of the present thesis. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
 
In summary, moral judgment allows people to differentiate between right and wrong. Both 
cognitive and emotional factors contribute to moral judgment. When people’s actions are 
judged to be morally impermissible, mitigating factors such as intentionality are considered 
in order to determine the extent to which they are personally responsible and thus 
blameworthy. Psychopathy is associated with a proclivity for moral transgression. Although 
moral reasoning appears to be relatively intact in psychopathy, the emotional aspects of 
moral judgment may be impaired. Limited work has been conducted directly examining 
blame attribution in psychopathy and the relevant evidence is somewhat mixed, with some 
evidence pointing to less severe attributions and other evidence pointing to more severe 
attributions.  
 
The experimental chapters presented in this thesis will focus on two specific aspects of moral 
judgment in everyday social interactions and examine the potential influence of psychopathic 
personality traits. Chapter 10 will focus on blame attributions and counterfactual sanctions. 
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Chapter 11 will focus on utilitarian decision-making in situations with different levels of 
personal involvement, and with both social and physical harms.  
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Part 2: Experimental Studies 
 
Chapter 5: Social strategies usage in awkward situations 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterised principally by emotional deficits such as 
a reduced capacity for remorse, poor behavioural control and a propensity for callous or 
antisocial behaviour (e.g. Cleckley, 1967; Hare, 1993),often accompanied by an aptitude for 
skilful manipulation and a superficially charming façade(e.g. Hare, 1993).Given this 
constellation of personality traits, it is unsurprising that psychopathy has considerable 
negative consequences, both for the individual and for society (Hare, 1993).Hare’s (1991) 
criteria for psychopathy are most commonly adopted for research, based on the Psychopathy 
Checklist: Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991). Whilst a substantial body of work has studied 
incarcerated individuals who meet these criteria, criminal behaviour is thought to correlate 
with psychopathy without necessarily being a central component (Skeeme & Cooke, 
2010).Psychopathy may be conceptualised as the extreme end of a collection of normally-
distributed traits lying on a continuum (Hare & Neumann, 2008; Marcus et al., 2004). Recent 
attention has focused on the impact of psychopathic traits in the general (non-incarcerated) 
population(Anderson et al., 2011; Curry et al., 2011; Blonigen et al., 2003, Babiak et al., 2010) 
using measures such as the Psychopathic Personality Inventory:Revised (PPI:R; Scott & 
Lilienfeld, 2005). This is a self-report questionnaire with good reliability and validity that has 
been commonly used to assess psychopathic traits. (e.g. Vaughn et al., 2008; Long & Titone, 
2007; Han et al. 2011) and correlates well (r=.54) with the PCL-R (e.g. Copestake et al., 2011; 
Poythress et al., 1998). Studying those with psychopathic traits in the general 
populationwithout the potentially confounding influence of criminality (Kirkman, 2002) 
permits examination of the interpersonal and emotional aspects of psychopathy. This in turn 
may illuminate the ways in which features of psychopathy such as manipulation and 
exploitation, which violate social norms, can hinder prosocial interactions with others. 
 
Prosocial behaviour plays a vital role in maintaining reciprocal and harmonious social 
relationships. In addition to the benefits experienced by those receiving help, those giving 
help by behaving prosocially have also been found to derive significant benefits(Weinstein 
& Ryan, 2010) including a greater experience of personal happiness (Ellison, 1991), life 
satisfaction (Wheeleret al., 1998), and increased self-esteem (Gecas & Burke, 1995). Both 
situational, external characteristics, such as the salience of someone’s need, 
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perceivedambiguity of personal responsibility, location, appearance of the victim and cost of 
helping, and dispositional, internal characteristics, such as intelligence, authoritarianism, 
submissiveness, propensity to feel empathy for others and sensitivity to social pressure (e.g. 
Oliner & Oliner, 1988) may mediate the likelihood of people behaving prosocially towards 
one another (Batson & Powell, 2003). One key factor thought to drive selfless social 
behaviour is the degree to which perceiving another individual’s distress causes a 
corresponding, empathic experience of personal distress (e.g. Batson et al, 1988; Bierhoff & 
Rohmann, 2004). It is posited that this empathic response drives people to alleviate distress 
in others (Batson et al., 1981; Dovidio et al., 1990; Eisenberg et al., 1996; Feshbach, 1987; 
Perry & Perry, 1974). 
 
This process may be impairedin psychopathy, which has been conceptualised as 
predominantly a disorder of empathy (Soderstrom, 2003). Two key components of empathy 
have been defined:cognitive and emotional aspects. Cognitive empathy (also referred to as 
mentalising or Theory of Mind) describes the ability to represent the internal state of another 
individual, to take their perspective and infer what they are thinking and feeling (e.g. Frith & 
Frith, 2006; Singer, 2006). Emotional empathy refers to the ability to resonate with another’s 
feelings (Blair, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et l., 2000). Impairments in either of these components 
might reduce the capacity for prosocial behaviour - individuals may not perceive someone 
to be in distress, or they may understand but not directly resonate with this distress, and 
therefore not be motivated to help.  
 
Psychopathy is thought to be characterised by intact cognitive but impaired emotional 
empathy (Blair, 2008). With respect to cognitive empathy, intact performance has been 
documented on a range of tasks including ability to answer questions accurately about the 
mental states of story characters, faux pas tasks, and false belief tasks (e.g. Dolan & Fullam, 
2004; Jones et al., 2010).Yet despite possessing the capacity to appreciate others’ perspectives, 
it seems that those with psychopathic traits are not motivated to behave prosocially; this has 
been linked to deficits in emotional empathy. A number of studies have demonstrated errors 
in identifying other people’s emotions from facial expressions, especially fear (Blair et al., 
2001b; Blair & Coles, 2000; Stevens et al., 2001; Kosson et al., 2002b) and recognition of 
vocal affect (Blair et al., 2002; Stevens et al., 2001). Reduced physiological responsivity to 
distress in others has also been demonstrated, both in those meeting criteria for psychopathy 
and in those with high trait scores, using a range of physiological measures including 
electrodermal responses (Blair et al., 1997) and startle reflexes (Vaidyanathan et al., 2011; 
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Anderson et al., 2011). There is also fMRI evidence showing reduced activity in the amygdala 
and orbito-frontal cortex (Crowe & Blair, 2008; Blair, 2010),brain regions typically associated 
with fear and the regulation of threat responses (Anderson & Phelps, 2001). These 
differences in physiological responsivity are often accompanied by self-reported distress 
ratings comparable to those of control participants, which may suggest that those with 
psychopathic traits are able to comprehend the emotions felt in a range of contexts without 
having the emotional experience themselves.  
 
The postulated dissociationbetween intact cognitive empathy and impaired emotional 
empathy may account for the apparent discrepancy between ability to manipulate others 
successfully and lack of emotionality and remorse in the commonly described profile of 
psychopathy. With respect to moral reasoning, those with psychopathic traits have been 
found to differentiate appropriately in relation to the moral permissibility of a range of 
actions (Cima et al., 2010) and to judge moral transgressions to be more serious than 
conventional transgressions (e.g. Blair 2005), suggesting an understanding of moral 
behaviour and the potential impact of moral transgressions on others. However, they are 
significantly less likely to make reference to the victims of moral transgressions (Arsenio & 
Fleiss, 1996; Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 2001c; Dunn & Hughes, 2001). Moreover, those with 
psychopathic traits appeared to suspend their judgment of wrongdoing when told to imagine 
that a behaviour such as hitting someone was no longer prohibited, whereas control 
participants maintained their view that this constituted wrongdoing (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 
2001c; Nucci & Herman, 1982). Numerous case studies have linked psychopathy with 
manipulative social behaviour (e.g. Hare, 1993; Babiak & Hare, 2006). More experimental 
evidence suggests psychopathic traits are associated with factors such as corporate 
ruthlessness (Babiak et al., 2010), scholastic cheating (Nathanson et al., 2006), and reduced 
cooperation when engaged in a task that requires negotiation with another character, for 
example the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (e.g. Curry et al., 2011; Rilling et al., 2007). 
 
Taken together, this body of work suggests that those with high psychopathic traits are less 
bound than others by social norms and moral codes, and maythus becapable of socially 
harmful behaviours.Whilst behaviour that is in breach of the law has attracted considerable 
attention, there is a paucity of work elucidating the potentially negative effects of 
psychopathy on social performance at a more subtle, everyday level. It seems probable that 
individuals with high psychopathic trait scores will behave less prosocially on a day-to-day 
basisthan those with lower trait scores, prioritising their own interests over those of 
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others.The present study was designed to investigate how the postulated empathic deficits 
associated with psychopathy translate into everyday social behaviour.  
 
One measure that has been used to study everyday prosocial behaviour is the Social Strategy 
Task (Channon et al., 2012). This consists of scenarios describing a range of everyday 
awkward situations that require weighing one’s own interests against those of another person. 
The task has been shown to differentiate between individuals high and low in social skill; 
more skilled people were found to show greater consideration for others than less skilled 
people.  
 
5.1.1 Hypotheses 
In Experiment 1, people who were high versus low in self-reported psychopathic traits were 
compared on the Social Strategy Task, to assess their responses to awkward social requests 
for favours or favourable opinions. It was expected that those high in psychopathic traits 
would employ fewer positive, compliance-based social strategies when responding to 
awkward requests, as compared to those low in psychopathic traits. It was also expected that 
the high trait group would rate these awkward social situations to be less awkward than the 
low trait group. Experiment 2 systematically manipulated the characteristics of the social 
situation to compare performance in situations involving a request for a favour against a 
request for an opinion. With respect to this manipulation, it was expected that any group 
differences in awkwardness ratings and strategy usage would be exacerbated in situations 
involving a request for a favour, since compliance in these situations was thought to incur a 
higher personal cost to participants.  
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5.2 EXPERIMENT 1A: SOCIAL STRATEGY USAGE IN AWKWARD 
SITUATIONS 
 
5.2.1 Methods 
 
5.2.1.1 Screening phase 
Ethical approval for all studies in the present thesis was obtained from the UCL Research 
Ethics Committee. An opportunistic sample of 502 full-time university students (217m, 285f), 
who were fluent in English and aged 18 or over, was recruited for the screening phase of the 
study. All participants provided informed consent before completing the PPI-SF (Lilienfeld 
and Hess, 2001). As an incentive, participants were entered into a prize draw and informed 
that they might be invited to a second stage of the study, for which they would receive 
payment.  
 
The PPI-SF (Lilienfeld and Hess, 2001) is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure 
personality traits central to the construct of psychopathy, for example egocentricity, 
impulsivity, cold-heartedness, capacity to manipulate and fearlessness. The PPI-SF consists 
of 56 statements on a 4-point, Likert-type scale with ‘False’,  ‘Mostly False’, ‘Mostly True’and 
‘True’as possible responses; higher scores indicate higher degrees of psychopathy. In order 
to ensure consistent responding, questionnaire items are counterbalanced such that 
psychopathic traits are associated with agreeing with half the statements and disagreeing with 
the remaining half. The PPI-SF total score has been found to have good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha .85) and correlates well with the full version of the PPI (r= .90).  
 
Total PPI-SF scores were calculated for the whole sample. In order to select the high and 
low psychopathic trait groups for the testing phase, participants scoring at the highest and 
lowest ends of the sample distribution were systematically contacted (i.e. starting with the 
highest scorer and moving lower for the high trait group, and starting with the lowest scorer 
and moving higher for the low trait group). Thus, 98 participants whose scores fell within 
the upper and lower tenth percentiles of the sample distribution were contacted and invited 
to take part in the second stage of the study. This consisted of 47 individuals (26m, 21f) in 
the upper range and 51 individuals (11m, 40f) in the lower range.  
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5.2.1.2 Testing phase 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Design 
A between-groups design was used to compare high-PPI and low-PPI participants. 
 
5.2.1.2.2 Participants  
Of those contacted from the screening phase, 20 high-scoring (10m, 10f) and 19 low-scoring 
(4m, 15f) individuals agreed to take part in the testing phase of the study. As anticipated, the 
groups differed significantly on PPI-SF scores, t(38)=22.64, p< 0.0001; the mean scores were 
154.1 (SD 8.14) and 98.10 (SD 7.26) for the high and low groups respectively. The groups 
did not differ significantly in age, t(38)=1.52, p =0.137; the mean ages were 19.85 years (SD 
1.60) and 21.00 years (SD 2.96) for the high and low groups respectively.  
 
5.2.1.2.3 Procedure 
All participants provided written informed consent before completing the Social Strategy 
Task and a brief health screen to ensure that nobody with a history of significant psychiatric 
or neurological illness was included; no participants were excluded on this basis. Participants 
were paid for taking part. 
 
5.2.1.2.4 Materials 
5.2.1.2.4.1Social Strategies Task  
The Social Strategies Task (Channon et al., 2012) consists of 10 vignettes, each describing 
everyday social situations in which a character known to the participant (i.e. friend, relative, 
colleague or neighbour) poses an awkward question involving asking the participant for a 
favour or a favourable opinion. The gender of the main characters, the type of relationship 
and the social context varied across scenarios. Presentation of the materials was randomly 
counterbalanced such that half of each group (high versus low) were shown a different 
order of items to control for order effects. 
 
The social strategy scenarios were designed to pit self-interest against consideration for 
others, giving the opportunity to study participants’ priorities in situations with no right or 
wrong answers. Each scenario description made it clear that it was in the main characters’ 
interest to get participants to comply with their requests, and in the participants’ interest not 
to comply, since compliance would necessitate incurring a personal cost of some kind. The 
task required participants to decide the extent to which they would comply with requests and 
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how they would communicate these to the main characters. See Figure 5.1 for example 
scenario. 
 
Figure 5.1: Example scenario from Social Strategies Task 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Story stem 
“Your cousin likes to come and stay with you. She is good company but when she visits 
she expects you to pay to take her out to expensive places.” 
During a phone call she asks: “Can I come and visit you next weekend?” 
Questions for each scenario 
1. What would you say in this situation? 
2. On a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 represents ‘not at all awkward’ and 100 ‘extremely 
awkward’, how awkward would you say this situation is?” 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.2.1.2.4.2 Administration 
After reading the instructions, participants were given an instruction sheet, shown an 
example item, and allowed to ask questions. All scenarios and corresponding questions were 
then presented one at a time, in a paper booklet. Participants responded verbally to all 
questions. The scenario remained on display until participants had completed the relevant 
questions in order to reduce the confounding effects of memory load.  
 
5.2.1.2.4.3 Scoring 
Strategy Usage. For each scenario, verbal responses were described as positive (i.e. 
prosocial) if they complied at least partially with the main characters’ requests, and negative 
if they did not comply. There were three categories each for positive and negative strategies; 
these were counted for each participant, and calculated as percentage scores.  
Positive responses were classified into one of three categories, according to the degree of 
prosocial behaviour:simple acquiescence, qualified acquiescence with an excuse, and 
qualified acquiescence with negative feedback. Simple acquiescence referred to responses in 
which participants agreed to the characters’ requests without qualification (e.g. ‘yes you can 
stay with me). Qualified acquiescence with an excuse referred to responses in which they 
partially or conditionally agreed to the character’s request, with an excuse based either on 
altering the interpretation of the behaviour of the main character to a more favourable one 
or an excuse based on the participant’s difficulty in complying fully (e.g. ‘Yes, come along 
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but this time I’d like to stay home and have dinner because its cosier than a 
restaurant’).Qualified acquiescence with negative feedback implied criticism by making direct 
reference to some undesirable aspect of the main character’s behaviour as a justification for 
lack of full compliance (e.g. Yes, but I expect you to pay your share of whatever we have to 
pay for).  
Negative strategies were classified into one of three categories, depending upon the degree 
of prosocial behaviour: justified refusal with an excuse that protected the main character’s 
feelings (e.g. Sorry but I’ve got other plans that weekend, maybe some other time), justified 
refusal with negative feedback that implied criticism of the main character (e.g. No, I can’t 
afford to keep taking you out), and outright refusal. Outright refusal strategies consisted of 
simple refusals to comply with the character’s request (e.g. No you can’t visit next weekend).  
Perceived awkwardness. Awkwardness ratings were averaged across the ten 
scenarios.  
 
5.2.2 RESULTS 
 
5.2.2.1. Statistical analyses 
Where possible, parametric tests were conducted throughout the present thesis, since they 
have greater power to reject a false null hypothesis than non-parametric equivalents (e.g. 
Howell, 1997), and provide greater flexibility with respect to multivariate analyses. However, 
parametric tests require the underlying distribution of the data to approximate to the normal 
distribution. It is therefore important to ensure that assumptions of normality have been met 
by the data. In all experimental studies presented in this thesis, the data were initially assessed 
for outliers and for skewness, following the methods recommended by Tabachnick and 
Fidell (1983), who state that the standard error for skewness is calculated as follows: 
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Ss = √6/N 
(N=number of cases) 
 
This value can then be put into the equation below, using the z distribution: 
 
Z = S – 0 
        Ss 
(S = computed value for skewness).  
 
If the data are from a normal distribution, a z-value in excess of +2.58 would lead to the 
rejection of the assumptions of normality of the distribution at p< .01. In the present study, 
the data were considered to be skewed beyond the parameters of the normal distribution if 
S>2.58√ (6/N) or S<-2.58√ (6/N). For the high trait group in the current study, n=20 and 
therefore S = 1.413; for the low trait group, n=19 and therefore S = 1.450.   
 
One method of adjusting data to reduce skewness and the potential impact of outliers is to 
perform a transformation. Throughout this thesis, when data transformation was required, 
the most appropriate transformation was decided upon using Tukey’s ‘ladder of 
transformations’ (Erickson & Nosenchuk, 1977). 
 
Examination of the present data showed that all but one of the variables was normally 
distributed; outright refusals for the high trait group was skewed. This variable could not be 
transformed to normality. However, a non-parametric test showed a similar result to a 
parametric test, and parametric analyses were therefore reported throughout. The data were 
also checked for outliers, specifically to ensure that the data fell within three standard 
deviations of the mean. Each variable was converted into a standard score (z-score); no data 
point was found to exceed + 3 using this method. A significance level of .05 was adopted 
throughout this thesis. Where post-hoc t-tests were conducted, a stricter significance level 
of .05/number of tests was adopted. Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the 
measures described below are presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for the Social 
Strategy Task.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group  Low PPI Group 
Mean (SD)   Mean (SD) 
(N=20)   (N=19) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Positive Strategy Usage (%)    
 Acquiescence   10.50 (12.34)  23.68 (12.57) 
 Qualification with excuse 20.00 (11.23)  24.21 (9.61) 
 Qualification with feedback 16.00 (12.31)  9.47 (10.26)  
  
Negative Strategy Usage (%) 
 Justification with excuse 26.50 (11.82)  28.95 (14.49) 
 Justification with feedback 18.50 (10.40   12.63 (10.98) 
 Outright refusal  8.50 (10.89)  1.05 (3.15)   
Awkwardness (%)   42.76 (13.36)  56.07  (12.05) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.2.2.2 Positive strategy usage 
The high and low PPI groups were compared on their usage of simple acquiescence, qualified 
acceptance with excuses and qualified acceptance with negative feedback. A t-test showed 
that the high PPI group used significantly fewer acquiescent social strategies than the low 
PPI group, t(38)=3.31, p=.002. The groups did not differ significantly in their use of 
acceptances qualified by excuses, t(38)=1.25, p=.218, or acceptances qualified by negative 
feedback, t(38)=1.79, p=.081.   
 
5.2.2.3 Negative strategy usage 
The groups did not differ significantly in their usage of justifications for refusal qualified by 
excuses, t(38)=0.58, p=.566, nor justifications for refusal qualified by negative feedback, 
t(38)=1.72, p=.095. The high PPI group used significantly more outright refusal strategies 
than the low PPI group, t(38)=2.87, p=.007. 
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5.2.2.4 Perceived awkwardness  
With respect to awkwardness, the high PPI group rated the scenarios to be significantly less 
awkward than did the low PPI group; t(38)=3.26, p=.002. 
 
5.2.2.5 Gender 
Since the gender distribution was uneven in the low PPI group, these analyses were repeated 
using ANCOVAs with gender as a covariate. The effect of gender did not reach significance 
for any of these analyses (p>.05) and did not change the overall pattern of results.  
 
5.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 1A 
 
The main findings of Experiment 1Awere that, as expected, the high psychopathic trait group 
was less prosocial in approaching the awkward requests than the low psychopathic trait group. 
With respect to strategy usage, the high trait participants were less likely to acquiesce with 
requests and more likely to give outright refusals than the low trait group. They also perceived 
the situations to be less awkward than did the low trait participants. 
 
The awkward situations presented in Experiment 1A varied in their nature, consisting of 
both requests for opinions and favours. The nature of the request might in itself influence 
prosocial behaviour, making different demands on participants. For example, requests for 
both undesirable favours and opinions are likely to carry an emotional cost, since both types 
of request potentially set up internal conflict between what the individual wants to say or do 
and what the main character wants them to say or do. Since requests for favours involve 
actions, they may also carry a practical cost in terms of money, time or physical effort, 
whereas this is not the case when asked for a favourable opinion. Experiment 1Bwas 
designed to investigate the influence of relative cost by systematically comparing both 
opinions and favours. Each of the scenarios was presented twice, once ending with a request 
for a favour and once ending with a request for an opinion. 
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5.3 EXPERIMENT 1B: STRATEGY USAGE AND TYPES OF AWKWARD 
REQUESTS 
 
5.3.1 Methods 
 
5.3.1.1 Screening phase 
A new sample of 401 full-time university students (177m, 224f) who were fluent in English 
and aged 18 and above was opportunistically recruited. All participants gave informed 
consent and completed the PPI-SF; they were entered into a prize draw and told that they 
might be invited to the next phase of the study, which would be paid. Total PPI-SF scores 
were calculated for the whole sample. Forty ‘high PPI’ participants, whose scores fell within 
the upper tenth percentile (18m, 22f) and forty ‘low PPI’ participants, whose scores fell 
within the lower tenth percentile (9m, 31f) were invited to take part in the second stage of 
the study.  
 
5.3.1.2 Testingphase  
5.3.1.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of PPI group (high vs. low scorers) and one 
within-participants factor of type of cost (option vs. favour).  
 
5.3.1.2.2 Participants  
A between-groups design was again used to compare high- and low-PPI participants. Of 
those contacted from the screening phase, 19 high-scoring (9m, 10f) and 19 low-scoring (4m, 
15f) individuals agreed to participate in the testing phase. As anticipated, the groups differed 
significantly on PPI-SF scores, t(36)=14.81, p< 0.0001. The mean PPI-SF scores were 155.95 
(SD 9.35) and 108.37 (SD 10.43) for the high and low groups respectively. The groups did 
not differ significantly in age, t(36)=0.24, p =0.816; the mean ages were 19.42 years (SD 1.17) 
and 19.31 years (SD 1.56) for the high and low groups respectively. After giving written 
informed consent, participants completed the Revised Social Strategy Task with two types 
of personal cost, and a brief health screen. The experiment lasted approximately 30-50 
minutes and participants were paid for taking part.  
 
5.3.1.2.3 Procedure 
All participants in the testing phase provided written informed consent and completed a brief 
health screen to ensure that nobody with a history of significant psychiatric or neurological 
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illness was included; no participants were excluded on this basis. Participants were paid for 
taking part. 
 
5.3.1.2.4Materials 
5.3.1.2.4.1 The Social Strategies Task: Revised 
This was an extension of the Social Strategy Task described in Experiment 1A. In this version 
of the task, the 10 vignettes describing a character posing an awkward question each had two 
variants, one involving a request for a favour and the other for a favourable opinion, 
representing different types of personal cost; order of presentation of the two variants was 
counterbalanced across scenarios. See Figure 5.2 for an example scenario: 
 
Figure 5.2: Example scenario from Social Strategies Task: Revised 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Story Stem 
“Your cousin likes to come and stay with you. She is good company but when she visits 
she expects you to pay to take her out to expensive places.” 
OPINION ENDING:  During a phone call she asks: “Do you like having me to stay?” 
FAVOUR ENDING: During a phone call she asks: “Can I come and visit you next 
weekend?” 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.3.1.2.4.2 Scoring  
The questions and corresponding scoring system for the revised task was identical to that 
used for Experiment 1A.  Two blind, independent raters conducted all scoring in accordance 
with this system, and had an agreement rate of 96%.  
 
5.3.2 Results 
 
The protocol for statistical analysis was identical to that specified in Experiment 1A. Means 
and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures described below are presented in 
Table 5.2. Parametric analyses were again reported, since although there was skewness in 
several variables (simple acquiescence, qualified acquiescence with negative feedback, and 
qualified refusal with negative feedback), non-parametric tests showed a similar pattern of 
findings.  
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Table 5.2: Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for the Social 
Strategies Task with two personal cost variants.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group   Low PPI Group 
Mean   (SD)    Mean (SD)  
(N=19)    (N=19)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Positive Strategy Usage (%)    
   Acquiescence          
Opinions  1.58 (5.01)    2.11 (4.19)
 Favours  1.05 (3.15)    0.53 (2.29) 
   Qualification with excuse         
Opinions  22.11 (13.16)    30.00 (13.74) 
 Favours  22.11 (15.12)    40.00 (17.00)   
Qualification with negative feedback        
Opinions  10.00 (12.91)     9.47 (9.70)
 Favours    4.74 (8.41)    4.21 (6.07) 
  
Negative Strategy Usage (%) 
    Justification with excuse         
Opinions  19.47 (12.24)    22.63 (15.22)
 Favours  24.21 (15.02)    28.95 (12.86) 
   Justification with negative feedback        
Opinions  12.11 (17.51)    11.05 (11.97)
 Favours  3.16 (7.49)    1.05 (3.15) 
   Outright refusal          
Opinions  34.74  (20.65)   24.74 (20.10)
 Favours  44.74 (15.77)    25.26 (19.26) 
   
Awkwardness (%)          
Opinions  49.16  (16.85)    57.89 (9.73) 
Favours  47.68  (15.81)    56.16 (11.73) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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5.3.2.1 Positive strategy usage 
The high and low PPI groups were compared on their usage of acquiescence, qualification 
with excuses and qualification with negative feedback strategies for the two request type 
variants. For acquiescent strategies, a 2 x 2 Anova (group by type of request) showed no 
significant main effect of group, F(1, 36)=0.00, p= 1.00; the effect of request type was not 
significant, F(1, 36)=2.77, p=.105, nor the group by request interaction, F(1, 36)=0.692, 
p=.411. The high PPI group used significantly fewer acceptance strategies qualified by 
excuses, F(1, 36)=11.88, p=.002; the effect of personal cost was not significant, F(1, 36)=2.76, 
p=.105, nor the group by cost interaction, F(1, 36)=2.76, p=.105. The effect of group was 
not significant for acceptance strategies qualified by negative feedback, F(1, 36)=0.04, 
p=.834; the effect of personal cost was significant, F(1, 36)=7.98, p=.008, and there was no 
significant group by cost interaction, F(1, 36)=0.01, p=.999. 
 
5.3.2.2 Negative strategy usage 
The high and low PPI groups were compared on their usage of refusal justified by excuses, 
refusal justified by negative feedback and outright refusal strategies for the two personal cost 
variants. For refusal justified by excuses, there was no significant main effect of group, F(1, 
36)=1.17, p=.288; there was a significant effect of personal cost, F(1, 36)=4.39, p=.043, and 
the group by cost interaction was not significant, F(1, 36)=0.09, p=.766. When refusals 
justified by negative feedback were examined, the main effect of group was not significant, 
F(1, 36)=0.36, p=.550; there was a significant effect of personal cost, F(1, 36)=13.38, p=.001, 
and the group by cost interaction was not significant, F(1, 36)=0.41, p=.840. For outright 
refusal strategies, there was a significant main effect of group, F(1, 36)=8.71, p=.006; the 
effect of personal cost was not significant, F(1, 36)=2.09, p=.157, nor the group by cost 
interaction, F(1, 36)=1.70, p=.201. 
 
5.3.2.3 Perceived awkwardness  
With respect to awkwardness, the high PPI group rated the scenarios to be significantly less 
awkward than did the low PPI group, F(1, 36)=4.16, p=.049; the effect of personal cost was 
not significant, F(1, 36)=1.10, p=.302, nor the group by cost interaction, F(1, 36)=0.01, 
p=.932.  
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5.3.2.4 Gender 
Since the gender distribution was uneven in the low PPI group, these analyses were repeated 
using ANCOVAs with gender as a covariate. The effect of gender did not reach significance 
for any of these analyses (p>.05) and did not change the overall pattern of results.  
 
5. 4 Discussion  
 
The present study was designed to examine how psychopathic personality traits translate into 
everyday social behaviour. Two experiments compared participants who were high and low 
in self-reported psychopathic traits on variants of a social strategy task. Experiment 1 
examined the types of strategies used in awkward social situations that ended with the main 
character asking participants for either a favour or an opinion. Experiment 2 extended this 
by manipulating the nature of the main characters’ requests to compare different types of 
demand so that all task items had two variants, one involving a favour and one an opinion. 
Participants’ strategy usage was assessed by classifying their verbal responsesinto one of six 
categoriesdescribing the extent of prosocial behaviour, in descending order:simple 
acquiescence with the main characters’requests, qualified acquiescence with an excuse, 
andqualified acquiescence with negative feedback (positive strategies); justified refusal with 
an excuse, justified refusal with negative feedback, and outright refusal of the main characters’ 
requests (negative strategies). In line with predictions, the main findings for both experiments 
were that the high trait group was less prosocial in strategy usage, and also rated the situations 
to be less awkward than did the low trait group. 
 
With respect to the effects of the manipulation in Experiment 2, participants across groups 
refused requests more tactfully in the favour condition than in the opinion condition, since 
they used more justified refusals with excuses in response to requests for favours and more 
justified refusals with negative feedback in response to requests for favourable opinions. This 
may reflect differences in the emotional and/or practical costs associated with the two types 
of request. Both opinions and favours may incur emotional costs linked on the one hand to 
discomfort or resentment if they lied or avoided direct discussion of the main character’s 
behaviour (such as giving a positive opinion when asked if they enjoyed the visits of the 
cousin in the example who likes to be taken to expensive places, or complying with her 
request for a favour by allowing her to stay without raising this); or on the other hand to the 
anxiety or guilt caused or the longer-term consequences for the relationship if they did 
express their dissatisfaction with the request (such as making direct reference to being 
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expected to spend money on the cousin in responding to requests for both opinions and 
favours). By contrast, the favours were more likely to incur practical costs such as financial 
expenditure of loss of time. The overall difference in type of negative strategy employed 
between conditions may have arisen since it was easier for participants to find an excuse to 
avoid compliance with a request for a practical favour (e.g. telling the cousin they were busy) 
than to find an excuse to avoid offering a favourable opinion. Contrary to predictions, group 
membership did not interact with request type. This lack of interaction may have occurred 
since both groups were predominantly influenced by the emotional costs common to both 
favour and opinion conditions, thus focusing on these and disregarding the practical costs 
associated with only the favour condition.  
 
Examining strategy usage in people high in psychopathic traits illuminates the nuances of 
how they approach their social world, and how they navigate solutions when faced with 
awkward social encounters. A significant body of research into psychopathy has focused on 
the relationship to criminal behaviour and extreme acts. For instance, a range of studies 
investigating cognitive and emotional difficulties in psychopathy has compared psychopathic 
and non-psychopathic prisoners. There is also work evaluating psychopathy with respect to 
moral behaviour. One salient example of this is The Trolley Dilemma (e.g. Bartels & Pizarro, 
2011), in which participants are required to make moral decisions that result in the death of 
either one person or five people. Psychopathic traits are typically linked to more utilitarian 
judgments where the most logical decision prevails, in contrast with control groups who may 
save one individual rather than five when the level of emotional involvement is high. Studies 
such as these often use extreme cases involving substantial physical harm or emotional 
distress. By contrast, the present study focused on social functioning at a commonplace level. 
The evidence of reduced prosocial behaviour in social interactions highlights the potentially 
pervasive influence of psychopathic traits in everyday life.  
 
A range of factors might have accounted for the differences in behaviour between the high 
and low psychopathic trait groups. It is noted that the upper and lower deciles of the 
screening samples in both experiments differed in their gender balance, with roughly even 
males and females scoring high and mostly females scoring low in psychopathic traits; this 
was also reflected in the samples tested. It is thus difficult to differentiate between the 
influence of psychopathic traits and gender. However, the literature reveals that psychopathy 
is more commonly diagnosed in males than in females (Patrick, 2006; Hartung & Widiger, 
1998), and thus gender differences are likely to be intrinsically linked to trait groups. What 
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other factors potentially account for the group differences in performance? These are 
unlikely to be attributable to memory, since the social scenarios and related questions 
remained on display throughout the task to reduce memory load. It is also unlikely that the 
groups differed in ability to understand the concrete, literal meanings of the scenarios and 
what the story characters were requesting, since the items were presented in short, simple 
form, and all participants were both university students and fluent English speakers. For 
example, if asked in relation to the cousin’s visit scenario, ‘Can I come and visit you next 
weekend?’, it is probable that all participants were able to infer that the scenario character 
wanted to know whether they could come and stay.  
 
Despite understanding the literal meaning of the requests, it may be that the high 
psychopathic trait group did not comprehend the non-literal subtext behind them. For 
instance, in the example of the cousin’s visit, there was an implication that the cousin 
specifically wanted a favourable response (i.e. that she could come and stay). Participants 
whose interpretations of the questions are limited to a literal understanding without grasping 
the subtext may be less tactful and less compliant with the requests than those who do 
appreciate the subtext. Since the high trait group gave responses that were less favourable 
than those of the low trait group, one possible explanation is therefore that they failed to 
infer the non-literal meanings behind the characters’ requests, and did not fully appreciate 
what was in fact being asked of them. Failure to understand the subtext of the requests might 
also be linked to difficulties in anticipating the consequences of the participants’ responses 
for the main characters. The immediate consequences of not complying with requests might 
be distress or inconvenience for the characters. In the longer-term, failure to comply could 
also damage the relationship with the characters. Thus, in the cousin’s visit scenario, telling 
the cousin that she could not visit at the weekend might cause immediate upset, and also lead 
to longer-term strain on the relationship with her. This explanation could also potentially 
account for the finding that high trait participants perceived the situations to be less awkward 
than did the low trait participants. They may have lacked awareness of the discrepancy 
between the favourable responses desired by the main characters and their own, less 
favourable perspective. 
 
Accounting for the present findings in terms of a failure to appreciate the non-literal subtexts 
and the potential consequences of not complying with characters’ requests could be linked 
to difficulties in cognitive empathy. However, there is relatively little evidence to support 
this. People with psychopathy demonstrate intact performance on a range of traditional 
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cognitive empathy tasks, for example those that measure faux pas and false belief (e.g. Jones 
et al., 2010), and can accurately answer questions about the mental states of story characters 
(Dolan & Fullam, 2004). Alternatively, deficits in emotional empathy have been more 
consistently acknowledged, with a substantial literature demonstrating errors in identifying 
emotions in others (Blair et al., 2001b; Blair & Coles, 2000; Stevens et al., 2001; Kosson et 
al., 2002b; Blair et al., 2001) and diminished physiological responsivity when witnessing 
others in distress (e.g. Blair et al., 1997; Vaidyanathan et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2011; 
Crowe & Blair, 2008; Blair, 2010). This is often accompanied by self-reported distress ratings 
comparable to those of control participants, suggesting that those with psychopathy 
understand the emotion that is felt in a variety of situations without necessarily experiencing 
it.  
 
Although deficits in either cognitive or emotional empathy could potentially explain the 
present pattern of results, impaired emotional empathy is more consistent with the construct 
of psychopathy and is thus more likely to account for the differences in performance between 
the high and low psychopathic trait groups. Emotional rather than cognitive factors may 
have primarily driven performance when complying with requests in the social strategy task. 
If participants identify emotionally with the main characters, this may increase the extent to 
which they prioritise the need to spare their feelings in order to avoid negative consequences 
for them. For instance, in the example of the cousin’s visit, participants may have initially 
wished to express their own dissatisfaction with the situation and tell the cousin that they 
did not like having to pay for everything when she came to visit. However, by resonating 
emotionally with the potential distress that this would cause her, they may have felt unable 
to give their honest opinion and substituted a more favourable one. Since the high trait 
participants were generally less compliant than the low trait participants, it is possible that 
they lacked emotional investment in the social interactions and failed to experience empathic 
distress at the prospect of non-compliance. They may thus have been concerned exclusively 
with their own interests and thus were not motivated to address the needs of the main 
characters. A lack of consideration for the main characters may also account for the finding 
that the high trait group rated the scenarios to be significantly less awkward than did the low 
trait group. Greater experience of awkwardness in the low trait group may have reflected an 
internal struggle to reach a suitable compromise between their own preferences (for example, 
wishing to tell the cousin that she could not come to stay) and those of the main characters 
(the cousin wanting to visit). High awkwardness ratings may have thus arisen either from the 
prospect of fulfilling an undesirable request, or from the prospect of disappointing or 
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upsetting the main character. If high trait participants did not care about the characters, and 
were happy to prioritise their own needs, they may have not experienced the same degree of 
awkwardness.  
 
In summary, the present study employed an experimental task to compare the use of social 
strategies and self-reported awkwardness in awkward, everyday social situations in those high 
and low in psychopathic personality traits. With respect to the extent of compliance, the high 
trait group were less prosocial in their strategy usage and perceived the situations to be less 
awkward than the low trait group. The findings help to illuminate some of the ways in which 
psychopathic traits translate into everyday social behaviour. Specifically, when interacting 
with people in their social world, those who feel less awkward in complex social situations 
and are unconcerned with another individual’s prospective distress may be less prone to do 
favours for their friends, family and colleagues, or to moderate their honest, potentially 
hurtful opinions. The most likely explanation for the differences in performance between 
groups is impaired emotional empathy, a prominent feature of psychopathy. Further research 
is needed to illuminate what characteristics of social situations might differentially influence 
those high and low in psychopathic traits, and how these might be ameliorated to increase 
prosocial behaviour.  
 
5. 5 THE NEXT STUDY: EXPLORING COST FURTHER 
Experiment 1B serves as the first study in this line of research, and was designed to 
investigate how the external value of a request might affect prosocial behaviour. Requests 
for favours and requests for favourable opinions were systematically compared, since it was 
thought that these two types of request might carry different external values, in terms of 
emotional and practical costs. For instance, requests for favourable opinions may incur an 
emotional cost due to the experience of internal conflict; requests for favours may incur an 
emotional cost in addition to practical costs such as a loss of time or money. Another 
valuable direction in this line or research might be to compare relative value, or different levels 
of the same cost. Different types of emotional/practical cost elicited differences in both 
groups, but without an interaction suggesting that whether the costs were emotional or 
practical was not relevant. However, not only the type of cost, but also the extent of the 
effort or sacrifice involved in responding might also influence responding. As the cost to the 
individual increases, those high in psychopathic traits might become differentially less 
inclined to respond favourably. The next experiment will examine how higher or lower costs 
of the same type might differentially influence the groups.  
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Chapter 6: Reciprocity and the relative value of social exchanges  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The present study investigated reciprocity in everyday social exchanges to evaluate the effects 
of higher or lower costs for prosocial behaviour. Reciprocity in social interactions plays an 
important role in developing and maintaining harmonious, cooperative social relationships, 
for instance by building up a positive reputation (Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002) and 
enhancing feelings of group identity (Kerr & Kauffman-Gilliland, 1994). It has also been 
posited that reciprocity has served an evolutionary advantage; when people help others who 
have helped them, the survival of both is more likely (Trivers, 1971, Fiske 2004). In addition 
to securing beneficial outcomes in the future, one possible factor driving prosocial behaviour 
is the extent to which people find reciprocity gratifying. Rilling, Gutman, Zeh, Pagnoni, 
Sterns and Kilts (2002) demonstrated that reciprocity is associated with greater activation in 
brain areas that have commonly been linked with reward processing, such as the nucleus 
accumbens, the caudate nucleus, the ventromedial frontal/orbitofrontal cortex and the 
rostral anterior cingulate cortex. Thus, the authors argue that people experience positive 
reinforcement when behaving prosocially. 
 
Reciprocity in social exchanges has been studied predominantly using paradigms emerging 
from economic game theory. One well-known paradigm is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which 
participants have to decide whether or not to cooperate with an opponent. In the classic 
version of the game, two prisoners (A and B) have to decide whether or not to betray the 
other in order to avoid a prison sentence. If A betrays B but B remains silent, then A will be 
set free and B will serve three years in prison. If A and B betray each other, they will each 
serve two years in prison. If A and B both remain silent, they will each serve one year in 
prison. This dilemma involves making a decision to minimise losses or reduce punishment; 
alternative versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma have since been developed to investigate 
decision-making to maximise gains or increase reward, for example deciding whether to 
cooperate and share money equally versus betray and potentially obtain a greater share. 
Participants in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and other similar tasks are consistently biased towards 
cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Tversky & Shafir, 2004; Toh-Kyeong, Ostrom & 
Walker, 2002). 
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One drawback of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma is that it involves a one-off interaction; the 
participant’s decision is thus not motivated by a desire to protect their reputation for future 
interactions. To address this, iterated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma have been 
developed, in which the classic game is played repeatedly between the same players. This 
offers the opportunity to penalise opponents for betrayals, and evidence shows that people 
are more cooperative when future interactions are likely (Andreoni & Miller, 2002).  
 
A number of studies have investigated reciprocity in psychopathy using the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. Findings suggest that psychopathic participants are less cooperative than control 
participants, showing a greater propensity to accumulate gains and exploit opponents 
(Mokros, Menner, Eisenbarth, Alpers, Lange & Osterheider, 2008; Curry, Chesters & Viding, 
2011). In addition, those high in psychopathic traits are able to distinguish between one-shot 
and iterated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and adapt their strategy accordingly; their 
reduced rate of cooperation is exacerbated in one-shot games in which uncooperative 
decisions incur no future penalty (Curry et al., 2011).  
 
Experimental evidence has linked the lack of emotional responsivity commonly associated 
with psychopathy with their reduced reciprocity in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Firstly, people 
high in psychopathic traits may not be motivated to reciprocate in order to reduce potential 
emotional distress in others. For instance, in one study, participants low versus high in 
psychopathic traits completed an iterated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which they 
were provided with affective feedback from the opponent; the opponent was rated to be 
‘very happy’ at the start of the game and became progressively more ‘sad’ each time 
participants chose not to reciprocate (Johnson, Hawes & Straiton, 2014). The findings 
showed that the low trait group increased their rate of cooperation in response to this 
affective feedback whereas the high trait group did not. Secondly, those high in psychopathic 
traits may not personally experience emotional distress in response to others’ failures to 
reciprocate. Thus, in one study, non-cooperation from opponents was associated with lower 
amygdala activity in those high versus low in psychopathic traits (Rilling, Glenn, Jairam, 
Pagnoni, Goldsmith et al., 2007), suggesting a lack of aversive conditioning in response to 
non-cooperation and therefore a lack of motivation to avoid non-reciprocal outcomes in the 
future. 
 
This simultaneous propensity to behave non-cooperatively and lack of emotional response 
to others’ non-cooperation may indicate that people with psychopathy are less concerned 
89 
 
with fairness and equity in social exchanges, and are not motivated to develop or maintain a 
reciprocal relationship with their opponents. This is further supported by evidence 
demonstrating that those with psychopathy are less likely to intervene in order to reverse or 
punish decisions that involve an unfair outcome (e.g. monetary penalty) for a third party in 
an economic game, even when they do not personally stand to lose (Masui, Iriguchi & Ura, 
2014). However, when given an incentive (e.g. monetary reward) for intervening, they did 
act against unfair decisions.  
 
Whilst the Prisoner’s Dilemma and other neuroeconomic games have provided valuable 
insights into reciprocity, the highly structured types of payoffs and decisions made in such 
games do not reflect cooperative decision-making as found in everyday contexts (Johnson, 
Stopka & Bell, 2002). Firstly, everyday social exchanges typically take place in a variety of 
settings, such as the workplace, educational settings, in the home or in public. Secondly, these 
exchanges incur varying levels of cost, and studies show that people are sensitive to this value, 
with prosocial behaviour decreasing as the cost of helping increases (e.g. Dovidio, 1984). 
Thirdly, the characters in traditional neuroeconomic paradigms are established as opponents 
or competitors, and are generally anonymous (e.g. Johnson et al., 2014) or strangers (e.g. 
Rilling et al., 2007), whereas many everyday reciprocal interactions involve family, friends 
and acquaintances. There is a paucity of work investigating how the posited lack of 
reciprocity in psychopathy manifests in everyday social exchanges. The present study focused 
on this through exchanges incurring varying levels of cost in which the characters were 
known to the participants in the context of an ongoing relationship. 
 
6.1.1 Hypotheses 
The present study involved the development of a novel research tool, the Social Exchange 
Task. This was designed to expand on the findings from the studies presented in Chapter 5.1 
and 5.2 in two key ways. Firstly, in the social strategies task described in 5.1, the interactions 
involved the characters making a request of the participant. By contrast, the Social Exchange 
Task involved characters who had previously done a favour for the participant and then 
offered a second favour. Secondly, the revised Social Strategy Task experimentally 
manipulated the type of cost incurred by behaving prosocially, and did not find high versus 
low trait groups to be differentially influenced. In the present study, the relative value of the 
cost rather than the type of cost was manipulated, in order to compare prosocial responding 
in situations in which returning a favour involves a lesser versus greater cost.  
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It was expected that those high in psychopathic traits would be less reciprocal, both when 
asked to verbally respond to a character’s offer and when asked to choose from a set of 
options. This is consistent with evidence from a range of neuroeconomic paradigms 
investigating reciprocity (e.g. Mokros et al., 2008; Curry et al., 2011), in addition to the 
findings from Chapter 5.  
 
In line with evidence suggesting reduced emotional empathy in psychopathy (e.g. Blair et al., 
1997; Blair, 2010), it was expected that the high trait group would report less satisfaction 
with reciprocal responding and greater satisfaction with non-reciprocal responding, as 
compared to those low in psychopathic traits. It was also expected that when asked to justify 
their choices, the high trait group would use less ‘social’ reasoning (involving kind or 
empathic comments or explicit references to social mechanisms such as turn-taking) and 
more ‘practical reasoning (involving unelaborated comments, or references to purely 
practical information), than the low trait group.  
 
Although it was expected that the high trait group were likely to be less prosocial overall, this 
may have been somewhat moderated in situations where the cost of reciprocating is low, and 
thus the sacrifice or inconvenience to the participant is minimal, particularly if reciprocating 
is likely to increase potential future benefits. By contrast, in situations where the cost of 
reciprocating is high, the high trait group may have been less likely to be influenced by factors 
such as sympathy for the character or a desire to behave fairly than the low trait group. 
Therefore, with respect to the manipulation of relative cost, it was expected that any group 
differences in prosocial responding would be exacerbated in the more costly variant of 
scenarios.  
 
6.2 METHODS 
 
6.2.1 Screening Phase  
A sample of 646 full-time university students (264m, 380f) who were fluent in English and 
aged 18 and above was opportunistically recruited. All participants gave informed consent 
and completed the PPI-SF (Lilienfeld and Hess, 2001); they were entered into a prize draw 
and told that they might be invited to the next phase of the study, which would be paid. 
Total PPI-SF scores were calculated for the whole sample.  
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In the studies reported in Chapter 5, the high and low psychopathic trait groups were 
recruited by contacting the participants scoring at the highest and lowest ends of the 
screening sample distribution, without adjusting for gender. This resulted in an uneven 
number of male and female participants in the high and low psychopathic trait groups. This 
was unsurprising, since psychopathic traits are more commonly associated with males than 
females, and the inclusion of gender as a covariate did not influence the findings in these 
studies. However, women also present with psychopathic traits, and these may manifest in 
different ways to men (e.g. Forouzan & Cooke, 2005). It was therefore important to examine 
how psychopathic traits in men and in women translate into social behaviour, and to control 
for any potentially confounding influence of gender. Thus, in order to select the high and 
low psychopathic trait groups for the testing phase whilst maintaining even gender 
distribution in both groups, the strategy for contacting participants was revised from Chapter 
5 for the remaining studies in the present thesis.Male participants scoring at the highest and 
lowest ends of the distribution and female participants scoring at the highest and lowest ends 
of the distribution were systematically contacted (i.e. starting with the highest scoring males 
and females separately and moving lower for the high trait group, and starting with the lowest 
scoring males and females separately and moving higher for the low trait group, until group 
sizes were reached). On this basis, 33 high-scoring participants from the upper tenth 
percentile (16 males, 17 females) and 33 low-scoring participants from the lower twentieth 
percentile (20 males, 13 females) of the screening sample distribution were contacted by 
email or telephone and invited to take part in the second stage of the study.  
 
6.2.2 Testing Phase 
6.2.2.1 Design  
The study had one between-participants factor of PPI group (high vs. low scorers) and one 
within-participants factor of relative cost (lower-cost vs higher-cost).   
 
6.2.2.2 Participants 
Twenty high-scoring (10m, 10f) and 20 low-scoring (10m, 10f) individuals took part in the 
experimental stage of the study, which involved completing the Social Exchange Task and 
the Favours Task (reported in Chapter 7). As anticipated, the groups differed significantly 
on PPI-SF scores, (t(39)=22.48; p<.001). The mean PPI score was 161.52 (SD 9.61) and 
96.80 (SD 8.79) for the high and low groups respectively. The groups did not differ 
significantly in age (t(38)=.13; p=.897); the mean age was 20.30 (SD 1.98) and 20.20 (2.82) 
for the high and low groups respectively.  
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6.2.2.3 Procedure 
All participants provided written informed consent before completing the experimental tasks 
and a brief health screen to ensure that nobody with a history of significant psychiatric or 
neurological illness was included; no participants were excluded on this basis. Participants 
were paid for taking part. 
 
6.2.2.4 Materials  
6.2.2.4.1 Social Exchange Task  
The Social Exchange Task was designed to examine reciprocity in unequal social exchanges. 
This task consisted of 10 short scenarios (see Figure 6.1 for example), describing an 
interaction with a character known to the participant (such as a friend, sibling, colleague or 
flatmate). Each scenario describes a previous instance in which the character has done a 
favour for the participant, incurring a loss of time, effort or money (for example paying for 
a sandwich). The same character then offers to do a second, related favour for the participant. 
The participant is then asked a) to respond verbally to this offer, b) to make a choice between 
reciprocating, compromising, or allowing the character to do the second favour, and c) to 
rate satisfaction which each of these options. Each scenario had two variants; in the first, 
lower-cost variant, the character offers to do another favour of lesser value than the original 
favour involving less effort, time or money (for example paying for coffee). If the participant 
chose to reciprocate, this would result in an advantageous social exchange, since their 
contribution would be smaller than the character’s. In the second, higher-cost variant, the 
character offers to do a favour of greater value than the original favour, involving more effort, 
time or money (for example paying for an evening meal). If the participant chose to 
reciprocate, this would result in a disadvantageous social exchange, since their contribution 
would be larger than the character’s original favour. Characters were counterbalanced across 
the scenarios for gender and proximity of relationship. Relationships with a clear hierarchy 
(for example boss, parent) were not included.  
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Figure 6.1: Example scenario from Social Exchange Task  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Story Stem 
“Last week when you and a friend went out for lunch, she paid for her own sandwich and 
yours.” 
LOWER-COST CONDITION: Today, you go out for coffee. When the bill comes, she 
says she will pay for your coffee. 
HIGER-COST CONDITION: Today, you go out for an evening meal in your local pub. 
When the bill comes, she says she will pay for your meal. 
Questions for each scenario 
1. What would you say in response? 
2. If you had to choose from the following three options, how would you respond in 
this situation?  
a. Thank her and let her pay for your coffee/meal 
b. Thank her but say you’ll pay for your own coffee/meal 
c. Thank her but pay for her coffee/meal and yours instead 
3. How satisfied would you be if you chose to let her pay for your coffee/meal? 
4. How satisfied would you be if you chose to pay for your own coffee/meal? 
5. How satisfied would you be if you chose to pay for her coffee/meal and yours 
instead? 
1= _______________________________________________________________ 10 = 
Not at all satisfied       Completely satisfied 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.2.2.4.2 Administration 
After reading the instructions, participants were shown an example item and allowed to ask 
questions. All scenarios and corresponding questions were then presented one at a time, in 
a paper booklet. Participants responded verbally to all questions. The scenario remained on 
display until participants had completed the relevant questions in order to reduce the 
confounding effects of memory load.  
 
6.2.2.4.3 Scoring  
6.2.2.4.3.1 Verbal responses 
Participants’ verbal responses to the question “what would you say in response” were 
coded according to a) course of action and b) justification of action, by one independent 
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rater and one rater who was not blind to group membership. The raters had an agreement 
rate of 93%. All disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Course of action. For each scenario, verbal responses were classified according to 
the extent to which they reciprocated the character’s original favour. There were three 
possible categories for course of action, which mapped onto the forced-choice ratings 
subsequently provided by participants:  non-reciprocal, compromise and reciprocal 
responses. Non-reciprocal responses (for example, allowing the friend to pay for the 
coffee/meal) were awarded a score of 1. Compromise responses (for example, paying for 
one’s own coffee, splitting the bill, or promising to take the friend out for coffee or a meal 
in the future) were awarded a score of two. Finally, reciprocal responses (for example, 
offering to pay for the coffee/meal instead of the character) were awarded a score of three. 
A composite verbal response reciprocity score was derived by summing course of action 
scores across all ten scenarios for each participant.  
Justification of action. This dimension relates to the extent and nature of the 
reasoning participants gave relating to their chosen course of action. Responses were 
classified with respect to whether they contained practical or social reasoning. Practical 
reasoning involved unelaborated responses that simply specified the course of action without 
explanation or provided practical explanations such as saving time or money. Social 
reasoning involved included references to the reciprocal, turn-taking nature of the exchange, 
references to the character’s positive attributes, or empathic comments. Responses that 
contained practical reasoning were awarded a score of 0 and those that contained social 
reasoning were awarded a score of 1. These scores were then summed across all 10 scenarios 
for each participant, with higher scores denoting a higher proportion of social reasoning. 
Example responses are presented in Figure 6.2:  
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Figure 6.2: Example responses and corresponding scoring 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. NON-RECIPROCAL 
Practical: 
“Yes, you can pay” 
“Thanks, I haven’t got any cash on me”  
Social: 
“I know it’s my turn, but it’d be great if you paid” 
“Thanks, that’s very generous of you”  
2. COMPROMISE  
Practical: 
“Let’s split the bill” 
“I’ve got enough money to pay for mine”  
Social: 
“You paid last time, let’s split it this time” 
“That’s very generous of you but we should split it”  
3. RECIPROCAL  
Practical: 
“No I’ll pay for both of us 
“I’ve got enough money to pay for both of us”  
Social: 
“No, it’s my turn to pay” 
“That’s not fair on you, I’ll pay”  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.2.2.4.3.2 Quantitative responses  
Reciprocity in forced choice alternatives. For each scenario, participants chose 
between a ‘nonreciprocal’ course of action (for example allow the character to pay for 
coffee/meal), a ‘compromise’ course of action (for example split the cost of the 
coffee/meal) and a ‘reciprocal’ course of action (for example pay for the coffee/meal 
instead). ‘Non-reciprocal’ choices were awarded a score of 1, ‘compromise’ choices a score 
of 2 and ‘reciprocal’ choices a score of 3. A composite forced-choice reciprocity score was 
derived by summing the scores across all ten scenarios for each participant. 
Satisfaction. Satisfaction scores for the ‘non-reciprocal’, ‘compromise’ and 
‘reciprocal’ options were also summed across all ten scenarios.  
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6.3 RESULTS 
 
The protocol for statistical analysis was identical to that specified in Chapter 5. The means 
and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures described below are presented in 
Table 6.1. Examination of the data showed that all variables were normally distributed. 
 
Table 6.1: Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for the Social 
Exchange Task with both cost variants.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group  Low PPI Group 
Mean   (SD)   Mean (SD) 
(N=20)   (N=20)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
VERBAL RESPONSES   
Reciprocity composite (%)    
Lower-cost   22.80 (3.82)   26.60 (3.62)  
Higher-cost   20.80 (2.97)   24.35 (2.60)  
Social reasoning (%)    
Lower-cost   25.50 (20.89)   51.00 (31.77)   
 Higher-cost   22.00 (18.24)   45.50 (30.86) 
QUANTITATIVE RESPONSES 
Reciprocity composite (%)    
Lower-cost   22.65 (4.09)   26.50 (3.49)  
Higher-cost   21.15 (2.50)   24.90 (2.47)  
Non-reciprocal satisfaction (%)    
Lower-cost   59.90 (20.98)   30.95 (16.08) 
 Higher-cost   45.00 (21.07)   26.30 (11.83)  
Compromise satisfaction (%)    
Lower-cost   61.95 (13.34)   53.65 (11.26) 
Higher-cost   68.15 (12.63)    62.90 (13.76) 
Reciprocal satisfaction (%)    
Lower-cost   68.45 (16.89)   79.75 (10.71)  
Higher-cost   58.35 (15.64)   70.05 (14.70)  
______________________________________________________________________  
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6.3.1 Qualitative responses 
6.3.1.1 Verbal response reciprocity score 
The high and low PPI groups were compared with respect to how reciprocal their verbal 
responses were. There was no significant interaction between group and the relative cost of 
the exchange (F(1,39)= .04; p=.836). There was a main effect of group (F(1,39)= 18.77; 
p<.001), such that the high trait group was less reciprocal than the low trait group. There was 
also a main effect of the relative cost of the exchange (F(1,39)= 12.49; p=.001), such that 
both groups were more reciprocal in the lower-cost condition than in the higher-cost 
condition. 
 
When the reciprocity score was broken down by chosen course of action, adopting a strict 
significance level of p=.017 (.05/3), it was found that the high trait group was significantly 
more likely to use non-reciprocal language (F(1,39)= 9.27; p=.004), and significantly less 
likely to use reciprocal language (F(1,39)= 21.65; p<.001), as compared to the low trait 
group. The high trait group also tended to refer to compromises to a greater extent than the 
low trait group, but this difference only approached significance (F(1,39)= 4.65; p=.037). 
 
6.3.1.2 Social reasoning 
The high and low PPI groups were compared with respect to extent to which their responses 
involved social reasoning. There was no significant interaction between group and the 
relative cost of the exchange (F(1,39)= .14; p=.734).There was a main effect of group 
whereby the high PPIs used less social reasoning than the low PPI group (F(1,39)= 10.05; 
p=.003. There was no main effect of cost (F(1,39)= 2.38; p=.131). 
 
6.3.2 Quantitative responses  
6.3.2.1 Forced choice reciprocity score 
The high and low PPI groups were compared with respect to how reciprocal their chosen 
courses of action were. There was no significant interaction between group and the relative 
cost of the exchange (F(1,39)= .01; p=.929). There was a main effect of group (F(1,39)= 
19.99; p<.001), such that the high trait group was less reciprocal than the low trait group. 
There was also a main effect of the relative cost of the exchange (F(1,39)= 7.77; p=.008), 
such that both groups were more reciprocal in the lower-cost condition than in the higher-
cost condition. 
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When the reciprocity score was broken down by chosen course of action, adopting a strict 
significance level of p=.017 (.05/3), it was found that the high trait group was significantly 
more likely to choose the non-reciprocate option (F(1,39)= 9.13; p=.004), and significantly 
less likely to choose the reciprocate option (F(1,39)= 21.01; p<.001), as compared to the 
low trait group. The groups did not differ with respect to the compromise option (F(1,39)= 
3.71; p=.062). 
 
6.3.2.2 Satisfaction scores  
The high and low PPI groups were compared with respect to how satisfied they reported 
being with the ‘non-reciprocate’, ‘compromise’ and ‘reciprocate’ options respectively. For 
the ‘non-reciprocate’ option, there was no significant interaction between group and cost 
(F(1,39)= 1.57; p=.218). There was a main effect of group (F(1,39)= 13.59; p=.001), such 
that the high trait group reported greater satisfaction with the non-reciprocal course of action 
than the low trait group. There was also a main effect of cost (F(1,39)= 23.41; p<.001), such 
that both groups were more satisfied with this option in the lower-cost versus higher-cost 
condition.  
 
With respect to the ‘compromise option’, there was no significant interaction between group 
and cost (F(1,39)= 1.01; p=.321), nor was there a main effect of group (F(1,39)= 3.27; 
p=.078). However, there was a main effect of cost (F(1,39)= 25.89; p<.001) such that both 
groups were more satisfied with the ‘compromise’ option in the higher-cost condition than 
in the lower-cost condition.  
 
With respect to the ‘reciprocate’ option, there was no significant interaction between group 
and cost (F(1,39)= .02; p=.904). There was a main effect of group (F(1,39)= 7.03; p=.012), 
such that the high trait group was less satisfied with the ‘reciprocate’ option than the low 
trait group. There was also a main effect of cost (F(1,39)= 36.07; p<.001), such that both 
groups were more satisfied with the ‘reciprocate’ option in the lower-cost condition than in 
the higher-cost condition.  
 
6.3.3 Gender  
 
In order to ensure that any group differences were due to PPI group membership rather than 
gender, these analyses were repeated using ANCOVAs with gender as a covariate. The effect 
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of gender did not reach significance for any of these analyses (p>.05) and did not change the 
overall pattern of results.  
 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The present study was designed to investigate reciprocal social behaviour in people high and 
low in psychopathic traits. The Social Exchange Task described situations in which a 
character had previously done a favour for the participant, and then offered to do a second, 
follow-up favour. This favour involved either greater or lesser effort or sacrifice than the 
original favour. Thus, if participants chose to reciprocate, the exchange would be 
advantageous when the second favour was less effortful than the first and disadvantageous 
when the second favour was more effortful than the first. The high trait group was less 
reciprocal overall, both when freely responding to the character’s offer and when choosing 
between various courses of action. The high trait group also made fewer references to the 
characters’ positive attributes or to the turn-taking nature of the exchange when responding 
to the characters’ offers as compared to the low trait group. Finally, the high trait group was 
more satisfied in relation to the non-reciprocal course of action and less satisfied in relation 
to the reciprocal course of action as compared to the low trait group.   
 
The findings indicated that the experimental manipulation of type of social exchange (lower 
or higher-cost) was effective; both groups were more reciprocal in the lower-cost variant. 
This is likely to reflect the fact that reciprocating in these exchanges was considerably less 
effort than reciprocating in the higher-cost variant. Participants across both groups were also 
more satisfied with both non-reciprocate and reciprocate options in the lower-cost variant 
and more satisfied with the compromise option in the higher-cost variant. This is likely to 
reflect the fact that the minimal effort required to carry out the second, lower-cost favour 
meant that the participants did not particularly mind whether the character or they 
themselves did so. By contrast, in the higher-cost condition, the participants may have felt 
that the effort required to carry out the second favour was excessive for one person; sharing 
the burden may thus have been the most satisfying course of action. Despite significant 
influence of the type of social exchange, there was no interaction between this and group 
membership; the high trait group may have been influenced by the relative cost of 
reciprocating in similar ways to the low trait group. Taken together with the findings reported 
in Chapter 5, neither the type nor the relative value of the cost differentially influences the 
high and low psychopathic trait groups’ prosocial responding.  
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The high and low psychopathic trait groups differed in their performance on the Social 
Exchange Task in a number of ways. Firstly, the high trait group was less reciprocal than the 
low trait group, which was in line with predictions. What factors could account for this group 
difference? One possible explanation is that the high trait group was not sensitive to the fact 
that reciprocity is socially encouraged and there is an expectation that people take turns. 
However, turn-taking ability is traditionally associated with cognitive empathy (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 2002) which is thought to be intact in psychopathy (e.g. Blair, 2008). It is thus unlikely 
that the high trait group did not understand the principle of turn-taking, particularly since 
the pattern of results between the two groups is similar: the high trait group reciprocated the 
majority of the time, they simply did so at a lower threshold than the low trait group.  
 
A more probable explanation of the group differences in reciprocity may be the extent to 
which the groups cared about the character’s original favour. The high trait group may have 
felt less gratitude for the original favour than the low trait group. They may have felt as 
though they didn’t ask for the favour in the first instance, and were thus absolved of the 
expectation to reciprocate. This explanation is consistent with deficits in emotional empathy, 
which have been commonly linked to psychopathy (e.g. Soderstrom, 2003). This explanation 
is also consistent with the findings relating to the reasoning participants used when 
generating a response to the characters. The high trait group was less likely to refer to the 
characters’ positive attributes, to praise the character or to actively express gratitude for their 
offer. By contrast, the low trait group was more likely to use socially sensitive justifications 
including references to turn-taking, flattering language or empathic comments, which 
typically reflected how unfair it would be if the character did a second, unreciprocated favour. 
 
Another possible explanation for group differences in reciprocity was the extent to which 
the participants found reciprocation rewarding. Reciprocal social behaviour may carry 
potential future benefits, such as ongoing favours from the character. The high trait group 
may have found this potential future reward enticing, and thus reciprocated to some extent. 
This coheres with the research evidence involving neuroeconomic games such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, which suggests that although those high in psychopathic traits are less 
prosocial than those low in psychopathic traits, they reciprocate more in repeated versus one-
off interactions. In addition to possible future benefits, reciprocal social interactions involve 
more intangible benefits such as recognition, praise or gratitude. The high trait group may 
have found these prospective benefits less attractive the low trait group. This may have been 
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reflected by the finding that in line with predictions, the high trait group reported that they 
would be less satisfied if they were to reciprocate and more satisfied if they chose not to 
reciprocate, as compared to the low trait group. This is also consistent with experimental 
work suggesting that those high in psychopathic traits are less receptive to social reward 
(Faulkes, McCrory, Neumann & Viding, 2014).  
 
In summary, the present study employed an experimental task to compare reciprocity in 
unequal social exchanges in those high and low in psychopathic personality traits. As 
compared to the low trait group, the high trait group was less reciprocal, less satisfied with 
the reciprocal course of action and more satisfied with the non-reciprocal course of action. 
The high trait group also made fewer empathic comments, references to the scenario 
character’s positive attributes or references to the concept of turn-taking when generating a 
direct reply to the character.  
 
6.5 THE NEXT STUDY: DESERVINGNESS AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
The experiments presented in chapters 5 and 6 suggest that whilst both groups are sensitive 
to cost manipulations, neither the type nor the relative value of cost differentially influence 
prosocial responding in those high versus low in psychopathic traits. The high trait group 
was thus thought to be less motivated to behave prosocially irrespective of how effortful the 
prosocial action might be. The next study will investigate prosocial behaviour from a 
different perspective. Rather than manipulating the effort required to do a favour, the next 
study will focus on the extent to which the character deserves the favour. 
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Chapter 7: Deservingness in prosocial behaviour 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 investigated how different types and relative values of cost influence 
prosocial behaviour in groups high and low in psychopathic traits. By contrast, the present 
chapter will move away from the influence of costs incurred by the person behaving 
prosocially, and instead focus on the extent to which the recipient of prosocial behaviour 
deserves help.  
 
What factors influence people to decide whether prosocial action is appropriate and 
deserved? Characteristics of the person requiring help may influence prosocial responding. 
Some studies have shown that people are more prosocial when they judge those in need of 
help to be similar to them, both in terms of physical appearance (DeBruine, 2002) and 
attitudes (Park & Schaller, 2008). Research into the role of mimicry provides further evidence 
for the relationship between similarity and prosocial behaviour. For example, in a series of 
experiments by van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami and van Knippenberg (2004), participants 
were more likely to help a confederate who had mimicked their mannerisms than one who 
had not. In psychopathy, reduced prosocial behaviour has been extensively linked to lack of 
empathic responsivity to others’ distress (e.g. Blair et al., 1997; Kosson et al., 2002b), which 
suggests those high in psychopathic traits may be less likely to make judgements of 
deservingness on the basis of whether they experience emotional resonance with others.  
 
Prosocial behaviour may also be driven by clarity of social rules: norms or standards that 
guide behaviour without the force of law (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).People have been found 
to be more prosocial when another’s need for help or distress is highly salient (e.g. Bickman, 
1972), which has been attributed to the experience of a corresponding, empathic experience 
of distress (e.g. Batson et al, 1988; Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004). There is also a significant 
body of literature suggesting that individuals are less prosocial when there are multiple people 
who could potentially provide help in the situation, since the responsibility for responding 
to someone in need is unclear (e.g. Darley & Latane, 1968). This is found both in emergency 
situations and in everyday contexts, such as responding to group email requests (Barron & 
Yechiam, 2012). Furthermore, a recent study reported that participants were more prosocial 
and more sympathetic when the expectation to behave prosocially was clear-cut (for example, 
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giving up a seat for an elderly woman) versus ambiguous (for example, giving up your seat 
for a young adult carrying a large parcel; Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Cassell & Channon, 2015). 
 
Another factor that may influence prosocial behaviour is the extent to which others conform 
to social rules and are thus judged as deserving of help. Studies have shown that people 
impose sanctions when others violate social rules (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Posner & 
Rasmusen, 1999). By contrast, the evidence suggests those high in psychopathic traits are 
less bound by social rules. Despite demonstrating accurate understanding of social 
conventions (e.g. Cima & Tonnaer, 2010), those high in psychopathic traits have been shown 
to judge misdemeanours that violate social conventions to be more permissible and less 
serious than those low in psychopathic traits (Dolan, & Fullam, 2010).  
 
Taken together, the above evidence suggests that people are more prosocial and likely to 
comply with requests for help on the basis of emotional empathy, unambiguous situations, 
and the belief that others are not in violation of social rules. Those high in psychopathic 
traits are less influenced by these factors and less likely to behave prosocially. However, it is 
unclear how those high and low in psychopathic traits respond when a request for help in 
itself violates social rules. People high in psychopathic traits, who are less empathic and less 
rule bound, may be less likely to judge reasonable requests for help as acceptable as compared 
to those low in psychopathic traits. How do group differences translate into responding to 
less reasonable requests for help? The high trait group may be more likely to judge 
unreasonable requests for help as acceptable, since those low in psychopathic traits may be 
more sensitive to the violation of social rules and may thus be harsher in their judgments.  
 
7.1.1 Hypotheses 
The present study was designed to investigate how prosocial behaviour in those high and 
low in psychopathic traits varied as a function of perceived deservingness. Deservingness 
was directly manipulated, in order to compare compliance with requests for favours when 
there was a strong versus weak justification provided.  
 
Participants rated requests for favours in two ways. Firstly, they rated how likely they would 
be to comply with the request. Secondly, they rated how acceptable they would find the 
request. With respect to likelihood of complying, it was expected that those high in 
psychopathic traits would be less compliant with requests overall, which is consistent with 
the findings from Chapters 5 and 6. It was also expected that this would be moderated by 
104 
 
type of request, such that group differences were exacerbated in response to reasonable 
requests. Whilst the low trait group might view requests with weak justifications as less 
permissible than requests with strong justifications, the high trait group might fail to 
discriminate between request types and thus be equally willing to comply in both variants.  
 
With respect to acceptability, it was expected that the high trait group would rate requests 
with strong justifications as less acceptable and requests with weak justifications as more 
acceptable than the low trait group.   
 
7.2 METHODS 
 
7.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of PPI group (high vs. low scorers) and one 
within-participants factor of deservingness (strong vs. weak justifications for requests).   
 
7.2.2 Participants  
The Favours Task was administered alongside the Social Exchange Task; the screening and 
testing samples in the present study were therefore identical to those described in Chapter 6. 
10 high-scoring males, 10 high-scoring females, 10 low-scoring males and 10 low-scoring 
females therefore took part in the test stage of the study.  
 
7.2.3 Procedure 
All participants provided written informed consent before completing the experimental tasks 
and a brief health screen to ensure that nobody with a history of significant psychiatric or 
neurological illness was included; no participants were excluded on this basis. Participants 
were paid for taking part. 
 
7.2.4 Materials  
7.2.4.1 Favours Task  
This task was designed to examine compliance with requests for favours with strong versus 
weak justifications. The task consisted of 10 short scenarios (see Figure 7.1 for example), 
describing an interaction with a character known to the participant (such as a friend, relative, 
colleague or flatmate). Each scenario describes a situation in which the character makes a 
request of the participant, compliance with which would incur a loss of time, effort or money 
(for example carrying a large parcel upstairs). The participant is then asked to a) rate how 
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likely they would be to comply with this request and b) rate the extent to which the request 
is acceptable.  
 
Each scenario had two variant endings; in one ending, the character provided a strong 
justification for making the request (for example, having an injury that would make carrying 
the parcel difficult). In the alternative ending, the character provided a weak justification for 
making the request (for example, not wishing to ruin their shirt). Characters were 
counterbalanced across the scenarios for gender and proximity of relationship. Relationships 
with a clear hierarchy (for example boss, parent) were not included.  
 
Figure 7.1: Example scenario from Favours Task  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Story Stem 
“You run into your neighbour one day, and he has just had a large parcel delivered.” 
REASONABLE REQUEST: He asks: “I’ve strained my back. Would you carry it 
upstairs for me?” 
UNREASONABLE REQUEST: He asks: “I’m going out and don’t want to get my shirt 
dirty. Would you carry it upstairs for me?” 
 
Questions for each scenario 
6. How likely are you to agree to your neighbour’s request? 
1= _______________________________________________________________ 10 = 
Not at all likely         Very Likely 
 
7. How acceptable is it of your neighbour to make this request? 
1= _______________________________________________________________ 10 = 
Not at all acceptable               Very acceptable 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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7.2.4.2 Administration 
After reading the instructions, participants were shown an example item and allowed to ask 
questions. All scenarios and corresponding questions were then presented one at a time, in 
a paper booklet. Participants responded verbally to all questions. The scenario remained on 
display until participants had completed the relevant questions in order to reduce the 
confounding effects of memory load.  
 
7.2.4.3 Scoring  
Likelihood and acceptability ratings were summed across all scenarios for each participant.  
 
7.3 RESULTS 
 
7.3.1 Statistical Analyses 
The means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures described below are 
presented in Table 7.1. Examination of the data revealed that the likelihood ratings in the 
strong justification variants were slightly negatively skewed for the low trait group only. Non-
parametric analyses did not alter the pattern of results; parametric analyses are thus reported 
throughout. One participant was an outlier in the acceptability ratings in the weak 
justification variants variable. Since, they were within range on the remaining variables, and 
neither their exclusion, transforming the variable, nor performing non-parametric tests 
changed the pattern of results, they were included in the analyses and parametric analyses 
reported throughout.  
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Table 7.1: Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for the Favours 
Task with two deservingness variants.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group   Low PPI Group 
Mean   (SD)    Mean (SD)  
(N=20)    (N=20) 
  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Likelihood (%)          
Reasonable request  77.85 (14.22)    84.00 (11.55) 
Unreasonable request  54.80 (16.28)    57.20 (12.53) 
   
Acceptability (%)      
Reasonable request  79.45 (12.58)    80.90 (11.16) 
Unreasonable request  50.90 (13.87)    44.45 (9.84)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7.3.2 Likelihood  
The high and low PPI groups were compared with respect to how likely they would be to 
comply with the characters’ requests for favours. There was no significant main effect of 
group: (F(1,38)=1.03; p=.316). There was a significant main effect of deservingness 
(F(1,38)=490.28; p<.001), whereby participants across both trait groups were more likely to 
comply with reasonable versus unreasonable requests for favours. There was no group by 
deservingness interaction (F(1,38)=2.77; p=.104).  
 
7.3.3 Acceptability  
The high and low PPI groups were also compared with respect to how acceptable they found 
the characters’ requests to be. There was no significant main effect of group: (F(1,38)=0.49; 
p=.488). There was a significant main effect of deservingness (F(1,38)=674.04; p<.001), 
whereby participants across both trait groups viewed reasonable requests for favours as more 
acceptable than unreasonable requests for favours. There was also a significant group by 
deservingness interaction (F(1,38)=9.96; p=.003); there was no group difference in 
acceptability ratings in the reasonable request variant, but the high trait group rated 
unreasonable requests for favours as more acceptable than did the low trait group.  
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7.3.4 Gender 
In order to ensure that the group interaction was due to PPI group membership rather than 
gender, these analyses were repeated using ANCOVAs with gender as a covariate. The effect 
of gender did not reach significance for any of these analyses (p>.05) and did not change the 
overall pattern of results.  
 
G.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The present study was designed to investigate how psychopathic personality traits influence 
prosocial responding in situations where characters make requests for favours. High-PPI and 
Low-PPI participants were compared with respect to their responses to these requests based 
on strong or weak justifications. Contrary to predictions, the groups did not differ 
significantly in their likelihood to comply with favours, regardless of whether the justification 
was reasonable or not. There was also no significant group difference with respect to their 
ratings of how acceptable the characters’ requests were. However, as predicted, there was a 
significant interaction between group and deservingness; the groups rated reasonable 
requests for favours as equally acceptable but the high trait group rated unreasonable requests 
as more acceptable than the low trait group.  
 
With respect to the experimental manipulation, the findings showed that this was successful, 
since there was a main effect of deservingness such that participants across both groups were 
more likely to comply with requests with strong versus weak justifications, and rated the 
former to be more acceptable. However, unlike the previous findings described in Chapters 
5 and 6, where the high trait groups behaved less prosocially than the low trait groups, 
differences between the groups in the extent to which they were willing to comply with the 
requests with strong and weak justifications did not reach significance. 
 
Were there any fundamental conceptual differences between the Favours Task and 
paradigms employed in Chapters 5 and 6 that may have driven a lack of significant group 
differences in prosocial behaviour? One possible explanation was the nature of the favours 
requested in terms of the effort required to carry them out. For instance, one scenario 
involved carrying a parcel upstairs. This might be said to be a relatively minor task incurring 
little effort, and hence people might have been willing to do this even if the justification 
behind was weak. However, a comparison of the scenarios in the present task with those in 
the previous two tasks suggests that there was little obvious difference in the effort required, 
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and hence that this is unlikely to have been a major factor. Moreover, the key finding from 
Chapters 5.2 and 6 was that the costs in terms of the effort required to behave prosocially 
did not differentially influence the trait groups.   
 
Could the nature of the relationship between the participant and the characters described in 
the Favours Task account for the lack of a significant main effect of group? In the present 
task, the characters were known to the participants, which may have served as an additional 
motivation for the high trait group to behave prosocially, since compliance in the context of 
an ongoing relationship may have assured future benefits (for instance, the neighbour owes 
the participant a favour in future). Comparing familiar and unfamiliar relationships within 
the same task could clarify this in a future experiment. However, the familiarity of the 
relationship is unlikely to have influenced participants in the present study alone, since the 
previous tasks also described interactions with characters with whom the participant had an 
established relationship. Moreover, the ongoing relationship with the character was most 
explicitly referred to in the Social Exchange Task described in Chapter 6, where characters 
had previously done a favour for the participant; the high trait group was still found to be 
less prosocial.  
 
One unique aspect of the design of the current study is the inclusion of justifications in the 
Favours Task; none of the previous studies provided a reason as to why participants should 
behave prosocially. The justifications provided in the current study may therefore have 
motivated the high trait group to comply with requests for favours. One possible explanation 
for this is that without justifications, participants may have relied on resonating emotionally 
with the characters when deciding on the extent to which they would behave prosocially. 
Previous literature has suggested those with psychopathic traits are less emotionally empathic 
and thus less motivated to reduce another person’s distress (e.g. Blair, 1995; Blair, 2008). 
Hence, for the low trait group, responding to someone who requested a favour might be 
triggered by resonating with their perceived distress. The high trait group, who are likely to 
have lacked the capacity to engage in this way, may thus have been less prosocial. By contrast, 
in the present study, the inclusion of justifications may have meant that the high trait group 
were able to comply more readily via an alternative, cognitive route when given a practical 
reason to do so. This is consistent with the findings from Chapter 6 that suggested that the 
high trait group used more practical rather than social or emotional reasoning when justifying 
the extent to which they would reciprocate social favours.  
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Although the strength of the justifications did not influence the high and low trait groups 
differentially in the extent to which they complied with requests with favours, it did 
differentially affect the extent to which the groups rated the requests to be acceptable. Whilst 
the groups rated requests for favours with strong justifications to be equally acceptable, the 
high trait group rated requests for favours with weak justifications to be more acceptable 
than did the low trait group. Thus, the high trait group discriminated less between the two 
request types. What factors may have driven this interaction? An explanation in terms of 
emotional versus cognitive routes is unlikely to account for this, since any compensatory 
advantage of providing a justification should have facilitated comparable acceptability ratings 
in the high trait group as well as comparable prosocial behaviour.  
 
One possible factor that may have led the high trait group to discriminate less between strong 
and weak justifications is the extent to which the groups valued adherence to social rules. 
When the characters provided a weak justification for making a request, the low trait group 
may have viewed this as a violation of social rules. For instance, the neighbour in the example 
asking the participant to carry a heavy parcel to avoid getting his shirt dirty may have been 
viewed as taking unnecessary advantage of the participant and requesting help without truly 
being in need. By contrast, the high trait group may have been less harsh in their ratings of 
unreasonable requests since they did not hold an expectation that others should follow social 
conventions. This is consistent with research showing that those high in psychopathic traits 
rate transgressions as less serious and more permissible than those low in psychopathic traits.  
 
Another possible factor that may explain the interaction between trait group and 
deservingness may have been the extent to which participants felt that they themselves would 
have behaved similarly to the characters in the scenarios. This is supported by evidence 
showing people make more positive evaluations of those who are physically and attitudinally 
similar to them (DeBruine, 2002; Park & Schaller, 2008). In the present study, when 
characters had good reasons for making requests, participants in the low trait group may 
have felt that they too would request a favour if they were in similar circumstances. However, 
they may have felt that they would not request a favour with a weak justification. Conversely, 
psychopathy is linked to moral transgressions and a greater likelihood to take advantage and 
to act out of self-interest (e.g. Hare, 1991). The high trait group may have thus felt they 
would make a request for reasons comparable to those provided by the characters in both 
the deserving and undeserving variants.  
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In order for any of these explanations for the significant group by deservingness interaction 
to be adequate, it is necessary to explain how these factors could have selectively played a 
role in acceptability ratings but not in prosocial behaviour. A different type of explanation 
may be that, given the relatively small sample sizes, the power of the study was not sufficient 
to detect a significant difference in prosocial behaviour, which may have been a weaker effect 
than acceptability ratings. Examination of the mean scores provides some support for this. 
 
In summary, the present study employed a novel experimental task to compare compliance 
with reasonable and unreasonable requests for favours in those high and low in psychopathic 
traits. There were no significant differences with respect to how likely the trait groups were 
to comply with either request type, which may have reflected the high trait group’s increased 
motivation to behave prosocially when the characters provided a practical explanation of 
their request. Whilst the groups did not significantly differ with respect to their ratings of 
how acceptable reasonable requests for favours were, the high trait group was found to rate 
unreasonable requests for favours as more acceptable than the low trait group. This may 
suggest the high trait group was less able to discriminate between types of request than the 
low trait group. Unreasonable requests for favours could be considered to be in violation of 
social rules; this may reflect that when evaluating the characters’ requests, the high trait group 
was less likely to condemn social rule violations than the low trait group.  
 
7.5 THE NEXT STUDY: EXPLORING DESERVINGNESS FURTHER 
 
The present study was designed to investigate how deservingness might influence prosocial 
behaviour. Requests for favours with strong and weak justifications were systematically 
compared, since requests with weak justifications might be considered socially unacceptable, 
and the characters who make these requests may have been taking advantage without being 
in genuine need or distress. In Chapter 8, deservingness will be examined from a new angle. 
Rather than focusing on compliance with favours, which results in exclusively positive 
outcomes for the characters, the experiment presented in Chapter 8will investigate how 
judgments of deservingness differ between high and low psychopathic trait groups when 
responding in situations with both positive and negative outcomes for the characters. 
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Chapter 8: Judgments of deservingness in evaluating positive and negative 
outcomes 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter 7 examined how prosocial behaviour in groups high and low in psychopathic traits 
was influenced by the extent to which people deserve help. In the Favours Task, when the 
scenario characters’ requests for favours were complied with, this resulted in a positive 
outcome for the characters. In order to investigate deservingness further, the present chapter 
will focus on how deservingness influences social decision-making in situations that have 
either positive or negative outcomes for the characters involved.  
  
An outcome, such as a reward, punishment or specified treatment, may be considered to be 
deserved if it results directly from a person’s actions or qualities (Feather, 2006). 
Deservingness may influence social decision-making in a number of ways. Firstly, it has been 
posited that people need to believe in a ‘just world’, a stable environment in which the 
consequences of their actions are morally fair; good deeds are rewarded and bad deeds are 
punished (Lerner and Simmons, 1966; Furnham, 2003). People who believe in a just world 
may thus be less likely to endorse or facilitate good outcomes for those who did nothing to 
deserve it (which is consistent with the findings of the study presented in Chapter 7). 
Conversely, when others suffer negative outcomes and have done nothing to deserve it, 
people may be motivated to help the victims and to alleviate their distress. Where this is not 
possible, it has been suggested that they may denigrate the victims in order to make the 
negative outcomes appear to be more fair (Lerner and Simmons, 1966). These strategies are 
adopted in order to maintain belief in a just world, and to avoid the experience of cognitive 
dissonance, whereby tension arises as a result of contradictory or inconsistent beliefs (Hafer 
& Begue, 2005).  
 
People’s emotional reactions to positive and negative outcomes may vary according to 
deservingness; this may in turn influence social decision-making. Feather (2006) proposed a 
model that outlines possible emotional reactions to positive and negative outcomes that are 
either deserved or undeserved. According to this model, people experience pleasure when 
they witness others’ deserved positive outcomes, such as achieving a high grade on an exam 
after putting in a lot of effort. People experience resentment when they witness others’ 
undeserved positive outcomes, such as achieving a high grade on an exam after putting in 
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little effort. People experience schadenfreude (feelings of pleasure in response to another 
person’s misfortune) when they witness others’ deserved negative outcomes, such as failing 
an exam after going to a party the night before. Finally, people experience sympathy when 
they witness others’ undeserved negative outcomes, such as failing an exam because the 
questions were particularly difficult.  
 
In one experiment that provides empirical support for this model (Feather & Sherman, 2002), 
participants were presented with scenarios describing deserved and undeserved positive and 
negative outcomes, including the examples relating to exam grade outcomes specified above. 
Participants’ ratings of their emotional reactions were consistent with the model, such that 
the highest pleasure ratings were given in response to deserved positive outcomes, the 
highest resentment ratings were given in response to undeserved positive outcomes, the 
highest schadenfreude ratings were given in response to deserved negative outcomes and the 
highest sympathy ratings were given in response to undeserved negative outcomes.  
 
How might deservingness influence social decision-making in psychopathy? It has been 
argued that people high in psychopathic traits may be less likely to believe in a just world 
(Hafer, Begue, Choma & Dempsey, 2005) and exhibit fewer cognitive dissonance effects as 
compared to those low in psychopathic traits (Murray, Wood & Lilienfeld, 2012). A lack of 
belief in a just world is consistent with the ways in which psychopathy has been broadly 
conceptualised; research suggests that people with psychopathy are less sensitive to violations 
of social rules (Dolan & Fullam, 2010), are primarily motivated by self-interest, are more 
likely to engage in moral transgressions and take advantage of others (e.g. Blair, 1995; Blair 
& Blair, 2005; Hare, 1993; Cleckley, 1967). Taken together, this suggests that people with 
psychopathy may not only reject the notion of a just world, but they may also stand to gain 
from an unjust world. Those high in psychopathic traits may differentiate between outcomes 
on the basis of deservingness to a lesser extent as compared with those low in psychopathic 
traits. 
 
In light of the prominent characteristics associated with psychopathy, including the well-
documented lack of emotional empathy, it appears unlikely that individuals high in 
psychopathic traits would experience pleasure in response to others’ achievements. Similarly, 
it appears unlikely that these people would feel sympathetic when others suffer unfairly. No 
studies to date have systematically examined resentment in psychopathy, and it is thus unclear 
whether those high in psychopathic traits would differ in feelings of resentment from those 
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low in psychopathic traits. It is possible that these people are primarily motivated by whether 
or not they would be personally affected by others’ outcomes rather than the deservingness 
of those outcomes. There is some evidence to suggest that those high in psychopathic traits 
are more likely to experience schadenfreude than those low in psychopathic traits (Porter, 
Bhanwer, Woodworth & Black, 2014; James, Kavanagh, Jonason, Chonody & Scrutton, 
2014). Taken together, it is likely that potential differences in emotional processing between 
high and low psychopathic trait groups may be associated with group differences when 
reasoning about deserved and undeserved positive and negative outcomes.  
 
There is some research investigating judgments of deservingness in both positive and 
negative outcomes. Lupfer and Gingrich (1999) developed a paradigm to investigate how 
judgments of deservingness are made when people of good and bad character experience 
positive and negative outcomes. In one study (Lupfer and Gingrich, 1999), participants read 
scenarios describing these characters and outcomes, such as the following: a) a hardworking 
man with a history of illness moves to a new location, after which his illness subsides (good 
character, positive outcome), b) a man having an affair maintains a tan in order to please his 
mistress and subsequently develops skin cancer (bad character, negative outcome), c) a well-
respected doctor who is committed to her patients makes a minor error that results in a 
child’s death (good character, negative outcome) or d) a selfish and unpleasant manager buys 
a cheap present for a colleague and in return receives an expensive present that includes a 
winning lottery ticket (bad character, positive outcome). As expected, participants gave 
higher deservingness ratings for scenarios where the relationship between character and 
outcome was congruent, particularly when the outcome was positive.  
 
Whilst the paradigm developed in the above study was relevant to the question of the 
relationship between deservingness and outcome, there were some limitations. Firstly, the 
scenarios often described extreme or highly improbably outcomes, such as a diagnosis of 
cancer or winning the lottery. These are not representative of more everyday types of positive 
and negative outcome. Secondly, the original paradigm involved some outcomes in which 
the primary implications were for others, rather than the story’s main character, which may 
have confounded the ratings of deservingness. For instance, in the doctor scenario, the 
outcome is more negative for the patient who dies as a result of the doctor’s action than for 
the doctor herself, although she is likely to suffer as well. Thirdly, in the congruent scenarios, 
the characters’ actions were not directly linked to the outcome. For instance, the fact that 
the man described in a) was hardworking did not contribute to the alleviation of his illness. 
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In b), it was the man’s adultery rather than his tanning that was relevant to his character; the 
link to the skin cancer outcome was thus somewhat tenuous. This may reflect the fact that 
the key factor manipulated by Lupfer and Gingrich (1998) was the type of character (good 
vs. bad) rather than the level of deservingness (deserving vs. undeserving). 
 
In order to investigate more systematically the link between deservingness and outcome and 
to address some of the limitations of the task designed by Lupfer and Gingrich (1998), two 
related sets of materials were developed for the present study. Each involved a series of 
scenarios designed to reflect the more commonplace types of outcomes prevalent in social 
interactions, rather than the more extreme types of events used in the Lupfer and Gingrich 
study. Secondly, the outcomes in the present study also primarily had consequences for the 
character in question, rather than for a different character. Thirdly, the congruent scenarios 
in both of the present sets of materials were designed such that the outcomes were directly 
linked to the characters’ actions.  
 
8.1.1 Task development 
In Deservingness: Positive Outcomes, the scenarios were designed to describe a good 
outcome for the main character, such as passing a driving test first time around. Each 
scenario was presented twice; in the first variant, the outcome was congruent with the 
character’s actions and it was evident that they had earned the outcome through their own 
efforts. In the second variant, the outcome was incongruent with the character’s actions and 
it was evident that they had achieved a positive outcome without earning it. For instance, in 
the example of passing a driving test, the congruent variant involved the character driving 
well and making few errors, and the incongruent variant involved the character making a 
number of errors but flirting with the instructor.  
 
In Deservingness: Negative Outcomes, scenarios were designed to describe a bad outcome 
for the main character, for example someone being reprimanded in front of their evening 
class. In the first variant, the outcome was congruent with the character’s actions since they 
had warranted a negative outcome through their own transgressions, for example being 
reprimanded for failing to complete the homework. In the second variant, the outcome was 
incongruent with the character’s actions since they had not transgressed and the outcome 
was simply unfortunate, for example being reprimanded because the course instructor was 
in a bad mood.  
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The two sets of materials were analysed separately, since studying positive and negative 
outcomes raises different issues with respect to both the chain of events leading to the 
negative outcome and the desirability of the outcomes. The first consideration, the chain of 
events, refers to the fact that for positive outcomes, both congruent and incongruent 
outcomes can readily be related directly to the good or bad actions of the characters. For 
instance, passing the driving test resulted from either good driving (congruent outcome) or 
flirtation with the examiner (incongruent outcome). Whilst the congruent outcomes in the 
negative set were also based on the character’s bad actions, for instance reprimand resulting 
from failure to complete the homework, there was no equivalent for incongruent outcomes, 
since good actions are not expected to lead to negative outcomes. For instance, completing 
the homework would not reasonably be expected to lead to reprimand; thus, the incongruent 
items for the negative set were situations in which negative outcomes arose from bad fortune 
rather than from the character’s behaviour. The second consideration that differentiated the 
positive and negative sets of materials in the present study was the desirability of the 
outcomes from the viewpoint of the observer. Whilst the positive outcomes for both 
congruent and incongruent variants were presumably desirable to the main character, only 
the congruent ones were likely to be desirable to the outside observer who subscribes to a 
just view of the world; the incongruent positive outcomes (which were not based on good 
actions) may well be undesirable to the observer. By contrast, in the negative set, both 
congruent and incongruent outcomes may have been considered undesirable by the outside 
observer, since even when ‘just desserts’ were served in the congruent variant, these 
outcomes by definition involved suffering for the main character. The differences between 
the positive and negative Deservingnesss are outlined in Figure 8.1 below. 
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Figure 8.1: Structure of Deservingness: Positive and Deservingness: Negative  
Deservingness:  Deservingness:  
Positive Outcome  Negative Outcome  
 
Congruent 
Outcome 
 
 
Incongruent  
Outcome 
 
 
 
In Chapter 7, the high and low psychopathic trait groups differed with respect to how 
acceptable they rated requests for favours with strong and justifications to be. However, 
acceptability might relate to either a cognitive judgment based on reasoning about the 
scenario, and/or a judgment based on emotional responses to the scenario, and this is 
particularly pertinent in light of the literature relating to preserved cognitive empathy with 
impaired emotional empathy in psychopathy. In the present study, these aspects were 
separated by asking participants to make two separate ratings after each scenario. In order to 
examine the cognitive component of acceptability, participants rated the extent to which the 
characters deserved the outcome. Secondly, in order to examine the emotional component 
of acceptability, participants rated how pleased they would feel in response to each outcome.   
 
8.1.2 Hypotheses 
The literature on deservingness, described above, suggests that people high in psychopathic 
traits discriminate less on the basis of deservingness than those low in psychopathic traits. 
This is consistent with findings from Chapter 7, which found group differences in ratings of 
acceptability. Reduced discrimination has also been found in a study examining the influence 
of deservingness on blame ratings in more extreme situations; Hafer et al. (2005) found that 
when asked to judge the extent to which a character is to blame for contracting HIV, people 
high in psychopathic traits moderated their ratings in accordance with deservingness to a 
lesser extent than those low in psychopathic traits. However, it is unclear to what extent 
cognitive versus emotional mechanisms are involved when making judgments about factors 
such as deservingness, acceptability, or blameworthiness. Given the posited dissociation 
Example: Passing driving 
test; making few errors and 
driving well 
Desirability: High 
Basis: Good action 
 
 
Example: Passing driving 
test; making many errors 
and flirting with instructor 
Desirability: Low 
Basis: Bad action 
Example: Reprimanded in 
front of class, failed to do 
homework 
Desirability: Low 
Basis: Bad action 
 
Example: Reprimanded in 
front of class, instructor in a 
bad mood 
Desirability: Low 
Basis: Bad fortune 
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between cognitive and emotional empathy in psychopathy, the high and low psychopathic 
trait groups would be expected to differ on emotional, but not cognitive, aspects of 
deservingness.    
 
Thus, in the positive set, it was expected that the high trait group would not differ from the 
low trait group with respect to their ratings of how much the characters deserved the 
outcomes. However, it was expected that the high trait group would rate themselves as less 
pleased with congruent outcomes and more pleased with incongruent outcomes than the 
low trait group.  
 
A similar lack of group differences was expected in the negative set with respect to 
deservingness ratings. However, with respect to ratings of how pleased they would feel, the 
predictions were less clear. On the one hand, the high trait group might be expected to 
discriminate less between congruent and incongruent outcomes on the basis of a lack of 
belief in a just world. On the other hand, the low trait group might be expected to 
discriminate less between congruent and incongruent outcomes, since despite belief in a just 
world, they were unlikely to feel particularly pleased with either outcome, since both involved 
suffering for the main characters.  
 
8.2 METHODS 
 
8.2.1 Screening Phase  
A sample of 562 full-time university students (241m, 321f) who were fluent in English and 
aged 18 and above was opportunistically recruited. All participants gave informed consent 
and completed the PPI-SF (Lilienfeld and Hess, 2001); they were entered into a prize draw 
and told that they might be invited to the next phase of the study, which would be paid. 
Total PPI-SF scores were calculated for the whole sample.  
 
The strategy for selecting the testing sample and contacting participants was identical to the 
method specified in Chapter 6. Thus, male participants at the highest and lowest ends of the 
screening sample distribution and female participants at the highest and lowest ends of the 
screening sample distribution were contacted. On this basis, 27 high-scoring participants (14 
m, 13f) and 20 low-scoring participants (19m, 11f) from the upper and lower twentieth 
percentiles of the sample distribution were invited to take part in the second stage of the 
study.  
119 
 
 
8.2.2 Testing Phase 
8.2.2.1 Design  
There was one between-participants factor of PPI group (high vs. low scorers) and one 
within-participants factor of deservingness (congruent vs. incongruent) for two sets of 
materials (positive and negative outcomes).  
 
8.2.2.2 Participants  
Twenty high-scoring (10m, 10f) and 20 low-scoring (9m, 11f) individuals took part in the 
experimental stage of the study, which involved completing the Deservingness and a second 
task (the Competitiveness Task, reported in Chapter 9 below). As anticipated, the groups 
differed significantly on PPI-SF scores, (t(38)=22.44; p<.001). The mean PPI score was 
154.60 (SD 7.94) and 92.9 (SD 9.39) for the high and low groups respectively. The groups 
did not differ significantly in age (t(34)=.557; p=.581); the mean age was 19.26 (SD 1.28) and 
19.59 (2.15) for the high and low groups respectively.  
 
8.2.2.3 Procedure 
All participants provided written informed consent before completing the experimental tasks 
and a brief health screen to ensure that nobody with a history of significant psychiatric or 
neurological illness was included; no participants were excluded on this basis. Participants 
were paid for taking part. 
 
8.2.2.4 Materials  
8.2.2.4.1 Deservingness: Positive Outcomes 
Deservingness: Positive Outcomes was designed to examine how people evaluate positive 
outcomes on the basis of deservingness. This set of materials consisted of five short 
scenarios describing a positive outcome for a character known to the participant, for example, 
passing a driving test. Each scenario had two variant endings. In the first variant, the outcome 
was congruent (making few errors and driving well) and in the second variant, the outcome 
was incongruent (making many errors but flirting with the instructor; see Figure 8.2).  
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8.2.2.4.2 Deservingness: Negative Outcomes 
Deservingness: Negative Outcomes was designed to examine how people evaluate negative 
outcomes on the basis of deservingness. As in the positive set above, the set consisted of 
five short scenarios; each scenario described a negative outcome for a character known to 
the participant, for example being reprimanded in front of a class, and had two variant 
endings. In the first variant, the outcome was congruent (failing to complete the class 
homework) and in the second variant, the outcome was incongruent (the instructor being in 
a bad mood; see Figure 8.3).  
 
In both positive and negative sets, participants were asked to rate the extent to which the 
character deserved the outcome and how pleased they would feel with the outcome for the 
character. The character known to the participant was referred to as “One of your friends” 
across all items in both sets, and gender was not specified.  
 
Figure 8.2: Example scenario from Deservingness Set A: Positive Outcomes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
STORY STEM: “One of your friends passes their driving test first time around.” 
CONGRUENT VARIANT: They made very few errors and drove very well. 
INCONGRUENT VARIANT: They made lots of errors but flirted with their driving 
instructor. 
Questions 
1. How much does your friend deserve to pass their driving test first time around? 
1 =________________________________________________________________10 = 
Not at all         Very much 
 
2. How would you feel about the fact that your friend passed their driving test first time 
around? 
1 =________________________________________________________________10 = 
Extremely displeased       Extremely pleased 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 8.3: Example scenario from Deservingness Set B: Negative Outcome  
______________________________________________________________________ 
STORY STEM: “One of your friends from an evening class is told off in front of the class.” 
CONGRUENT VARIANT: They did not do the required homework. 
INCONGRUENT VARIANT: The instructor is in a bad mood 
Questions 
1. How much does your friend deserve to be told off in front of the class? 
1 =________________________________________________________________ 10 = 
Not at all         Very much 
 
2. How would you feel about the fact that your friend was told off in front of the class? 
1 =________________________________________________________________ 10 = 
Extremely displeased       Extremely pleased 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.2.2.4.3 Administration 
After reading the instructions, participants were given an instruction sheet, shown an 
example item, and allowed to ask questions. All scenarios and corresponding questions were 
then presented one at a time, in a paper booklet. Participants responded verbally to all 
questions. The scenario remained on display until participants had completed the relevant 
questions in order to reduce the confounding effects of memory load.  
 
8.2.2.4.4 Scoring  
The ratings pertaining to how deserved the outcomes were and how pleased the participants 
would feel were summed across all scenarios in both sets for each participant.  
 
 [Grab your reader’s attention with a great quote from the document or use this 
space to emphasize a key point. To place this text box anywhere on the page, 
just drag it.] 
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8.3 RESULTS 
 
The means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures in Deservingness: Positive 
Outcomes are presented in Table 8.1. The means and standard deviations (SD) for each of 
the measures in Deservingness: Negative Outcomes are presented in Table 8.2. Examination 
of the data showed that all variables in both sets were normally distributed and there were 
no outliers. 
 
Table 8.1: Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for Set A: 
Deservingness: Positive Outcomes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group   Low PPI Group 
Mean   (SD)    Mean (SD)  
(N=20)    (N=20)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Deservingness rating (%)        
Congruent   88.30 (7.54)    93.40 (8.76)  
Incongruent   38.90 (9.50)    29.90 (10.76)  
Pleased rating (%)         
Congruent   86.10 (9.96)    90.70 (9.94) 
Incongruent   43.70 (14.24)    35.40 (14.18) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8.2: Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for Set B: 
Deservingness: Negative Outcomes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group   Low PPI Group 
Mean   (SD)    Mean (SD)  
(N=20)    (N=19)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Deservingness rating (%)        
Congruent   59.30 (14.62)    62.70 (14.42) 
Incongruent   23.70 (8.44)    15.00 (5.86)  
Pleased rating (%)         
Congruent   35.20 (14.68)    30.50 (8.20)  
Incongruent   20.10 (10.10)     14.70 (5.52)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.3.1: Set A: Deservingness: Positive Outcomes deservingness ratings 
With respect to how much the scenario characters deserved positive outcomes, there was no 
significant main effect of psychopathic trait group (F(1,38)=0.97; p=.330). There was a 
significant main effect of deservingness (F(1,38)=695.95; p<0.001) such that both groups 
rated positive outcomes as more deserved when they were congruent versus when they were 
incongruent. There was also a group by deservingness interaction (F(1,38)=10.86; p=.002). 
Post-hoc analysis revealed that although the high trait group had lower deservingness ratings 
for congruent outcomes, this difference was only marginally significant (t(38)=1.97; p= .056). 
The high trait group did rate incongruent positive outcomes to be significantly more 
deserved than did the low trait group (t(38)=2.81; p= .008). 
 
8.3.2: Set A: Deservingness: Positive Outcomes Pleased Ratings 
The groups were compared with respect to how pleased they rated themselves to feel in 
relation to congruent and incongruent positive outcomes for the scenario characters. There 
was no significant main effect of group (F(1,38)=0.50; p=.483). There was a main effect of 
deservingness (F(1,38)=290.86; p<0.001) such that both groups reported that they would 
feel more pleased with positive outcomes in the congruent versus incongruent scenario 
variants. There was also a group by deservingness interaction (F(1,38)=5.07; p=.03). Post-
hoc analysis showed a similar pattern to the deservingness ratings, such that the high trait 
group were less pleased with congruent outcomes and more pleased with incongruent 
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outcomes. However, neither comparison reached significance (congruent outcomes: 
t(38)=1.52; p= .146; incongruent outcomes: t(38)=1.50; p= .072).   
 
8.3.3 Set B: Negative Outcome Deservingness Ratings 
With respect to how much the scenario characters deserved negative outcomes, there was 
no significant main effect of psychopathic trait group (F(1,38)=0.92; p=.345). There was a 
significant main effect of deservingness variant (F(1,38)=300.76;  p<0.001) such that both 
groups rated negative outcomes as more deserved in the congruent versus incongruent 
variant. There was also a group by deservingness interaction (F(1,38)=6.35; p=.016). Post-
hoc analysis revealed that the groups did not differ in their deservingness ratings for 
congruent negative outcomes (t(38)=0.73; p= .469). However, the high trait group did judge 
incongruent negative outcomes to be significantly more deserved than did the low trait group 
(t(38)=3.79; p= .001).   
 
8.3.4 Set B: Negative Outcome Pleased Ratings 
The groups were compared with respect to how pleased they rated themselves to feel in 
relation to congruent and incongruent negative outcomes for the scenario characters in Set 
B. The main effect of group did not reach significance (F(1,38)=3.08; p=.087), nor was there 
a group by deservingness interaction (F(1,38)=0.06; p=.813). There was a main effect of 
deservingness, such that both groups rated that they would feel more pleased with negative 
outcomes in the congruent versus incongruent variant (F(1,37)=110.52; p<0.001) 
 
8.3.5 Gender  
Psychopathic traits are more commonly linked to males than females; in order to ensure that 
gender was not a confounding variable in the present study, these analyses were repeated 
using ANCOVAs with gender as a covariate.  
 
In Deservingness: Positive Outcomes, there was no significant main effect of gender for 
either deservingness or pleased ratings (p>.05). However, the ANCOVA did reveal an 
interaction between gender and deservingness variant. With respect to deservingness ratings, 
female participants were more extreme in their ratings, since they rated congruent positive 
outcomes as more deserved than male participants, and rated incongruent positive outcomes 
as less deserved than male participants (F(1,38)=8.31; p=.006). Similarly, female participants 
were more pleased with congruent positive outcomes, and less pleased with incongruent 
positive outcomes, as compared with male participants (F(1,38)=9.82; p=.003). Despite the 
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significant interaction between gender and deservingness, the inclusion of gender as a 
covariate did not change the overall pattern of results with respect to the comparison of the 
psychopathic trait groups.  
 
In Deservingness: Negative Outcomes, there was no significant main effect of gender for 
either deservingness or pleased ratings (p>.05). There were also no significant interactions 
between gender and deservingness, for either type of rating in the negative scenarios. The 
inclusion of gender as a covariate also did not change the pattern of result with respect to 
the comparison of the psychopathic trait groups.  
 
8.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The present study was designed to investigate how psychopathic personality traits influenced 
reasoning about deservingness using two related sets of materials. The positive set compared 
scenarios in which a main character’s good actions (congruent) or bad actions (incongruent) 
led to a positive outcome. The negative set compared scenarios in which a main character’s 
bad actions (congruent) or bad fortune (incongruent) led to a negative outcome. High and 
low psychopathic trait groups were compared with respect to the extent to which they judged 
scenario characters to deserve each outcome. Participants also rated how pleased they would 
feel in response to each outcome.  
 
8.4.1 Summary of findings 
The findings indicated that the experimental manipulation of deservingness was successful 
in both the positive and the negative sets; participants across both groups rated congruent 
outcomes as significantly more deserved than incongruent outcomes, and rated that they 
would be significantly more pleased with these outcomes. 
 
In the positive set, it was expected that the groups would not differ in their deservingness 
ratings but would differ in pleased ratings. As expected, the high trait group rated themselves 
to be more pleased with these outcomes than the low trait group. However, contrary to 
predictions, the high trait group judged incongruent positive outcomes to be significantly 
more deserved than the low trait group. Thus, in relation to the example above, the high trait 
group judged the friend who flirted with their examiner in order to pass their driving test to 
be more deserving and was more pleased with this outcome than the low trait group.  
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In the negative set, it was also expected that the groups would not differ in their 
deservingness ratings and that they would differ in their pleased ratings. However, results 
revealed that the high trait group judged incongruent negative outcomes to be significantly 
more deserved than the low trait group. For instance, the high trait group judged the friend 
who had been reprimanded in front of their class because their instructor was in a bad mood 
to be more deserving than did the low trait group. However, there were no differences 
between the groups with respect to their pleased ratings; this is was not in line with the 
study’s hypotheses.  
 
8.4.2 Interpretations relating to positive outcomes 
In Chapter 7, which examined how deservingness influenced compliance with requests for 
favours, the psychopathic trait groups differed in their ratings of how acceptable these 
requests were. In view of the research evidence suggesting that psychopathy is associated 
with intact cognitive empathy and impaired emotional empathy (e.g. Blair, 2008), the ratings 
of acceptability might have been made on the basis of cognitive and/or emotional responses 
to the scenarios, but this was not explored in the study. Hence, in the present study, two 
distinct ratings were obtained in order to separate these aspects. Ratings of how much the 
scenario characters deserved each outcome were intended to tap into the cognitive 
component of acceptability, whereas ratings of how pleased participants would be with each 
outcome were intended to tap into the emotional component of acceptability. Thus, it was 
expected that the groups would differ in their pleased ratings, since these related to emotional 
responding, but not deservingness ratings, since these related to cognitive judgments.  
 
Deservingness ratings were intended to measure cognitive reasoning about the scenarios. 
What factors could have accounted for the unexpected group differences in deservingness 
ratings in the positive set? One possible explanation is that the high trait group was impaired 
in cognitive empathy. However, it is unlikely in view of the evidence of intact cognitive 
empathy in psychopathy (Blair, 2008). Moreover, the groups did not differ in their 
deservingness ratings across the board; the two groups made comparable judgments in 
response to congruent outcomes, but the high trait group was more lenient when the scenario 
characters succeeded as a result of their bad actions. One potential explanation is that the 
deservingness and pleased ratings were not adequately separating cognitive and emotional 
aspects of acceptability. Whilst these two ratings were intended to tap different types of 
judgments, the extent to which they in fact measured different phenomena is somewhat 
unclear. For instance, participants may have judged that they would only feel pleased for a 
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character when the character deserved that particular outcome. An examination of the 
correlations between deservingness and pleased ratings, for both congruent and incongruent 
outcomes, provides some support for this. The two ratings were significantly correlated for 
both the positive items (p<.01) and for the negative items (p<.05). Both cognitive and 
emotional processes are generally believed to contribute to judgment formation (e.g. Haidt, 
2001; Schwarz, 2000), and it may thus be difficult for people to separate these adequately 
using rating scales, or indeed to be aware of these as distinct influences. A number of studies 
in support of a dissociation between cognitive and emotional empathy have recruited 
physiological and brain imaging techniques; for instance a range of studies have 
demonstrated that psychopathy is associated with reduced galvanic skin conductance (Blair, 
Jones, Clark & Smith. 1997), reduced activity in the amygdala, which is associated with 
emotional processing (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1994; Phelps & LeDoux, 
2005) and differences in EEG activity (Brazil, Mars, Bulten, Buitelaar, Verkes & De Bruijn, 
2011). Therefore, separating cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy without the use of 
the physiological and/or brain imaging techniques may present significant challenges.  
 
Another possible explanation for group differences in deservingness ratings may be the 
extent to which the groups valued social rules, an explanation that was also helpful when 
interpreting the findings relating to deservingness presented in Chapter 7. Social rules are 
norms or standards that guide behaviour without the force of law (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). 
One type of social rule which has been discussed in relation to deservingness (Feather, 2006) 
is the belief in a just world. This belief suggests that people’s good deeds, for instance 
working hard and performing well, will directly lead to positive outcomes (such as passing a 
driving test). By contrast, incongruent relationships between people’s actions and outcomes, 
such as passing a driving test as a result of flirting with the instructor rather than driving well, 
are inconsistent with belief in a just world. Research suggests that those high in psychopathic 
traits are less likely to believe in a just world (Hafer et al., 2005) than those low in 
psychopathic traits. Thus, in the present study, the low trait group may have been perturbed 
by incongruent outcomes that defied the existence of a just world and reflected this by 
discriminating more than the high trait group between positive outcomes that were 
congruent versus incongruent.  
 
With respect to the pleased ratings in the positive set, it was expected that the high trait group 
would discriminate between the congruent versus incongruent outcomes to a lesser extent 
than the low trait group, and the findings supported this hypothesis. One prominent model 
128 
 
of deservingness suggests people have distinct reactions to different kinds of outcomes 
(Feather, 2006). According to this model, people experience pleasure in response to positive 
outcomes that are deserved and resentment in response to positive outcomes that are 
undeserved. Whilst the present study was not designed explicitly to test this particular model, 
it may aid in the interpretation of the current findings. In the congruent, positive outcomes, 
it may have been relatively simple to acknowledge that the friend who made few errors and 
drove well deserved to pass their driving test. Both groups may have been equally pleased 
with this outcome, since they were not in competition for the same resource and therefore 
did not have to incur any sort of personal sacrifice in order for the character to succeed. For 
instance in the scenario in which the friend passes their driving test, the participant is not 
taking a test themselves.  
 
Feather’s (2006) model can also potentially account for incongruent, positive outcomes, such 
as that in which the friend flirted with the driving instructor in order to pass. In these 
situations, the low trait group may have felt resentful and been critical of the friend for acting 
in violation of social rules; cheating is considered to be one such violation (Fehr 
&Fischbacher, 2002; Jordan, 2001). By contrast, the high trait group, who are likely to have 
been less concerned with social rule violation and more likely to take advantage of others 
(e.g. Hare, 1993) may have admired the friend, and recognised that if they were in a similar 
position, they may have been likely to cheat themselves (Coyne & Thomas, 2008; Nathanson, 
Paulhus & Williams, 2006).  
 
8.4.3 Interpretations relating to negative outcomes 
With respect to the deservingness ratings, no group differences were predicted for the 
negative set. However, as for the positive set, the high trait group discriminated between 
congruent and incongruent negative outcomes to a lesser extent than the low trait group. 
What could have accounted for this unexpected group difference? As discussed above, this 
difference was unlikely to reflect a lack of awareness or capacity to make a cognitive judgment 
in the high trait group, especially since the groups did not differ in response to the congruent 
outcomes. The high trait group was simply harsher in their ratings when the scenario 
characters experienced unfortunate suffering that was unrelated to their actions. Both 
cognitive and emotional factors may have contributed to the participants’ deservingness 
ratings.  
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The model of deservingness proposed by Feather (2006) may provide an aid interpretation 
of this finding. This model suggests that people experience schadenfreude, or pleasure at 
others’ misfortune, in response to others’ deserved negative outcomes. Thus, in the 
congruent negative outcomes, both trait groups are likely to have understood the causal link 
between the failure to complete the homework and the subsequent reprimand, and deemed 
the character to be responsible. The higher deservingness ratings in congruent versus 
incongruent negative outcomes may indicate that both groups experienced schadenfreude.  
 
An alternative reaction may have accounted for the high trait group’s ratings. As discussed 
above, the high trait group may have identified with the experience of successfully 
transgressing in order to achieve a goal and admired characters that behaved in that fashion. 
By contrast, in the congruent negative outcomes the characters’ transgressions were 
unsuccessful; in the present example they did not escape reprimand when they decided not 
to complete their homework. The high trait group may therefore have been less likely to 
admire their transgressions, and accordingly made similar judgments of deservingness to the 
low trait group. 
 
In the incongruent, negative outcomes, the high trait group was likely to have felt less 
sympathetic than the low trait group. Given that psychopathic traits are associated with 
callousness, a lack of regard for others and a lack of emotional empathy (e.g. Hare, 1993, 
Blair, 2008), the high trait group may have experienced less vicarious distress when presented 
with the friend’s hardship as compared to the low trait group. This may have been reflected 
in higher deservingness ratings. Another possible explanation for group differences in 
response to incongruent negative outcomes may have been the extent to which the high trait 
group actively blamed the victim, despite the fact that the outcome was unrelated to their 
behaviour. A number of studies examining blame attributions have found that people with 
psychopathy tend to target the victim (Batson & Gray, 2010). This often serves the function 
of deflecting blame in the aftermath of their own transgressions (DeLisi, Angton, Vaught, 
Trulson Caudill & Beaver, 2014), but further research is needed to investigate how those 
high in psychopathic traits judge blame in situations where they have not transgressed.  
 
With respect to how pleased the participants would feel, the predictions for the negative set 
were less clear than those for the positive set. One possibility was that the high trait group 
would discriminate more between the congruent and incongruent outcomes as compared to 
the low trait group, since despite believing in a just world, the low trait group would not wish 
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to endorse suffering for the main character. An alternative prediction was that the high trait 
group would discriminate less between congruent and incongruent outcomes, since this 
discrimination may have been made on the basis of belief in a just world which the high trait 
group was thought to lack; this was the pattern expected (and found) in the positive set. 
 
In reality, the results did not support either of these predictions; no group differences 
emerged in response to either congruent or incongruent negative outcomes. It is possible 
that the high trait group did not feel more pleased with either type of negative outcome 
because they were not personally affected by the characters’ actions. Psychopathy is 
associated with instrumental aggression, or the tendency to behave aggressively in order to 
achieve a goal, (Glenn & Raine, 2009) and an increased propensity for vengeance 
(Giammarco & Vernon, 2014); neither motivation was necessarily applicable in the present 
study. An interesting future direction might be to examine responding in situations in which 
the character’s actions have negative implications for the participants.  
 
8.4.4 Difference between positive and negative sets of materials 
One explanation as to why the groups differed in pleased ratings for the positive set but not 
for the negative set may relate to fundamental differences between how people view positive 
and negative outcomes. Firstly, the desirability of congruent and incongruent outcomes 
(from the perspective of the observer) is likely to have differed between sets. In the situation 
in which the friend passed their driving test after performing well, this was an example of a 
positive outcome directly arising from good actions, and the low trait group may have thus 
viewed this as desirable. When the friend passed after flirting with the instructor, this was an 
example of a positive outcome directly arising from bad actions, and the low trait group may 
have viewed this as undesirable. There was a different balance in the desirability of outcomes 
in the negative set, since neither congruent nor incongruent outcomes were likely to have 
been perceived as desirable. Thus, the lack of group differences may have been driven by the 
low trait group providing similar ratings in response to both types of outcome, since they 
were unlikely to revel in the characters’ suffering, even if they judged it to be deserved. The 
high trait group may have lacked investment in the implications of any outcomes for the 
characters and therefore given less extreme ratings across the board. Inspection of the mean 
scores provides some support for this, and suggests that the groups may have differed with 
respect to how they reasoned about positive and negative types of situations.  
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Another difference between the positive and negative sets relates to the chain of events 
leading to each outcome. In the positive set, both congruent and incongruent outcomes arose 
from the characters’ actions. By contrast, in the negative set, the congruent outcome arose 
from the characters’ bad actions (failing to compete the homework), whereas the incongruent 
outcomes arose from misfortune (the instructor’s bad mood). The positive set could have 
included an additional set of incongruent outcomes resulting from good fortune; for example, 
the character could pass their driving test because the instructor was in a good mood. 
Alternatively, the negative set could have included an additional set of incongruent outcomes 
resulting from bad actions; for example, the character could be reprimanded because they 
accidentally lost or damaged the homework. However, the both these extra sets are 
potentially problematic. In the case of good fortune leading to positive outcomes, people are 
unlikely to feel as strongly about the lack of deservingness as they would about undeserved 
negative outcomes. In the case of negative outcomes resulting from bad actions, these would 
have to be unintentional, accidental actions and again would be a weaker manipulation with 
respect to the link to deservingness. Nonetheless, a future study could include all these 
potential sets of outcomes.    
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8.4.5 Conclusions  
In summary, the present study employed a novel experimental task to compare reasoning 
about deservingness in people high and low in psychopathic traits. One set of materials 
described positive outcomes and the second described negative outcomes. In the first set, 
the groups gave similar ratings when positive outcomes arose from the characters’ good 
actions. However, the high trait group judged positive outcomes that arose from the 
characters’ bad actions to be more deserved than the low trait group. The high trait group 
also rated that they would feel more pleased with these outcomes. In the negative set, a 
similar pattern was revealed in terms of judgments of deservingness; the groups did not differ 
in response to outcomes that arose from the characters’ bad actions and the high trait group 
rated outcomes that arose from the characters’ misfortune to be more deserved than the low 
trait group. However, the groups did not differ with respect to how pleased they would feel. 
Broadly speaking, the high trait group therefore discriminated less on the basis of 
deservingness than the low trait group. This may reflect the high trait group’s reduced 
sensitivity to social rule violations and in particular a lack of belief in a just world. The groups 
may also have differed in their emotional reactions to different types of outcomes. Ultimately, 
when compared to the low trait group, the high trait group may have been more likely to 
endorse transgressions that led to positive outcomes, since these potentially matched their 
own inclinations; they may also have been less likely to sympathise with unwarranted 
adversity, and more likely to blame victims for their own misfortune.  
 
8.5 THE NEXT STUDIES: EXPLORING POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE 
OUTCOMES FURTHER 
 
The present study was designed to investigate how people high and low in psychopathic 
traits might reason about different types of outcomes on the basis of deservingness. 
Deservingness was found to influence responding to positive versus negative outcomes in 
different ways. The study presented here and much of the relevant literature describes how 
people make attributions about deservingness, cause, and blame in situations in which the 
consequences of characters’ actions are primarily for the character themselves. The next two 
chapters will examine positive and negative outcomes further.  
 
Chapter 9 will focus on positive and negative outcomes that potentially affect both the 
participants and the task characters using the Competitiveness Task. This will examine 
competitiveness, and the extent to which participants prefer positive outcomes for others, 
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following their own success or failure. In this task, the outcome for the participant is 
independent of the outcome for the character. Chapter 10 will focus only on negative 
outcomes which primarily affect only the participant using the Counterfactual Thinking Task. 
This will examine participants’ judgments of blame and preferences for potential solutions 
that might have prevented negative outcomes (counterfactuals) in situations where a 
character’s negligence has resulted in a negative outcome for the participant. 
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Chapter 9: Competitive preferences following failure versus success 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter 8 used the Deservingness task to examine how groups high and low in psychopathic 
traits reason about positive and negative outcomes for others in situations where the 
outcome is either deserved or undeserved. In this task, the outcomes were only for the 
scenario characters and the participants themselves did not stand to gain or lose from these 
outcomes. By contrast, the present chapter will focus on participants’ preferences for positive 
and negative outcomes for others when they as well as the characters gain or lose from the 
outcomes.  
 
From an evolutionary perspective, competition traditionally refers to a contest over resources 
necessary for survival and reproduction, such as food or a suitable mate, in contexts where 
the demand for these resources outweighs the supply (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). In a 
contemporary context, people may compete for a range of social resources, including 
achievements relating to skills or ambitions, jobs, promotions and other career milestones, 
and successful relationships. Success in these contexts may signify that goals such as social 
and financial stability have been reached.  
 
Competitiveness, or the drive to succeed in competition, may thus be an adaptive mechanism 
when there are limited resources available, such as a competition prize, job or promotion; in 
order for someone to obtain these resources, others must fail to do so. However, people 
often behave competitively even in situations where they are not in direct competition with 
others over a limited resource and their success is independent of others’ success or failure. 
For instance, students may behave competitively towards each other when undertaking 
exams, even if the likelihood of achieving a good grade is independent of other students’ 
grades. 
 
What drives competitiveness? Evidence suggests that it may be influenced by dispositional, 
internal characteristics such as narcissism (Luchner, Houston, Walker & Houston, 2011) and 
the extent to which people view themselves as high achievers (Harackiewicz & Sansone, 
1991). The extent to which people tend to compare themselves with others is also thought 
to be relevant (Garcia, Tor & Schiff, 2013; Festinger, 1954). For instance, it has been posited 
that drawing social comparisons may enable people to make more accurate evaluations about 
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their opinions and abilities (Fiske, 2004), may enhance self-esteem (Wills, 1981), or may 
enable people to emulate those with  significant achievements in order to motivate hard work 
and better performance (Collins, 1996).  
 
Competitiveness may also be influenced by situational, external characteristics such as the 
presence, salience and value of a reward and the extent to which others are explicitly referred 
to as competitors (Tauer & Harackiewicz, 1999). For example, factors such as the existence 
of rivals or rewards can increase the pressure to win and reduce intrinsic motivation to take 
part in an activity for its own sake (Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams & Porac, 1981; Reeves & 
Deci, 1996). This negative effect may be ameliorated by providing positive or encouraging 
feedback that highlights the competence of the individual (Tauer & Harackiewicz, 1999). 
Other studies have shown that people are most competitive when they perceive themselves 
to be in competition with one other person, as opposed to a group (Buckingham & Alicke, 
2002; Garcia & Tor, 2009). For instance, studies have demonstrated that online auction 
bidders reported greater desire to win, even when bidding was more costly than beneficial, 
in situations where they were pitted against a bidding rival (Cox, Smith & Walker, 1992; 
Malhotra, 2010). Enhanced competitiveness in one-on-one interactions could be due to the 
ease with which people can draw personalised comparisons with specific individuals versus 
generalised comparisons with large groups (Garcia et al., 2013; Locke, 2007).  
 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that there may be both benefits and drawbacks to 
competitiveness. Competitiveness may aid adaptation to new situations, motivate people to 
put in greater levels of effort and improve performance (Franken & Brown, 1995). However, 
competitiveness can also decrease people’s intrinsic motivation and may in some cases may 
impede the maintenance of harmonious social relationships (Thornton, Ryckman & Gold, 
2011). The extent to which competitiveness helps or hinders may be linked to people’s 
individual competitive styles. For example, at one extreme, the desire to succeed in 
competitive contexts, with the aim of self-improvement and personal growth has been 
termed personal development competitiveness (Ryckman, Libby, van den Borne, Gold & 
Lindner, 1997). These competitors do not view people as obstacles to be removed nor do 
they wish to win at the expense of others. Personal development competition is associated 
with greater achievement and self-sufficiency (Ryckman, Libby, van den Borne, Gold & 
Lindner, 1997; Franken & Brown, 1995). At the other extreme, the indiscriminate need to 
win at any cost, as a means of maintaining or enhancing self-worth has been termed 
‘Hypercompetitiveness’ (Horney, 1936). Unlike personal development competitiveness, 
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hypercompetitiveness has been associated with narcissism (Ryckman, Thornton & Butler, 
1994), a propensity to exercise power and control over others (Ryckman et al., 1997), the use 
of duplicitous tactics (Houston, Queen, Cruz, Vlahov & Gosnell, 2015) and greater conflict 
in personal relationships (Thornton et al., 2011).  
 
How might psychopathic traits influence competitiveness? One study linked psychopathic 
traits with decreased personal development competitiveness and increased 
hypercompetitiveness (Ross & Rausch, 2001), and a range of studies recruiting 
neuroeconomic game paradigms such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma have found that people 
high in psychopathic traits are more competitive and less cooperative than those low in 
psychopathic traits (e.g. Mokros et al., 2008). These differences in competitiveness are 
consistent with several aspects of the psychopathic profile. Firstly, competitiveness in an 
evolutionary context is adaptive, and psychopathy has been conceptualised as a successful 
evolutionary strategy (Glenn & Raine, 2009), which may increase chances of success in 
competitive contexts in a number of ways. For example: the use of deception and/or 
coercion may have enabled those with psychopathy to gain additional resources; the capacity 
to appear superficially charming may have won support and gained useful allies; impulsivity 
and fearlessness may have enabled people with psychopathy to take advantage of presenting 
opportunities and explore their environment without hesitation; sexual promiscuity may have 
enhanced chances of reproductive success, and a lack of emotional empathy may have 
increased resilience against stress and facilitated an unrestrained ability to take advantage of 
others (Glenn, Kurzban & Raine, 2011).   
 
Another aspect of psychopathy that may increase competitiveness is the propensity for 
aggression. Aggression has been conceptualised as comprising two main subtypes: 
instrumental (or proactive) aggression and reactive aggression (Dodge & Coie, 1987). 
Reactive aggression has been defined as an impulsive, hostile reaction to a perceived threat, 
dangerous situation or provocation, whereas instrumental aggression has been defined as a 
non-provoked aversive action intended to influence others, either in order to gain a resource 
or to intimidate or dominate others (Patrick, 2004; Poulin & Boivin, 2000). Unlike reactive 
aggression, which is typically preceded by a strong emotional reaction, instrumental 
aggression is controlled, purposeful, premeditated and goal-oriented (Glenn & Raine, 2009). 
A significant body of literature has linked psychopathy with instrumental rather than reactive 
aggression (Glenn & Raine, 2009; Cornell, Warren, Hawk, Stafford, Oram et al., 1996; Blair, 
2001; Walsh, Swogger & Kosson, 2009). Therefore, if success in a competitive context is the 
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goal, those high in psychopathic traits may be more likely than those low in psychopathic 
traits to use instrumental aggression as a means to achieve their aims. 
 
In what other ways might psychopathic traits influence behaviour in competitive contexts? 
Psychopathic traits such as superficial charm, impulsiveness, lack of empathy and a 
propensity for instrumental aggression have been associated with not only criminal acts but 
also with considerable career success (Dutton, 2012; Babiak, 1995). However, this success is 
also more likely to have been achieved by cheating (e.g. Nathanson, Paulhus & Williams, 
2006), conning and other duplicitous tactics (Babiak & Hare, 2006; LeBreton, Binning & 
Adorno, 2006). In a corporate context, this self-serving psychopathic success is often a threat 
to business performance and longevity (Boddy, 2005).  
 
In addition to being more self-serving in competitive contexts, those high in psychopathic 
traits may also behave more antagonistically towards losing competitors, despite the fact that 
they no longer pose a threat. In one study (Geniole, Busseri & McCormick, 2013), 
participants took part in an online game with a fictitious competitor and the game was rigged 
such that all participants won the competition. They then had to decide how much money 
should be given to their losing competitor; this money was independent of their own 
winnings. Participants high in psychopathic traits awarded significantly less money to 
competitors than those low in psychopathic traits. This suggests that those high in 
psychopathic traits are harsher and more punitive towards competitors, even in competitive 
contexts in which they succeed.  
 
Despite the evidence suggesting links between psychopathic traits and competitiveness, this 
relationship has yet to be systematically investigated. This is the focus of the present study. 
One possibility would be to investigate competitive behaviour in situations in which 
participants are in direct competition over a limited resource, such as a single prize. However, 
it would be unsurprising to find that individuals high versus low in psychopathic traits are 
more competitive in these situations. Instead, the present study was designed to investigate 
how psychopathic traits influence competitive behaviour in situations involving indirect 
competition, where the outcomes for competitors are independent and the resources in 
question are not short in supply, for example exam grades. The present study involved the 
development of a novel paradigm: the Competitiveness Task. This task described scenarios 
in which participants themselves achieved a positive or negative outcome, and they had to 
decide a) whether they would prefer another character to experience a positive, neutral or 
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negative outcome, and b) how pleased they would feel with each of these outcomes for the 
other character. For instance, in one scenario, both the participant and the character were 
taking an important exam, and the possible outcomes for the other character were that they 
could have failed, passed with an average grade or passed with a top grade. Participants 
responded both to scenarios where they themselves failed the exam, to scenarios where they 
themselves passed with a top grade, since participants’ own success or failure may have 
influenced competitiveness differently in the two trait groups.  
 
In the Deservingness Task, the two rating scales, deservingness and pleased, were intended 
to tap into cognitive and emotional aspects of acceptability respectively. However, the 
findings revealed significant correlations between the measures, suggesting that these ratings 
did not adequately differentiate between cognitive and emotional empathy. Therefore, in the 
present study, no attempt was made to differentiate these. Instead, participants were asked 
to give both their preferences for the outcomes, and to rate how pleased they would be with 
each type of possible outcome.  
 
9.1.1 Hypotheses  
 
Psychopathic personality traits such as reduced empathy, a capacity for superficial charm, 
increased impulsivity and a propensity for instrumental aggression (e.g. Glenn & Raine, 2009), 
have been associated with increased competitiveness and a desire to win at all costs. Thus, 
in the present study, it was expected that there would be a group difference in both 
preferences and pleased ratings, such that the high trait group would prefer less positive 
outcomes for competitors, would be more pleased with negative outcomes and less pleased 
with positive outcomes, as compared to the low trait group.  
 
In the Competitiveness Task, participants read two variants of each scenario: one in which 
they succeeded and one in which they failed. Failure and success in competitive contexts 
might have influenced the ways in which participants felt feel about outcomes for other 
competitors. It was thus possible that the groups might have been differentially influenced 
by this manipulation.   
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9.2 METHODS 
9.2.1 Design  
There was one between-participants factor of PPI group (high vs. low scorers) and one 
within-participants factor of level of success (succeed vs. fail).  
 
9.2.2 Participants  
The Competitiveness Task was administered alongside the Deservingness Task; the 
screening and testing samples in the present study were therefore identical to those described 
in Chapter 8. On this basis, 20 high-scoring (10m, 10f) and 20 low-scoring (9m, 11f) 
individuals took part in the test stage of the present study.  
 
9.2.3 Procedure 
As described in Chapter 8.2.2.3, participants provided written informed consent before 
completing the experimental tasks and a brief health screen to ensure that nobody with a 
history of significant psychiatric or neurological illness was included; no participants were 
excluded on this basis. Participants were paid for taking part. 
 
9.2.4 Materials  
9.2.4.1 Competitiveness Task  
The Competitiveness Task was designed to examine how preferences relating to positive 
outcomes for others varied as a function of one’s own success or failure. The task consisted 
of 8 short scenarios (see Figure 9.1 for example), describing a situation in which both the 
participant and a character they knew were awaiting an outcome, for example having recently 
taken an important exam. The participant had to state whether they would prefer the 
character to experience a negative outcome (failing the exam), a neutral outcome (passing 
the exam with an average grade) or a positive outcome (getting a top grade in the exam). 
Participants also rated how pleased they would be with each of these outcomes.  
 
Each scenario had two variant levels of success for the participant: ‘succeed’ and ‘fail’. In the 
‘succeed’ variant, the outcome for the participants was positive, for instance they passed the 
exam with a top grade. In the ‘fail’ variant, the outcome for the participants was negative, for 
instance they failed the exam (see Figure 9.1 for example scenario).Characters were 
counterbalanced across the scenarios for gender, and the proximity of the relationship to the 
participant was counterbalanced such that half the characters were described as friends and 
the remaining half were described as colleagues.  
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Figure 9.1: Example scenario from Competitiveness Task  
______________________________________________________________________ 
STORY STEM: “You and a friend have been studying for a final exam that is worth 50% 
of your degree.” 
SUCCEED VARIANT: When the results come out, you have passed with a top grade. 
FAIL VARIANT: When the results come out, you have failed. 
Questions 
1. From your personal perspective, which of the following options would you prefer?  
a. Your friend has failed 
b. Your friend has passed with an average grade  
c. Your friend has passed with a top grade 
2. How pleased would you be if your friend failed? 
3. How pleased would you be if your friend passed with an average grade? 
4. How pleased would you be if your friend passed with a top grade? 
 
1=________________________________________________________________ 10 = 
Not at all pleased       Extremely pleased 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.2.4.2 Administration 
After reading the instructions, participants were shown an example item and allowed to ask 
questions. All scenarios and corresponding questions were then presented one at a time, in 
a paper booklet. Participants responded verbally to all questions. The scenario remained on 
display until participants had completed the relevant questions in order to reduce the 
confounding effects of memory load.  
 
9.2.4.3 Scoring  
9.2.4.3.1 Choice of outcome 
For each scenario, participants indicated whether they would prefer a negative outcome (for 
example, fail exam), a neutral outcome (for example, pass exam) or a positive outcome (for 
example, pass exam with top grade). Negative preferences were awarded a score of 1, neutral 
preferences were awarded a score of 2 and positive preferences were awarded a score of 3. 
A composite preference score was derived by summing these scores across all scenarios for 
each participant; higher scores denoted preferences for more positive outcomes.  
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9.2.4.3.2 Pleased ratings 
The participants also rated how pleased they would be with each type of outcome 
(negative, neutral and positive). These ratings were summed across all scenarios.  
 
9.3 RESULTS 
 
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures described below are presented 
in Table 9.1. Examination of the date revealed that all variables were normally distributed 
and there were no outliers.  
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Table 9.1: Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for 
Competitiveness Task  
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group   Low PPI Group 
Mean   (SD)    Mean (SD)  
(N=20)    (N=20)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Preference scores for outcomes for character (%)     
If participant succeeds  91.67 (5.41)    93.54 (7.58)  
If participant fails  66.04 (7.91)    71.67 (16.08)  
How pleased were participants with the fail grade for the friend?   
(Negative outcome) (%) 
If participant succeeds  26.05 (9.65)    17.65 (6.85)  
If participant fails  35.10 (8.55)    26.85 (9.44)  
How pleased were participants with the average mark for the friend?    
(Neutral outcome) (%)         
If participant succeeds  43.40 (5.23)    43.95 (7.54) If 
participant fails 46.00 (4.42)    43.40 (6.98)  
How pleased were participants with the top mark for the friend?    
(Positive outcome) (%) 
If participant succeeds  58.65 (8.61)    67.50 (8.39) 
If participant fails  41.90 (5.33)    46.25 (16.70) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.3.1 Composite preference score 
The high and low PPI groups were compared on their preference scores in the 
Competitiveness Task. Thus, a 2 x 2 (group [high/low PPI] by level of success [succeed/fail]) 
ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant main effect of level of success, such that 
participants across both groups preferred more positive outcomes for the characters in 
situations in which they themselves had succeeded versus situations in which they themselves 
had failed (F(1, 38)= 203.82; p<.001). There was no significant main effect of group (F(1, 
38)= 1.89; p=.177); nor was there a significant interaction between group and level of success 
(F(1, 38)= 1.27; p=.267). 
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9.3.2 Pleased ratings  
The high and low PPI groups were compared with respect to how pleased they felt with each 
outcome for the character. Since a separate rating was taken for each outcome, a 2 x 2 x 3 
(group [high/low PPI] by level of success [succeed/fail] by outcome 
[negative/neutral/positive]) ANOVA was conducted. 
 
There was a significant main effect of level of success, such that participants across both 
groups, in response to all three types of outcome, were more pleased in situations where they 
themselves had succeeded versus situations in which they themselves had failed (F(1, 38)= 
11.36; p=.002). There was also a significant main effect of outcome for the character, such 
that participants across both groups, and across both levels of success, were more pleased in 
situations in which there was a positive outcome for the character versus situations in which 
there was a negative outcome for the character (F(1, 38)= 96.94; p<.001). There was a 
significant interaction between level of success for the participant and outcome for the 
character (F(1, 38)= 72.41; p<.001), such that both groups were more pleased the more 
positive the outcome for the character, but only in situations in which they themselves had 
succeeded.  
 
There was no significant main effect of group (F(1, 38)= 0.63; p=..433). There was also no 
significant interaction between level of success and group (F(1, 38)= 2.05; p=..161), nor was 
there a significant three-way interaction between group, level of success and outcome for the 
character (F(1, 38)= 2.05; p=..161). However, there was a significant interaction between 
group and outcome for the character, such that the high trait group was less pleased with 
positive outcomes and more pleased with negative outcomes, as compared to the low trait 
group (F(1, 38)= 5.41; p=.009). 
 
In order to examine the interaction between group and outcome for the character, three 
separate post-hoc t-tests were conducted. This allowed for the high and low trait groups to 
be compared on their pleased ratings for negative, neutral and positive outcomes respectively. 
With respect to negative outcomes, the high trait group was significantly more pleased than 
the low trait group (t(38)= 3.32; p=.002). There were no significant group differences with 
respect to pleased ratings for neutral outcomes (t(38)= 0.6; p=.509). The high trait group was 
less pleased with positive outcomes than the low trait group, but with a strict p value of 0.017 
(.05/3), this difference only approached significance (t(38)= 2.29; p=.028).  
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9.3.3 Gender 
Psychopathic traits are more commonly linked to males than females; in order to ensure that 
gender was not a confounding variable in the present study, these analyses were repeated 
using ANCOVAs with gender as a covariate.  
 
In the Competitiveness Task, there was no significant main effect of gender for either 
preference score or pleased ratings (p>.05). However, the ANCOVA did reveal a significant 
interaction between gender and outcome for the character such that the females were less 
pleased with negative outcomes and more pleased with positive outcomes than males (F(1, 
38)= 3.80; p=.032). There were no other significant interactions with gender (p>.05). Despite 
the significant interaction between gender and outcome for character described above, the 
inclusion of gender as a covariate did not change the pattern of results with respect to the 
comparison of the psychopathic trait groups.  
 
9.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The present study was designed to investigate how psychopathic personality traits influence 
competitiveness, using a novel task. The Competitiveness Task described situations in which 
the participant and another character, such as a friend or colleague, were both involved in a 
particular competitive context, such as an important exam, and were both hoping to achieve 
a positive outcome, such as a good grade. The participant and character were not in direct 
competition over one positive outcome; both could have achieved a good grade. Participants 
had to decide whether they would prefer for the character to experience a negative outcome 
(failing the exam), a neutral outcome (an average grade) or a positive outcome (a high grade). 
Participants also had to rate how pleased they would feel with each of these outcomes for 
the character. Since people’s own success or failure may influence the extent to which they 
behave competitively, both levels of success were included in the present study. Thus, in one 
variant, participants responded as though they had achieved a high grade, and in the second 
variant responded as though they had failed the exam.  
 
The findings indicated that the experimental manipulation of level of success (own success 
or failure) was effective; participants across both groups preferred positive outcomes and 
were more pleased with these outcomes in situations in which they themselves had succeeded 
versus in situations where they themselves had failed. This may be accounted for by evidence 
suggesting that people are susceptible to a self-serving bias when making attributions about 
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their own successes and failures; successes are typically attributed to internal, dispositional 
characteristics and failures are typically attributed to external, situational factors (Campbell 
& Sedikides, 1999; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde & Hankin, 2004). Thus, in the scenario in the 
present study in which the participants failed the exam, they may have wished to attribute 
this to a particularly difficult exam, rather than a lack of competence. This was more plausible 
when the other character also failed the exam than when the other character passed with a 
top grade.  
 
Despite the significant differences in responding to success versus failure across all 
participants, it was unclear whether the psychopathic trait groups would be differentially 
influenced by the experimental manipulation. The findings revealed that there was no group 
by level of success interaction; the high trait group may have been influenced by both failure 
and success variants of the task in similar ways to the low trait group.  
 
Contrary to predictions with respect to participants’ preferences for positive, neutral or 
negative outcomes for the characters, there were no significant differences between the high 
and low trait groups. This prediction was made on the basis of previous studies examining 
competitiveness in psychopathy. This literature suggests that psychopathy is linked to greater 
competitiveness when in direct competition with others, to the use of deception or coercion 
to gain resources when the supply is limited, and to a competitive style characterised by a 
desire to win rather than by a desire for personal development (Ross & Rausch, 2001; Glenn 
& Raine, 2009). However, the findings of the present study revealed no differences between 
the high and low trait groups. The simplest explanation for this is that they did not differ 
because the participants were not in direct competition with the scenario characters. For 
instance, if there was only one top grade available, the high trait group may have been more 
likely than the low trait group to prefer negative outcomes for competitors, but this was not 
the case in the present study. The lack of group differences in outcome preferences is 
consistent with evidence suggesting that people with psychopathy are not indiscriminately 
aggressive, but rather that they are instrumentally aggressive. Instrumental aggression refers 
to controlled, deliberate and goal-directed aggression (Glenn & Raine, 2009). In the present 
task, the goal of getting a high grade in the exam was not incompatible with the character 
performing well. It is possible that the high trait group would only have been driven to be 
‘hypercompetitive’, or to wish to win at any cost, when there was a clear motivation to behave 
in this way, such as in situations where resources were limited or only one person could win. 
By contrast, the low trait group may have been more likely to be competitive with the aim 
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of personal development rather than simply a desire to win, and were therefore less likely to 
wish to succeed at the expense of others or to view others as obstacles to their success, 
regardless of whether the competition was direct or indirect.  
 
Although the groups did not actively select different types of outcomes for the other 
characters in the scenarios, with respect to pleased ratings, the high trait group was more 
pleased with negative outcomes for the character and less pleased with positive outcomes 
for the character as compared to the low trait group, which was in line with predictions. 
These group differences may have been driven by a lack of emotional empathy in the high 
trait group, which influenced the way in which participants felt about the outcomes for the 
characters. For positive outcomes, such as in the scenario where participants were faced with 
the prospect of the character achieving a top grade, the high trait group may have felt actively 
resentful of the character’s success, either because it diminished the value of their own 
achievement in the ‘succeed’ variant of the task, or because it enhanced their sense of 
disappointment in the ‘fail’ variant of the task. By contrast, the low trait group may have 
experienced a vicarious sense of success and thus felt pleased for the character. However, if 
the high trait group was actively resentful, it is surprising that they did not differ from the 
low trait group in their preference scores. It may be more likely that the high trait group was 
simply unaffected by the prospect of the character’s success, and thus that only the low trait 
group was actively pleased for the character. 
 
Similarly empathic differences between the trait groups can also account for the pattern of 
results relating to pleased ratings for negative outcomes. In the scenario where the 
participants were faced with the prospect of the character failing the exam, the high trait 
group may not have personally resonated with the character’s predicament and therefore 
may have been unsympathetic to their distress. This may have led to the high trait group 
making comparatively higher pleased ratings than the low trait group, who may have 
vicariously experienced the character’s distress or their disappointment associated with 
failure (e.g. Shepherd, 2003) and felt sympathy for them. Thus, it is likely that the group 
differences in pleased ratings arose from the high trait group differentiating between negative 
and positive outcomes for characters to a lesser extent than the low trait group, and 
inspection of the mean scores provides some support for this. This lack of differentiation 
echoes previous findings in the present thesis. In Chapter 7, the high trait group’s 
acceptability ratings differentiated less between reasonable and unreasonable requests for 
favours than did the low trait group, and in Chapter 8, the high trait group differentiated less 
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between deserved and undeserved outcomes than did the low trait group. This may be linked 
to the flattened affect, reduced emotional empathy and impaired emotional processing 
associated with psychopathy (Blair, 2008; Blair, 1995). The high trait groups may have had a 
more limited range of emotional responding than the low trait groups which translated into 
less extreme ratings. 
 
In summary, the present study employed a novel experimental task to compare 
competitiveness in those high and low in psychopathic traits. The task described competitive 
contexts in which the participant and another scenario character were both aiming for a 
positive outcome, such as a high exam grade. The participant and character were not in direct 
competition, since both could have potentially succeeded. There were two variants of each 
task scenario, one in which the participant had failed and one in which they had succeeded. 
Regardless of the level of success, the high trait group did not actively select more negative 
outcomes than the low trait group when expressing a preference for what would happen to 
the scenario characters. Thus, although the literature implies that psychopathy is associated 
with increased competitiveness and choices that have negative consequences for competitors, 
the present findings suggest this may only be true when direct competition over limited 
resources is involved. Nonetheless, in comparison with the low trait group, the high trait 
group did take greater pleasure in negative outcomes for the scenario characters, and less 
pleasure in positive outcomes, when told to imagine that these outcomes had already 
occurred. This differentiation between active preferences and pleased ratings suggests that 
the time point at which participants respond, i.e. whether they are making choices about 
future events or reflecting on past events may be pertinent for detecting group differences. 
This was explored further in Chapter 10 (reported below) by examining counterfactual 
reasoning in relation to situations with negative outcomes for the participant.  
 
9.5 THE NEXT STUDY: NEGATIVE OUTCOMES AND COUNTERFACTUAL 
THINKING 
 
The present study was designed to investigate competiveness in people high and low in 
psychopathic traits. This study described positive and negative outcomes that had 
consequences for both the participants and for the scenario characters. However, the 
outcomes for the participant were independent of the outcome for characters (both could 
succeed, one could succeed and one could fail, or both could fail) and the outcome for the 
participants did not result from the character’s actions. This may have had some inhibitory 
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effect on the extent to which the high trait group responded antagonistically towards the 
characters. This may have been reflected in the high trait group’s preferences for outcomes 
for the characters, which were similar to the low trait group. The next study will investigate 
this further, by comparing the trait groups’ reasoning about negative outcomes that primarily 
affect the participants themselves, and that result from the characters’ negligence.  
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Chapter 10: Judgments of blame and counterfactual thinking  
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Evidence suggests that when people experience negative outcomes, they automatically reflect 
on “what might have been”: alternative decisions or events that would have avoided the 
negative outcome (Roese, 1997; Epstude & Roese, 2008). For instance, if a person were to 
miss a train and subsequently an important job interview, they may generate counterfactual 
alternatives such as ‘if only I packed my bag the night before’, ‘if only I left the house earlier’, 
‘if only I had driven’, ‘if only the train had been delayed’ etc. This capacity to generate 
possible alternatives to past events is referred to as counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1997). 
 
Experimental evidence suggests that counterfactual thinking influences the ways in which 
people respond to and reason about negative outcomes. When the negative outcomes 
happen to other people and result not from their own actions but from those of others, 
counterfactual thinking has been linked to increases in both sympathy for these victims and 
the amount of compensation awarded to them (Miller & McFarland, 1986; Macrae & Milne, 
1992). With respect to the perpetrators, counterfactual thinking has been associated with 
increased anger, a tendency to judge their transgressions as more negligent and more severe 
(Macrae, 1992), and a tendency to impose harsher penalties directed towards transgressors, 
even when these actions are accidental (Price, 1996; Macrae, Milne & Griffiths, 1993). When 
we ourselves experience a bad outcome as a result of our own actions, counterfactual 
thinking is thought to increase the experience of regret (Boninger, Gleicher & Strathman, 
1994) and to help us avoid negative outcomes in the future (Epsude & Roese, 2008). 
Relatively little work has examined the influence of counterfactual thinking in situations 
where negative outcomes for the self result from other people’s actions.  
 
In situations in which people experience negative outcomes as a result of others’ actions, one 
common response is to assign blame (Alicke, 2000). Assigning blame has been 
conceptualised as a social mechanism that identifies moral, social, and/or legal 
transgressions, with the aim of discouraging harmful behaviours and holding the perpetrators 
accountable for their actions (Alicke, 2000). This aim is typically achieved by imposing 
sanctions on transgressors, since people view the primary purpose of punishment to be 
deterrence and just deserts (Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002). Legal transgressions are 
likely to be met with sanctions such as fines or imprisonment, whereas moral or social 
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transgressions are likely to be met with socially mediated sanctions such as disapproval, 
criticism or social exclusion (e.g. Homans, 1961; Noussair & Tucker, 2005). A range of 
factors may influence blame attributions, including the severity of harm caused by people’s 
actions, (Bornstein, 1998), the extent to which people are personally culpable (Alter, 
Kernochen & Darley, 2007), intentionality (Shaver, 1985) and the degree of negligence 
involved (Channon, Fitzpatrick, Drury, Taylor & Lagnado, 2010).  
 
How might psychopathic traits influence counterfactual reasoning and blame attributions in 
response to negative outcomes? Turning first to counterfactual thinking, there is a paucity of 
experimental work examining this directly in psychopathy. On the one hand, the capacity to 
generate counterfactual alternatives has been associated with the experience of negative 
emotions, in particular regret (Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg, 1998), which is believed to be 
diminished in psychopathy (Hare, 1993). People with psychopathy have also been posited to 
lack the capacity to critically reflect upon, take responsibility for, or feel guilty about their 
own transgressions, which may make generating counterfactual alternatives to their actions 
particularly challenging (Glannon, 2008). On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest 
counterfactual thinking may be preserved in psychopathy. For instance, counterfactual 
thinking has been developmentally linked to false-belief, or the capacity to understand that 
others’ beliefs may be divergent from one’s own (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983), since both 
processes require people to simulate an alternative reality (Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & 
Mitchell, 1998). False-belief attribution has been extensively conceptualised as an aspect of 
cognitive empathy (e.g. Singer, 2006), which is thought to be intact in psychopathy (Blair, 
2008).  
 
How might psychopathic traits influence blame attributions in situations where they 
experience negative outcomes as a result of others’ actions? Psychopathy is associated with 
an increased tendency to make legal and social transgressions (e.g. Hare, 1992). It is thus 
unsurprising that limited work has examined how psychopathy is linked to blame attributions 
when others have transgressed, since people with psychopathy are arguably by definition 
more likely to be the transgressor than the victim. Nonetheless, psychopathy has been 
associated with a propensity to externalise blame and to blame victims for their own 
misfortune (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Batson, Gudjonsson & Gray, 2010; DeLisi, Angton, 
Vaughn, Trulson, Caudill & Beaver, 2014), which may lead to more severe blame attributions 
in those high versus low in psychopathic traits. However, this has typically been studied in 
contexts where the individual with psychopathy themselves has transgressed, and blame 
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externalisation has therefore served to deflect blame away from their own transgressions 
(DeLisi, Angton, Vaughn, Trulson, Caudill & Beaver, 2014); the extent to which those high 
in psychopathic traits blame others when they themselves are the victims of transgressions 
thus remains unclear.  
 
The present study was designed to investigate the relationship between psychopathic traits 
and responding to negative outcomes. In the Counterfactual Thinking Task, participants read 
scenarios describing negative outcomes that affected them personally, and resulted from 
another character’s actions. Participants were required to make judgments relating to regret, 
blame and guilt. Participants also had to evaluate a series of counterfactual alternatives to the 
events leading up to the negative outcome that could have prevented it from occurring.  
 
Psychopathy has been extensively linked to intact cognitive empathy and impaired emotional 
empathy (e.g. Blair, 2008), and many of the findings in the present thesis have been 
interpreted in view of this literature. Therefore, in the present study, an additional measure 
of empathy was administered to elucidate further the relationship between cognitive and 
emotional aspects of empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) is a 
self-report questionnaire designed to tap into both the cognitive components of empathy, 
such as perspective-taking and imagination, and the emotional components of empathy, such 
as the experience of personal distress and concern when others suffer. 
 
10.1.1 Hypotheses 
In view of the literature suggesting that psychopathic traits are associated with limited 
experience of regret, it was predicted that the high trait group would judge the scenario 
characters to experience less regret. Psychopathic traits are also associated with blame 
externalisation; it was thus expected that the high trait group would provide higher blame 
ratings when judging the characters’ actions.  
 
It was also predicted that the trait groups would express different preferences for the 
counterfactual alternatives, with the high trait group making more extreme choices. Since 
psychopathic traits have been linked to a reduced experience of guilt, it was predicted that 
the high trait group would report that they would feel less guilty in relation to the 
counterfactual alternatives than the low trait group.  
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With respect to the additional empathy measure administered in the present study, it was 
expected that the groups would not differ on the IRI subscales relating to perspective-taking 
or imagination, since these were intended to tap into cognitive empathy. It was expected that 
the high trait group would have lower scores than the low trait group on the IRI subscales 
relating to personal distress and empathic concern, since these were intended to tap into 
emotional empathy.   
 
10.2 METHODS 
 
10.2.1 Screening Phase  
A sample of 813 full-time university students (343m, 470f) who were fluent in English and 
aged 18 and above was opportunistically recruited. All participants gave informed consent 
and completed the PPI-SF (Lilienfeld and Hess, 2001); they were entered into a prize draw 
and told that they might be invited to the next phase of the study, which would be paid. 
Total PPI-SF scores were calculated for the whole sample.  
 
The strategy for selecting the testing sample and contacting participants was identical to the 
method specified in Chapter 6. On this basis, 30 high-scoring participants (20m, 10f) and 37 
low-scoring participants (19m, 18f) from the upper and lower fifteenth percentiles of the 
sample distribution were contacted by email or telephone and invited to take part in the 
second stage of the study.  
 
10.2.2 Testing Phase 
10.2.2.1 Design  
A between-groups design was used to compare high-PPI and low-PPI participants. 
 
10.2.2.2 Participants  
Twenty-one high-scoring (11m, 10f) and 20 low-scoring (10m, 10f) individuals took part in 
the experimental stage of the study, which involved completing the Counterfactual Thinking 
Task and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Participants also completed a set of measures 
reported in Chapter 11 below. As anticipated, the groups differed significantly on PPI-SF 
scores, t(39)=22.71, p< 0.001). The mean PPI score was 163.43 (SD 10.16) and 95.26 (SD 
8.67) for the high and low groups respectively.  The groups did not differ significantly in age 
(t(37)=0.34, p= 0.737); the mean ages were 21.15 (SD 2.92) and 21.53 (SD 3.96) for the high 
and low groups respectively. 
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10.2.2.3 Procedure 
All participants provided written informed consent before completing the experimental tasks 
and a brief health screen to ensure that nobody with a history of significant psychiatric or 
neurological illness was included. On this basis, one male participant from the low PPI group 
was excluded from the testing sample. The final sample therefore consisted of 21 high trait 
participants (11m, 10f) and 19 low trait participants (9m, 10f). Participants were paid for 
taking part. 
 
10.2.2.4 Materials  
10.2.2.4.1 Counterfactual Thinking Task 
The Counterfactual Thinking Task1 was designed to examine how people reason about 
situations in which they have experienced a negative outcome resulting from other people’s 
actions. The task consisted of 9 short scenarios describing a situation in which a character 
known to the participant, such as a friend, sibling, housemate or colleague accidentally does 
something that leads to the participants being inconvenienced, having their property 
damaged or losing time, effort or money (see Figure 10.1). For instance, in one scenario, the 
participant’s sibling accidentally filled the family car with the wrong fuel, which resulted in 
the participant missing their graduation. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which 
they thought the other character would regret their actions, and the extent to which they 
were to blame for the outcome. Participants then rank-ordered a list of six counterfactual 
options, i.e. potential alternatives that would have prevented the outcome. The 
counterfactual options manipulated both the type of alternative (practical, emotional or 
extreme) and the perspective (character or participant). There were thus six counterfactual 
alternatives consisting of one practical alternative from each perspective (character and 
participant), one emotional alternative from each perspective, and one extreme alternative 
from each perspective. The order in which these counterfactuals were presented was 
counterbalanced across items. The relationship of the main character to the participant was 
counterbalanced across items, and the gender of the character was not specified.  
                                                        
1 Please note that this task was developed jointly with Ms Leila Jameel. Ms Jameel used this task to explore 
counterfactual judgments in people scoring high versus low on a self-report measure of autistic traits. This 
study is included in her doctoral thesis.   
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Figure 10.1: Example scenario from Counterfactual Thinking Task  
______________________________________________________________________ 
STORY STEM: “Your sibling drives you to your graduation ceremony. They accidentally 
fill the car up with the wrong type of fuel, which damages the engine. You break down and 
miss your graduation ceremony.” 
Questions 
1. How much do you think your sibling would regret filling the car up with the wrong 
fuel? (Please circle one number ONLY) 
1-----------2---------3---------4----------5---------6---------7---------8----------9---------10 
Not regret at all       Regret very much  
2. How much do you think your sibling is to blame for you breaking down and missing 
your graduation ceremony? (Please circle one number ONLY) 
1-----------2---------3---------4----------5---------6---------7---------8----------9---------10 
Not at all to blame                 Very much to blame  
3. Here is a list of options that would have prevented your sibling from filling the car 
up with the wrong type of fuel and you missing your graduation ceremony. Please 
rank order the options according to your preference, whereby 1= most preferred and 
6 = least preferred (Please use ONE option per ranking). 
 
a) If your sibling hadn’t been well enough to drive you to your graduation ceremony 
(Character perspective, extreme)  
b) If you hadn’t invited your sibling to your graduation ceremony 
(Participant perspective, extreme) 
c) If your sibling hadn’t overlooked how important your graduation ceremony was 
(Character perspective, emotional) 
d) If you hadn’t accepted your sibling’s offer to drive you to your graduation ceremony 
(Participant perspective, practical) 
e) If your sibling hadn’t filled up the car with the wrong type of fuel 
(Character perspective, practical) 
f) If you hadn’t trusted your sibling with something so important  
(Participant perspective, emotional) 
4. How guilty would you feel if you wished [options a) to f)]? (Please circle one number 
ONLY) 
1----------2----------3----------4-----------5----------6----------7----------8----------9----------10 
Not at all guilty        Very guilty  
______________________________________________________________________ 
10.2.2.4.2 Administration 
155 
 
Participants were given a paper booklet containing instructions, all 9 scenarios, and 
corresponding questions. After reading the instructions, they completed the first item by 
filling in the booklet. After completing the first item, the experimenter checked that they had 
filled it in correctly and gave the participant the opportunity to ask questions. The participant 
then filled in the rest of the booklet alone. The relevant scenario was presented on each page 
of corresponding questions in order to reduce the confounding effects of memory load.  
 
10.2.2.4.3 Scoring  
10.2.2.4.3.1 Regret and blame 
The rating scales relating to regret and blame were summed for each participant across all 
items.  
 
10.2.2.4.3.2 Counterfactual alternative preferences  
For each item, participants ranked the six counterfactual alternatives (character practical, 
character emotional, character extreme, participant practical, participant emotional and 
participant extreme) in accordance with their preference. The alternative ranked as the first 
choice received a score of 1 and the alternative ranked as their last choice received a score 
of 6. These individual counterfactual alternative scores were summed across all items for 
each participant to arrive at six total preference scores, one per counterfactual alternative, 
with lower scores denoting greater preference. 
 
10.2.2.4.3.3 Guilt 
The rating scales relating to guilt for each separate counterfactual alternative were summed 
for each participant across all items.  
 
10.2.2.4.4 Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) is a self-report questionnaire designed 
to measure four subscales that tap into the global concept of empathy. The first subscale is 
‘perspective-taking’, and was designed to assess spontaneous attempts to adopt the 
perspectives of others. The second subscale is ‘fantasy’, and was designed to assess the 
tendency to identify with characters in movies, plays and other fictional situations. The final 
two subscales were designed to assess people’s emotional reactions; ‘Empathic concern’ 
refers to respondents’ feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for others and ‘personal 
distress’ refers to personal feelings of anxiety and discomfort resulting from observing 
others’ negative experiences. See Figure 10.2 for example questions for each subscale. The 
156 
 
IRI consists of 28 statements (8 for perspective taking subscale, 7 for fantasy subscale, 7 for 
empathic concern subscale and 6 for personal distress subscale) on a 5-point scale with a 
score of 1 representing ‘does not describe me well’ and a score of 5 representing ‘describes 
me well’; higher scores indicate greater empathy. All four subscales of the IRI have been 
found to have good test-retest reliability (.61-.81) and good internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha .70-.78). In order to ensure consistent responding, the questions were counterbalanced 
such that for some, higher scores corresponded to higher empathy and for others, the item 
was reversed and higher scores corresponded to lower empathy. 
 
Figure 10.2: Example items from Interpersonal Reactivity Index  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Perspective-taking 
Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their 
place. 
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
Does not describe me well       Describes me well 
Fantasy 
When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading  
character.  
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
Does not describe me well       Describes me well 
Empathic concern 
I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
Does not describe me well       Describes me well 
Personal distress 
In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.  
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
Does not describe me well        Describes me well 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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10.3 RESULTS 
10.3.1 Statistical Analyses 
The means and standard deviations (SD) for the Counterfactual Thinking Task are presented 
in Table 10.1. Examination of the data showed that all variables were normally distributed 
and there were no outliers for the low trait group. However, blame ratings and counterfactual 
guilt ratings for ‘extreme’ counterfactuals describing the character’s perspective were 
negatively skewed for the high trait group; there was also one outlier in the high trait group 
for this guilt rating. Both skewness and the outlier were brought within acceptable limits by 
conducting a square transformation, in accordance with Tukey’s ladder of transformations 
(Tukey, 1977).  
 
For the blame ratings parametric analysis using the transformed data are reported. For the 
guilt ratings it was not possible to transform them to normality. Since both parametric and 
non-parametric tests were showed the same pattern of findings, parametric tests for these 
data are reported.  
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Table 10.1: Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for the 
Counterfactual Thinking Task 
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group  Low PPI Group 
Mean   (SD)   Mean (SD)     
 (N=21)   (N=19)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Regret rating (%)   73.67 (6.87)   78.53 (6.71)    
Blame rating (%)   62.86 (14.94)   56.89 (9.56)  
Counterfactual Preferences  
(/54; low scores = greater preference)  
Practical Alternatives 
     Character perspective  16.52 (4.03)   14.84 (2.36)  
     Participant perspective  19.76 (3.53)   20.79 (3.19)  
Emotional Alternatives 
     Character perspective  26.86 (4.13)   25.58 (4.35) 
     Participant perspective  35.85 (3.26)   36.79 (2.07)  
Extreme Alternatives 
     Character perspective  46.48 (4.92)   46.36 (3.18)  
     Participant perspective  43.86 (2.87)   44.94 (1.57) 
Counterfactual guilt ratings (%)        
Practical Alternatives   
     Character perspective  18.67 (10.15)   20.00 (7.66) 
     Participant perspective  24.48 (13.06)   27.84 (10.98)  
Emotional Alternatives 
     Character perspective  29.62 (14.43)   39.05 (13.17) 
     Participant perspective  47.24 (17.27)   59.16 (12.26)  
Extreme Alternatives 
     Character perspective  68.52 (19.20)   79.05 (7.89)  
     Participant perspective  59.24 (18.75)   73.05 (8.78)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
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10.3.2: Regret ratings 
The high and low psychopathic trait groups were compared with respect to how much they 
judged that the scenario characters would regret their actions. The high trait group’s regret 
ratings were significantly lower than low trait group (t(38)=2.26; p=.03).  
 
10.3.3: Blame ratings 
The high and low psychopathic trait groups were compared with respect to how much they 
blamed the scenario characters for the negative outcomes. The groups did not significantly 
differ in their blame ratings (t(38)=1.49; p=.146).  
 
10.3.4: Preferences for counterfactual alternatives 
The high and low PPI groups were compared with respect to their preference scores for each 
type of counterfactual alternative. Since the six options included practical, emotional and 
extreme alternatives that focused on the actions of both the character and the participant, a 
2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA was conducted (group [high/low PPI] by type of alternative 
[practical/emotional/extreme] by perspective [character/participant]).  
 
There was no significant three-way interaction between group, alternative type and 
perspective (F(2,37)=.23; p=.796). There were also no interactions between group and 
alternative type (F(2,37)=.25; p=.782) or group and perspective (F(1,38)=2.85; p=.100). 
There was no main effect of group (F(1,38)=.299; p=.588).  
 
There was a significant interaction between alternative type and perspective (F(1,38)=55.85; 
p<.001), such that both groups preferred practical alternatives the most and extreme 
alternatives the least, particularly when the alternative focused on the character’s perspective. 
There was a significant main effect of alternative type (F(1,38)=2084.71; p<.001), such that 
both groups preferred practical alternatives to emotional alternatives and emotional 
alternatives to extreme alternatives. There was also a significant main effect of perspective 
(F(1,38)=48.91; p<.001) such that both groups preferred counterfactual options that focused 
on the character’s perspective to those that focused on their own perspective.  
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10.3.5: Guilt ratings in relation to counterfactual alternatives 
The high and low PPI groups were also compared with respect to the guilt they would 
experience in relation to each of the counterfactual alternatives. Since the counterfactual 
alternatives varied both with respect to type and perspective, a 2 x 3 x 2 (group [high/low 
PPI] by type of alternative [practical/emotional/extreme] by perspective 
[character/participant]) ANOVA was conducted.  
 
There was no significant three-way interaction between group, alternative type and 
perspective (F(2,37)=.04; p=.957). There was no significant interaction between group and 
perspective (F(1,38)=1.62; p=.211). However, there was a significant interaction between 
group and alternative type (F(2,37)=4.73; p=.015). Post-hoc t-tests were conducted to 
examine this interaction further. Adopting a strict significance level of .017 (.05/3), there was 
no significant group difference in guilt in response to practical counterfactuals (F(1,38)=.081; 
p=.423). However, the high trait group reported experiencing less guilt than the low trait 
group in response to both emotional counterfactuals (F(1,38)=2.56; p=.015) and to extreme 
counterfactuals (F(1,38)=264.19; p<.001). Finally, there was a main effect of group 
(F(1,38)=5.89; p=.020) such that the high trait group experienced less guilt overall than the 
low trait group.  
 
There was also a significant interaction between alternative type and perspective 
(F(2,37)=60.85; p<.001). Both groups felt least guilty in relation to practical alternatives and 
most guilty in relation to extreme alternatives. For practical and emotional alternatives, both 
groups felt guiltier in relation to alternatives that focused on their own perspectives than 
those that focused on the character’s perspective. For extreme alternatives, participants felt 
guiltier when these focused on the character’s perspective than their own perspective. 
 
There was a significant main effect of alternative type (F(2,37)=264.19; p<.001), such that 
both groups experienced least guilt in response to practical alternatives and most guilt in 
response to extreme alternatives. There was also a significant main effect of perspective 
(F(1,38)=34.61; p<.001) such that both groups experienced less guilt in response to 
counterfactual alternatives that focused on the character’s perspective as compared with their 
own perspective. 
 
 
10.3.6 Empathy  
161 
 
With respect to the empathy measure administered, the IRI, t-tests were conducted on each 
of the empathy subscales and the total IRI score. There were no significant group differences 
on either the perspective-taking subscale (t(38)=1.46; p=.153) or the fantasy subscale 
(t(38)=0.45; p=.658). The high trait group had significantly lower scores on the empathic 
concern subscale as compared to the low trait group (t(38)=3.99; p=<.001). The high trait 
group also had lower scores on the personal distress subscale than the low trait group, but 
using a strict significance level of p=.01 (.05/5), this difference only approached significance 
(t(38)=2.37; p=.024). Finally, the high trait group had a significantly lower total IRI score 
than the low trait group (t(38)=4.46; p=.001).  
 
10.3.7 Gender  
In order to ensure that any group differences were due to PPI group membership rather than 
gender, these analyses were repeated using ANCOVAs with gender as a covariate. The effect 
of gender did not reach significance for any of these analyses (p>.05) and did not change the 
overall pattern of results.  
 
10.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The present study was designed to investigate how people high and low in psychopathic 
traits reflected on past events that had led to negative outcomes. The Counterfactual 
Thinking Task described situations in which the participants experienced negative outcomes 
as a result of another character’s actions. When asked how much they thought the character 
would regret their actions and the extent to which they were to blame for the outcome, the 
high trait group gave significantly lower regret ratings than the low trait group. However, the 
groups did not differ in their blame ratings. They then rank-ordered practical, emotional and 
extreme alternatives from the character’s or participant’s perspective and reported how guilty 
they would feel in relation to each of the alternatives. The groups did not differ in their 
rankings of the counterfactual alternatives. The high trait group reported less guilt than the 
low trait group in response to emotional and extreme but not practical counterfactual 
alternatives. No gender differences emerged.  
 
10.4.1 Regret and blame  
As expected, the high trait group judged that the scenario characters would regret their 
actions significantly less than did the low trait group. This is consistent with the evidence 
suggesting that when people’s own actions result in negative outcomes for others, those high 
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in psychopathic traits experience limited regret (Hare, 1993). Thus, when the situation was 
reversed and the actions of others resulted in negative outcomes for the participants 
themselves, the high trait group may have assumed that the characters would also experience 
limited regret for their actions. 
 
It was expected that the high trait group would blame the characters for their actions to a 
greater extent than the low trait group. Although inspection of the means suggests that the 
data were in this general direction, the findings did not support this prediction. This 
contradicts the evidence suggesting that psychopathic traits are associated with blame 
externalization (DeLisi et al., 2014). However, it has been posited that this blame 
externalization serves to deflect blame away from those with psychopathy when they 
themselves have transgressed (DeLisi et al., 2014). This motivation was unlikely to have 
applied in the present study, since the high psychopathic trait participants were the victims 
of transgressors rather than the perpetrators.  
 
The findings relating to blame are in line with work suggesting that psychopathy is linked to 
greater lenience when negative outcomes result from unintentional acts. For instance, one 
study describes a scenario in which a character accidentally poisoned a friend to death while 
making them coffee, because a toxic substance was mislabelled ‘sugar’. People with 
psychopathy judged the character’s actions to be more morally permissible than did control 
participants (Young, Koenigs, Kruepke & Newman, 2012). However, the lack of group 
differences in blame attributions was still somewhat surprising, considering how negligent 
the characters’ unintentional actions were in the present scenarios. Previous research has 
found that people impose higher sanctions when the actions leading to negative outcomes 
are more negligent (Channon et al., 2010). In the study by Young et al. (2012), the character 
could not have reasonably known that the sugar was in fact toxic and their mistake was 
therefore not particularly negligent. By contrast, for all the scenarios in the present study, the 
characters’ actions were unintentional, but their mistakes were relatively negligent and could 
have been easily avoided. For instance, although the sibling in the graduation example did 
not intend to use the wrong fuel, they could have reasonably checked more carefully. In 
order to elucidate further whether negligence differentially influences the psychopathic trait 
groups’ blame attributions, future research could include a manipulation that compares 
negligent and non-negligent actions. The extent to which the characters’ actions were 
intentional could also be manipulated in future, since this is a factor that has been previously 
shown to influence blame attribution (Shaver, 1985; Alter et al., 2007). 
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10.4.2 Counterfactual preferences 
In the present study, the psychopathic trait groups were also compared on their preferences 
for different counterfactual alternatives. Had these counterfactual alternatives occurred, the 
negative outcomes described in the scenarios would have been avoided. The findings 
indicated that regardless of psychopathic trait group membership, participants preferred 
practical alternatives most and expressed the lowest preferences for extreme alternatives. For 
instance, in relation to the graduation example, both groups ranked highest the alternatives 
where they had not accepted the sibling’s offer of a lift, or where the sibling had used the 
correct fuel, and least preferred the alternatives where they had not invited the sibling or 
where the sibling was ill. With respect to perspective, both groups tended to choose 
counterfactual alternatives that focused on the actions of the character rather than those of 
the participant. Since the negative outcome resulted from the character’s actions, they may 
have felt that the best counterfactual alternatives were those that required the character to 
change their actions themselves rather than alternatives that required the participants to 
intervene. Thus, these alternatives placed the least burden on the participants. 
 
A substantial body of evidence has linked psychopathy with difficulties in interpersonal 
relationships (Hare, 1993) and a limited capacity for emotional empathy (Blair, 2008). It was 
therefore predicted that in the present study, the high trait group would be less likely than 
the low trait group to favour alternatives that focused on the emotional aspects of the 
participant’s relationship with the character, such as trust. It was also predicted that the high 
trait group would be more likely than the low trait group to favour extreme alternatives that 
may have resulted in the character experiencing harm. However, there were no significant 
differences in counterfactual preferences between the psychopathic trait groups. This may 
have been because in practice, both groups overwhelmingly perceived practical alternatives 
to be the most satisfactory; these were simple, direct alternatives that did not involve the 
character experiencing unnecessary harm. In addition, the Counterfactual Thinking Task 
stated that all of the counterfactual alternatives would have prevented the negative outcomes. 
Thus, the high trait group may have felt no need to choose more extreme alternatives when 
the practical alternatives would clearly suffice. In order to further investigate group 
differences in counterfactual preferences, a future study could manipulate the extent to which 
the different types of alternatives would have successfully prevented the negative outcome. 
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Another factor that could account for the lack of group differences in preferences is the 
extent to which counterfactual thinking involves cognitive empathy. The evidence has linked 
counterfactual thinking to aspects of cognitive empathy such as false belief, since both 
require people to simulate an alternative reality (Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998). 
A substantial literature suggests that cognitive empathy is intact in psychopathy (e.g. Blair, 
2008). This was supported by the findings from the empathy measure administered in the 
present study, which suggest that the trait groups were equally able to take others’ 
perspectives and fantasise about alternative realities. However, in the present study, the 
capacity to simulate alternative realities was not directly investigated, since the Counterfactual 
Task spelt out the alternatives and required participants to rank-order them. In order to 
investigate more systematically how psychopathic traits might influence counterfactual 
thinking, a future study could compare the groups’ capacity to generate their own 
counterfactual alternatives. The speed with which these alternatives were generated, the 
number of alternatives generated, whether these alternatives were practical, emotional or 
extreme, and how vividly the alternatives were described could all be examined in future.  
 
10.4.3 Counterfactual guilt  
After rank-ordering the counterfactual alternatives, participants in the present study rated 
how guilty they would feel for wishing that they had adopted each of these. The findings 
indicated that both groups expressed least guilt in relation to practical alternatives and most 
guilt in relation to extreme alternatives. Both groups also rated that they would feel guiltier 
in response to practical and emotional alternatives that focused on their own perspective 
than those that focused on the character’s perspective, which most likely reflects a preference 
not to intervene personally in order to change the outcome. With regard to perspective, both 
groups rated that they would feel guiltier in response to extreme alternatives that focused on 
the character’s perspective than those that focused on their own perspective. Whilst this 
appears to contradict the idea that they prefer not to intervene personally, an inspection of 
the extreme counterfactual alternatives in the present study suggests that they were not 
equally balanced, since those focusing on the character’s perspective involved the character 
experiencing greater harm than those focusing on the participant’s perspective. For instance, 
in the graduation example, wishing that the sibling was ill may have been judged to be more 
extreme than wishing that they had not invited their sibling. Matching the severity of the 
extreme alternatives would thus be necessary to assess this effect of perspective further.  
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With respect to counterfactual guilt in the psychopathic trait groups, the findings revealed 
that the high trait group expressed less guilt overall than the low trait group, which was in 
line with predictions. This is consistent with the extensive research linking psychopathy with 
a lack of guilt and remorse and with deficits in emotional empathy. It is likely that as 
compared to the low trait group, the high trait group did not care about the negative 
consequences that the character would experience if the counterfactual alternatives occurred. 
This is supported by the fact that the group differences were greatest for the extreme 
alternatives, which had the most negative implications for the characters. Conversely, the 
group differences were smallest for the practical alternatives, which had few negative 
implications for the characters. An account of the group differences based on limited 
emotional empathy is also consistent with the findings from the empathy measure 
administered in the present study. Although the groups did not differ on the aspects of the 
measure relating to cognitive empathy, the high trait group scored significantly lower than 
the low trait group on the aspects of the measure relating to emotional empathy (empathic 
concern and personal distress).  
 
With respect to the discrepancy in group differences between active preferences and ratings, 
the findings in the present study are similar to those found in the Competitiveness Task, 
reported in Chapter 9. In Competitiveness Task, both the participant and another character 
were aiming for a positive outcome in a competitive context, such as a high exam grade. 
Participants had to choose whether they would prefer the character to fail, to experience an 
average outcome (i.e. neither succeeding nor failing), or to succeed (for instance, by getting 
a top grade). Participants also rated how pleased they would feel in response to each 
outcome. There were no group differences with respect to preferences when the participants 
actively chose the outcomes: the high trait group did not choose more negative outcomes 
for characters than the low trait group. However, there were group differences when the 
outcomes were presented as though they had already occurred: the high trait group was more 
pleased with negative outcomes and less pleased with positive outcomes than the low trait 
group. It was thought that this apparent discrepancy might relate to the time point at which 
participants were responding: active preferences were proactive, and referred to the outcome 
the participants would prefer to occur in the future. By contrast, pleased ratings were 
retroactive, and referred to how pleased participants would feel in response to the outcomes 
had they already occurred. To examine this, the present study held this time point constant, 
so that both active preferences and guilt ratings referred to imagined events that might have 
taken place. Nevertheless, the pattern of results still matched those found in the 
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Competitiveness Task, suggesting that the time perspective was not the crucial factor. This 
adds further weight to the suggestion made in Chapter 9: that those high in psychopathic 
traits may not actively choose for others to suffer unless they themselves have something to 
gain from their suffering. Nonetheless, they appear not to experience displeasure or guilt in 
response to others’ suffering which may be linked to a reduced capacity to resonate 
emotionally with the characters.  
 
10.4.4 Summary  
In summary, the present study employed a novel experimental task to compare how those 
high versus low psychopathic traits reason about negative outcomes that affect them 
personally and result from another character’s actions. The findings suggest that the high 
trait group rated that the character regretted their actions less than did the low trait group, 
but that the groups did not differ with respect to the extent to which they blamed the 
character for the negative outcome. When asked to consider various counterfactual 
alternatives that would have prevented the negative outcome, the groups did not differ in 
their active preferences but did differ in counterfactual guilt; the high trait group felt less 
guilty in relation to the counterfactual alternatives, particularly those that would have had 
negative consequences for the scenario character. 
 
10.5 THE NEXT STUDY: UTILITARIAN JUDGMENTS IN MORAL 
REASONING 
 
Chapters 9 and 10 examined how groups high and low in psychopathic traits reason about 
negative outcomes. In both studies, the groups did not differ when actively choosing an 
outcome or counterfactual alternative, but did differ when rating their emotional response 
to these outcomes or alternatives. The next study will also examine both active preferences 
and emotional responses in relation to negative scenarios but will focus more directly on the 
influence of psychopathic traits on moral reasoning.  
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Chapter 11: Utilitarian decision-making 
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Utilitarianism is a philosophical theory stating that the most ethical course of action is that 
which maximises benefit and minimises cost across any individuals who might be affected 
(Mill, 1863). This is in contrast with deontology, whereby the most ethical course of action 
is that which adheres to absolute moral rules, regardless of utility or maximal benefit (e.g. 
Kant 1785). For instance, consider a situation in which killing one person would save the 
lives of five other people. Killing one person would be the ethical course of action according 
to utilitarianism, since it benefits the most people. By contrast, killing one person would be 
the unethical course of action according to deontology, since the act of taking a life is 
generally considered to be in breach of moral rules.  
 
Philosophers have proposed various hypothetical utilitarian dilemmas. One well-known 
utilitarian dilemma is the ‘Trolley Problem’ (Foot, 1967). In this dilemma, five people are tied 
to a railway track, and a trolley is heading towards them. If the trolley reaches them, all five 
people will die. There is a lever by the track, which if pulled will cause the trolley to divert 
onto a second track, where it will kill one person instead. Pulling the lever would constitute 
the most ethical course of action according to utilitarianism, since the majority would survive. 
Conversely, not pulling the lever would be the most ethical course of action according to 
deontology, since it avoids performing an action that results in the death of a human being.  
 
An alternative version of the ‘Trolley Problem’ is the ‘Footbridge Problem’ (Thomson, 1976). 
In this variant, there is no lever or second track. Instead, there is a footbridge over the track, 
and a very large man is stood upon the footbridge. Pushing the large man to his death would 
stop the course of the trolley and save the five people tied to the track. Both dilemmas require 
a utilitarian judgment to be made, and the outcome of the decision is identical in both 
situations; pulling the lever and pushing the large man both result in one person dying and 
the lives of five people being saved. However, the act of physically pushing a man to his 
death may be considered more emotionally salient and requires greater personal involvement 
as compared to simply pulling a lever (Greene, Somerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001).   
 
There has been some recent experimental work examining utilitarian dilemmas, including 
adaptations of the trolley and footbridge dilemmas (e.g. Greene et al., 2001; Moore, Clark 
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&Kane, 2008). This body of literature suggests that both cognitive and emotional factors 
may play a role when resolving utilitarian dilemmas (e.g. Haidt, 2001). Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen (2008) proposed a dual-process theory of moral judgment, 
whereby the utilitarian decision to sacrifice one in order to save five is pragmatic, logical, and 
results from controlled cognitive processes. By contrast, non-utilitarian decisions are linked 
to a desire to avoid the experience of negative emotional consequences, and result from 
automatic, affective processes. A range of studies support this dual-process theory. For 
instance, Greene et al. (2008) found that increasing cognitive load selectively interferes with 
utilitarian decisions but not non-utilitarian decisions. In another study, participants who 
reported their thinking style to be deliberate tended to make utilitarian decisions, whereas 
those reported that their thinking style was intuitive tended to make non-utilitarian decisions 
(Bartels, 2008).  
 
Finally, the evidence suggests that people are less utilitarian in ‘personal’ dilemmas, such as 
the footbridge problem, than in ‘impersonal’ dilemmas, such as the trolley problem (Greene 
et al., 2008; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). This is thought to relate to the fact that situations 
with higher personal involvement tend to engage people’s emotions to a greater extent than 
those with lower personal involvement (Greene et al., 2001). Evidence in support of this has 
found that inducing positive emotion selectively increases utilitarian responding to the 
footbridge dilemma but not the trolley dilemma (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). 
 
How might psychopathic traits influence utilitarian decision-making? There is a substantial 
body of research linking psychopathy with intact cognitive processing and impaired 
emotional processing (e.g. Blair, 2008). In view of the evidence outlined above linking 
utilitarian decisions with cognitive processes and non-utilitarian decisions with emotional 
processes, psychopathy may be associated with an increased tendency to make utilitarian 
decisions. There is some experimental evidence suggesting that people with psychopathy are 
more likely to endorse utilitarian actions (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011), including in response to 
personal dilemmas (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier & Newman, 2011) than control participants. 
Thus, these studies suggest that people with psychopathy may be more likely both to pull the 
lever and to push the fat man. However, the relationship between psychopathy and utilitarian 
decision-making has only been examined within the prison population. Although criminality 
is associated with psychopathy, it has been posited that it is not a central component (Skeeme 
& Cook, 2007). In addition, the evidence relating to moral reasoning within incarcerated 
samples is mixed, with some studies suggesting impairment (e.g. Jurkovic & Prentice, 1977) 
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and others suggesting none (Trevethan & Walker, 1989; Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 2005). Given 
this lack of clarity, studying moral reasoning within a population that by definition is likely 
to have engaged in moral transgressions may impede the extent to which conclusions can be 
drawn about psychopathy and utilitarianism. Thus, in the present study, people high and low 
in psychopathic personality traits within the general population were compared on a measure 
of utilitarian decision-making.  
 
The above studies investigating the relationship between psychopathy and utilitarian 
decision-making were conducted using the battery of utilitarian dilemmas developed by 
Greene et al. (2001). Whilst this battery was a novel adaptation of a traditional philosophical 
conundrum, and has provided a valuable contribution to the study of utilitarian decision-
making, there are some limitations. Firstly, the scenarios were not balanced with respect to 
whether or not the participant’s life was in danger. Secondly, the extent to which the 
scenarios consistently tapped into utilitarianism was not balanced: some dilemmas required 
participants to choose between one person and a group, some required participants to 
choose between two groups, and some required participants to choose between an outcome 
where one person dies and an outcome in which everyone (including the one person) dies. 
Thirdly, their personal dilemmas tended to involve injury or death and impersonal dilemmas 
tended to involve lying or stealing (Moore, Clarke & Kane, 2008). Finally, the scenarios 
described very extreme dilemmas, for instance, whether to kill one man so that a starving 
group of people could eat him, or whether a father should sell his daughter into child 
pornography to feed the rest of his family. Whilst the original trolley and footbridge 
problems are also relatively extreme, these scenarios are unlikely to be representative of the 
types of moral dilemmas people typically face, and evidence suggests there may be 
differences when reasoning about real life versus hypothetical moral dilemmas (Trevethan & 
Walker, 1989). 
 
In order to investigate more systematically the influence of psychopathic traits on utilitarian 
decision-making, and to address the limitations of the battery designed by Greene et al. 
(2001), a novel task (the Utilitarian Judgments Task2), which included an adapted version of 
the trolley/footbridge problem, was developed for the present study. Participants read about 
situations in which a main character, or ‘agent’, needed to decide between a utilitarian and 
non-utilitarian outcome. The scenarios made it clear that the agent was not at risk themselves, 
                                                        
2 Please note that this task was developed jointly with Ms Leila Jameel. Ms Jameel used this task to explore 
utilitarian judgments in people scoring high versus low on a self-report measure of autistic traits. This study is 
included in her doctoral thesis.   
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and did not have anything to gain or lose from their decision. Secondly, all the scenarios 
required participants to weigh up the interests of an individual against those of a group. 
Thirdly, there was one personal variant and one impersonal variant of each scenario; the 
outcome for the two variants was identical and only the degree of personal involvement for 
the agent varied.  
 
Finally, in order to investigate utilitarian decision-making in both everyday and extreme 
dilemmas, the items in the Utilitarian Judgments Task were balanced with respect to the type 
of harm. One set involved dilemmas that involved physical harm, and the second set 
involved social harm, and there may have been different considerations when responding to 
the two types of harm. Moral reasoning in relation to physical harm may have been more 
black and white, with prescriptive rules such as ‘murder is wrong. By contrast, reasoning 
about social harm may have been more subtle and nuanced.  
 
In the Utilitarian Judgments Task, participants had to decide between a utilitarian and non-
utilitarian course of action and to rate how uncomfortable each option made them feel. 
Participants were also asked to explain firstly why the utilitarian course of action might be 
the right thing to do, and secondly why the non-utilitarian course of action might be the right 
thing to do. These responses were scored to classify them with respect to their reasoning 
about both the characters affected by the outcome and the agent making the decision.  
 
In order to elucidate further the relationship between psychopathy and moral reasoning, two 
additional measures were administered. The Ethics Position Questionnaire (Forsyth, 1980) 
is a self-report questionnaire designed to investigate the extent to which people judge ethical 
standpoints to be absolutely right or wrong and not dependent on contextual factors. The 
Moral Behaviour Inventory (Mendez, Anderson & Shapira, 2005) describes a list of actions; 
respondents rate the extent to which each action is right or wrong.  
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11.1.1 Hypotheses 
In view of the literature suggesting that psychopathy is associated with reduced emotional 
responding and utilitarian decision-making. It was predicted that as compared to the low trait 
group, the high psychopathic trait group would choose the utilitarian option more frequently 
and would experience less discomfort with both utilitarian and non-utilitarian options.  
 
The extent to which the groups would differ in their verbal rationales was somewhat unclear. 
On the one hand, a reduced capacity for emotional empathy may have meant that the high 
trait group did not resonate with the agent or with the characters affected by their decision. 
They may thus have given less sophisticated explanations and referred less to the agent than 
the low trait group. On the other hand, a number of studies have suggested that both moral 
reasoning and cognitive empathy are unimpaired in psychopathy. The high trait group may 
thus have been able to provide an equally sophisticated response to the low trait group since 
their cognitive processes may have been sufficient for them to do so, without emotionally 
empathising with any of the characters.  
 
There were two experimental manipulations in the present study: the proximity of the agent 
to the situation (personal versus impersonal) and the type of harm involved (social versus 
physical). With respect to proximity, personal dilemmas are considered to be more 
emotionally salient than impersonal dilemmas; any group differences may thus have been 
exacerbated in response to the variants in which the agent was closer to the action.   
 
The predictions relating to the type of harm were less clear-cut. On the one hand, physical 
harm may have carried more damaging consequences and thus inspired more sympathetic 
responses than social harm; any group differences may thus have been more pronounced in 
the physical dilemmas. On the other hand, the physical dilemmas were created in the same 
vein as the original trolley dilemma; they may have thus been so extreme that they did not 
reflect the types of moral dilemmas participants could have personally identified with. By 
contrast, the social dilemmas were deliberately designed to tap into the more everyday types 
of dilemma; any group differences may thus have been more pronounced for these dilemmas.  
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11.2 METHODS 
 
11.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of PPI group (high vs. low scorers) and two 
within-participants factors: a) the proximity of the agent to the situation (personal vs. 
impersonal) and b) the type of harm (social vs. physical).  
 
11.2.2 Participants 
The Utilitarian Judgments Task was administered alongside the Ethics Position 
Questionnaire and the Moral Behavioral Inventory. Participants also completed a set of 
unrelated measures, described in Chapter 10 above. The screening and testing samples in the 
present study were therefore identical to those described in Chapter 10. On this basis, 21 
high-scoring (11m, 10f) and 19 low-scoring (9m, 10f) individuals took part in the testing 
phase of the present study.  
 
11.2.3 Procedure 
As described in Chapter 10.2.2.3, participants provided written informed consent before 
completing the experimental tasks and a brief health screen to ensure that nobody with a 
history of significant psychiatric or neurological illness was included. On this basis, one male 
participant from the low PPI group was excluded from the testing sample. The final sample 
therefore consisted of 21 high trait participants (11m, 10f) and 19 low trait participants (9m, 
10f). Participants were paid for taking part. 
 
11.2.4 Materials  
11.2.4.1 Utilitarian Judgments Task 
The Utilitarian Judgments Task was designed to investigate moral decision-making in 
situations where the needs of an individual were weighed up against the needs of a group. 
The task consisted of 8 scenarios, in which an ‘agent’ is required to make a decision that will 
either favour the best interests of one character at the expense of a group of characters, or 
vice versa. For 4 of the scenarios, the agent’s dilemma related to social harm, for instance 
social exclusion, emotional distress or inconvenience either for one character or for a group 
of characters (Figure 11.1). For the other 4 scenarios, the agent’s dilemma related to physical 
harm, for instance injury or death either for one character or for a group of characters. One 
of the four physical harm scenarios was an adapted version of the trolley problem (Figure 
11.2).  
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Each of the 8 scenario (4 social, 4 physical) had two versions that varied with respect to the 
proximity of the agent to the situation. One version involved an impersonal dilemma (i.e. 
pulling the lever in the trolley problem). The second version involved a personal dilemma 
(i.e. pushing the fat man in the footbridge problem).  
 
For both social and physical scenarios, participants had to a) decide whether they would 
choose the non-utilitarian or the utilitarian option, b) rate how uncomfortable they would 
feel with each option and c) provide a verbal response as to why each option might be the 
right thing for the agent to do. The task instructions made it clear that the agent in the 
scenarios would not be punished for their decision, even if such decisions would normally 
lead to legal consequences (for instance, pushing a man to his death would typically lead to 
punitive consequences). Moreover, there was no incentive for the participant to choose one 
option over the other since the agent had nothing to gain or lose by making a decision. It 
was also made clear that the outcomes were absolute; either the individual or the group would 
experience harm and there was no option that could prevent harm for both parties. The 
gender and type of social relationship of the scenario characters was counterbalanced across 
items. To control for any potential order effects, the physical scenarios were presented first 
within half of each group of participants, and the social scenarios presented 
first for the remaining half. 
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Figure 11.1: Example social scenario from Utilitarian Judgments Task  
______________________________________________________________________ 
STORY STEM: “Ellie has invited a group of friends to stay for the weekend. Amir is not 
coping very well after breaking up with his girlfriend. The last few times he has socialised 
with the group, he has become tearful and talked about nothing but his break-up. Although 
the group were initially sympathetic, they are now fed up with Amir, since he and his 
girlfriend broke up a long time ago.” 
IMPERSONAL VARIANT: 
Over coffee, Amir mentions that he’s feeling very lonely and would like to do something 
with the group to take his mind off things. Ellie feels sorry for him and wonders whether 
she should invite him to stay for the weekend. If Ellie invites Amir, he will be happy. 
However, the rest of the group will be annoyed and won’t enjoy the weekend. If Ellie doesn’t 
invite Amir, he will be left out lonely. However, the rest of the group will enjoy the weekend.  
PERSONAL VARIANT: 
Amir finds out through Facebook that the group are staying with Ellie for the weekend and 
asks her if he can come. He says he has been feeling very lonely and would like to do 
something with the group to take his mind off things. If Ellie lets Amir come, he will be 
happy. However, the rest of the group will be annoyed and won’t enjoy the weekend. If Ellie 
doesn’t let Amir come, he will be left out and lonely. However, the rest of the group will 
enjoy the weekend.  
Questions 
1. If you were the agent, which of the following options would you choose? 
a. Invite Amir/Let Amir come (Non-utilitarian decision) 
b. Do not invite Amir/Do not let Amir come (Utilitarian decision)  
2. If you were Ellie, how uncomfortable would you feel if you invited Amir /if you let 
Amir come?  
1 =_____________________________________________________________10 =  
Not at all uncomfortable      Very uncomfortable 
3. If you were Ellie, how uncomfortable would you feel if you did not invite Amir/if 
you did not let Amir come? 
1 =_____________________________________________________________10 =  
Not at all uncomfortable      Very uncomfortable 
4. Why would inviting Amir/letting Amir come be the right thing for Ellie to do? 
5. Why would NOT inviting Amir/NOT letting Amir come be the right thing for Ellie 
to do? 
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Figure 11.2: Example physical scenario from Utilitarian Judgments Task  
______________________________________________________________________ 
STORY STEM: “Rachel is standing on a railway bridge and an empty train is quickly 
approaching. As the result of a vicious attack, five of her friends are tied to the tracks and 
are unable to move.” 
IMPERSONAL VARIANT: 
On the bridge beside Rachel, there is a lever. Pulling this lever will cause the train to switch 
onto a different track. Another friend, Darren, is trapped on this track. If Rachel doesn’t pull 
the lever, Darren will remain alive. However, the five friends on the other track will die. If 
Rachel pulls the lever, Darren will die. However, the five friends on the other track will be 
saved.  
PERSONAL VARIANT: 
On the bridge beside Rachel, there is another of Rachel’s friends, Darren, who is very large. 
Pushing Darren would cause the train to stop. If Rachel doesn’t push Darren, he won’t be 
harmed. However, the five friends on the track will die. If Rachel pushes Darren, he will die. 
However, the five friends on the track will be saved. 
Questions 
1. If you were Rachel, which of the following options would you choose? 
a. Do not pull the lever/Do not push Darren (Non-utilitarian decision) 
b. Pull the lever/Push Darren (Utilitarian decision)  
2. If you were Rachel, how uncomfortable would you feel if you did not pull the lever/if 
you did not push Darren?  
1 =_____________________________________________________________10 =  
Not at all uncomfortable      Very uncomfortable 
3. If you were Rachel, how uncomfortable would you feel if you pulled the lever/if you 
pushed Darren? 
1 =_____________________________________________________________10 =  
Not at all uncomfortable      Very uncomfortable 
4. Why would pulling the lever/pushing Darren NOT be the right thing for Rachel to 
do? 
5. Why would pulling the lever/pushing Darren be the right thing for Rachel to do? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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11.2.4.2 Administration 
Participants read the task instructions, were shown an example item, and allowed to ask 
questions. All scenarios and corresponding questions were then presented one at a time, in 
a paper booklet. Participants responded verbally to all questions. The scenario remained on 
display until participants had completed the relevant questions in order to reduce the 
confounding effects of memory load.  
 
11.2.4.3 Scoring 
11.2.4.3.1 Scoring of choice and rating responses  
With respect to choice, participants were awarded a score of 0 if they chose the non-
utilitarian option and were awarded a score of 1 if they chose the utilitarian option. These 
scores were then summed across all 8 scenarios, with higher scores denoting more utilitarian 
choices. Participants’ ratings with respect to how uncomfortable they would be with the non-
utilitarian and utilitarian options respectively were also summed across all 8 scenarios, with 
higher scores denoting greater discomfort.  
 
11.2.4.3.2 Scoring of verbal responses  
11.2.4.3.2.1 Reasoning about characters 
Participants’ verbal responses were firstly classified according to whether they were simple 
or sophisticated in their reasoning about characters affected by the decision. Simple 
responses reiterated the consequences for the characters stated in the scenario stem without 
elaboration. By contrast, sophisticated responses were judged to show sympathy for the 
characters, to consider their perspective or to refer to guiding ethical principles (see Figure 
11.3 for examples). All responses were given a score of 0 if they were simple and score of 1 
if they were sophisticated; these scores were summed across all 8 scenarios to give a total 
sophisticated score.  
 
11.2.4.3.2.2 Reasoning about agent 
Participants’ verbal responses were also classified according to whether or not they made 
reference to the agent making the decision (Rachel or Ellie in the above examples). 
Responses that made reference to the agent were scored if the answer was judged to show 
sympathy for the agent, to consider their perspective or to refer to their responsibility (see 
Figure 11.3 for examples) All qualifying responses were awarded an agent score of 1; these 
scores were summed across all 8 scenarios to give a total agent score.   
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In order to ensure consistency of scoring, participants’ verbal responses were coded 
according to perspective by one rater who was not blind to group membership and by a 
second blind, independent rater. There was an inter-rater agreement rate of 96% and all 
disagreements were resolved by discussion.   
 
Figure 11.3: Example responses from Utilitarian Judgments Task  
______________________________________________________________________ 
REASONING ABOUT CHARACTERS: 
Simple: Non-utilitarian option 
“Darren will die” (Physical harm) 
“Amir wants to spend time with the group” (Social harm) 
Simple: Utilitarian option 
“Five people will die” (Physical harm) 
“The group won’t enjoy their weekend” (Social harm) 
Sophisticated: Non-utilitarian option 
“Darren must be feeling very afraid/Darren has a right to life” (Physical harm) 
“Amir would feel betrayed”/“friendship is more important than a fun weekend”  
(Social harm) 
Sophisticated: Utilitarian option 
“The friends are not to blame/it is right to prioritise the majority” (Physical harm) 
“The friends would feel frustrated and disappointed if Amir came along” (utilitarian) were 
considered 
REASONING ABOUT AGENT: 
“Rachel must be in a difficult position” (Physical harm)  
“Ellie should be a supportive friend” (Social harm) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.2.4.4 Ethics Position Questionnaire 
The Ethics Position Questionnaire (EQP; Forsyth, 1980) is a self-report questionnaire 
designed to measure the extent to which people adhere to two divergent ethical perspectives: 
relativism and idealism. Relativism represents the pragmatic view that ethical standpoints are 
not absolutely right or wrong, and depend on contextual factors. Statements such as 
“whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends on the circumstances surrounding 
the action” were considered relativistic perspectives. Conversely, idealism represents the 
view that there are unconditional ethical principles that give rise to an absolute right or wrong. 
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Statements such as “people should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm 
another even to a small degree” were considered idealistic perspectives. The EQP comprises 
20 Likert-type ethical statements rated on a nine point scale (1 = completely disagree; 9 = 
completely agree) Total EPQ scores for the respective relativism and idealism subscales 
ranged from 9-90 and the measure has been shown to have good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha .073-.080) and test-retest reliability (.66-.67); Forsyth, 1980; Forsyth, Nye 
& Kelley, 1988).  
 
11.2.4.5: Moral Behavior Inventory 
The Moral Behavior Inventory (MBI; Mendez, Anderson & Shapira, 2005) is a self-report 
questionnaire describing 24 actions, for example “refuse to help people who don’t deserve 
it”, “take the last seat on a crowded bus” or “drive out the homeless from your community”. 
These actions are rated on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 represents ‘Not Wrong’, 2 represents 
‘Mildly Wrong’, 3 represents ‘Moderately Wrong’ and 4 represents ‘Severely Wrong’. Total 
MBI scores thus ranged from 24-96 and the measure has been shown to have good split-half 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha .072-.076).   
 
11.3 RESULTS 
 
11.3.1 Statistical Analyses 
The means and standard deviations (SD) for the Utilitarian Judgments Task are presented in 
Table 11.1. Examination of the data showed that for the low trait group, the ‘uncomfortable’ 
ratings in relation to the utilitarian option in situations involving physical harm were 
negatively skewed, for both personal and impersonal dilemmas. There was also one outlier 
in the low trait group for the personal dilemma variant. For the high trait group, the 
‘uncomfortable’ ratings in relation to the utilitarian option in situations involving physical 
harm were negatively skewed for personal dilemmas. The agent scores in relation to the 
utilitarian option were positively skewed, both for situations involving physical harm 
(personal and impersonal variants) and those involving social harm (impersonal variant only). 
There was also one outlier in the high trait group for the agent score in impersonal dilemmas 
involving physical harm. Since these variables could not be transformed to normality, and 
both parametric and non-parametric tests showed the same pattern of findings, parametric 
tests for these data are reported.  
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Table 11.1: Mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups for the Utilitarian 
Judgments Task 
______________________________________________________________________ 
High PPI Group  Low PPI Group 
Mean   (SD)   Mean (SD)      
  (N=21)   (N=19)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
SOCIAL HARM ITEMS 
Utilitarian Choice (/4)         
Impersonal proximity    1.86 (1.11)   1.58 (1.26) 
Personal proximity   1.14 (0.73)   1.00 (1.00)  
Uncomfortable Rating 
Non-utilitarian option (/40) 
Impersonal proximity    24.14 (4.56)   25.63 (4.95) 
Personal proximity   23.71 (5.78)   24.52 (3.02) 
Utilitarian option (/40) 
Impersonal proximity    26.14 (5.73)   31.26 (5.54) 
Personal proximity   29.67 (4.99)   33.00 (4.76) 
Reasoning about characters (sophisticated score)     
Non-utilitarian option (/4)  
Impersonal proximity   2.19 (1.33)   2.21 (1.27)  
Personal proximity   2.00 (1.22)   2.11 (1.41) 
Utilitarian option (/4) 
Impersonal proximity   1.62 (0.97)   2.53 (1.39) 
Personal proximity   1.38 (0.97)   1.74 (1.10)  
Reasoning about agent         
Non-utilitarian option (/4) 
Impersonal proximity    1.14 (0.91)   1.37 (1.46) 
Personal proximity   1.43 (1.12)   1.47 (1.26) 
Utilitarian option (/4) 
Impersonal proximity    0.95 (1.07)   0.95 (0.97) 
Personal proximity   0.95 (1.02)   1.74 (1.10) 
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PHYSICAL HARM ITEMS 
Utilitarian Choice (/4)         
Impersonal proximity    3.10 (1.18)   2.84 (1.84) 
Personal proximity   2.05 (1.47)   1.58 (1.43) 
Uncomfortable Rating 
Non-utilitarian option (/40) 
Impersonal proximity    29.86 (7.55)    32.44 (6.87) 
Personal proximity   26.48 (8.51)   27.58 (8.49) 
Utilitarian option (/40) 
Impersonal proximity   33.29 (6.68)   37.89 (3.23) 
Personal proximity   35.76 (6.03)   38.79 (2.37) 
Reasoning about characters (sophisticated score) 
Non-utilitarian option (/4) 
Impersonal proximity   1.14 (0.96)   1.42 (0.96)  
Personal proximity   0.95 (1.02)   1.32 (1.11) 
Utilitarian option (/4)  
Impersonal proximity   2.48 (1.33)   3.05 (0.78) 
Personal proximity   1.90 (1.37)   2.32 (1.29) 
Reasoning about agent 
Non-utilitarian option (/4) 
Impersonal proximity   1.90 (1.30)   2.37 (1.21)  
Personal proximity   2.48 (1.43)   2.84 (1.21) 
Utilitarian option (/4) 
Impersonal proximity    0.48 (0.75)   0.58 (0.77)  
Personal proximity   0.57 (0.81)   0.84 (0.58) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.3.2 Utilitarian Choice 
The high and low psychopathic trait groups were compared with respect to how frequently 
they chose the utilitarian course of action. Since the scenarios varied with respect to the type 
of harm and the proximity of the agent to the situation, a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted 
(group [high/low PPI] by type of harm [social/physical] by proximity 
[personal/impersonal]). 
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There was no significant three-way interaction between group, type of harm, and proximity 
(F(1,38)=1.04; p=.314). There were also no interactions between group and type of harm 
(F(1,38)=.09; p=.768) or group and proximity (F(1,38)=.03; p=.861). There was no main 
effect of group (F(1,38)=.1.34; p=.254).  
 
There was a significant interaction between type of harm and proximity (F(1,38)=8.77; 
p=.005), such that both groups were more utilitarian in personal dilemmas than impersonal, 
and this was exacerbated in situations involving physical harm. There was a significant main 
effect of type of harm (F(1,38)=15.55; p<.001), such that both groups were more utilitarian 
in situations involving physical harm than those involving social harm. There was also a 
significant main effect of proximity (F(1,38)=62.85; p<.001) such that both groups were 
more utilitarian in impersonal dilemmas than in personal dilemmas.  
 
11.3.3 Uncomfortable Ratings    
The high and low psychopathic trait groups were compared with respect to how 
uncomfortable they would feel in relation to each utilitarian option. Since the scenarios varied 
with respect to the type of harm and the proximity of the agent to the situation, and 
participants rated both non-utilitarian and utilitarian options, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was 
conducted (group [high/low PPI] by type of harm [social/physical] by proximity 
[personal/impersonal] by utilitarian option (non-utilitarian/utilitarian). 
 
There was no significant four-way interaction between group, type of harm, proximity and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=.15; p=.705). There were also no significant three-way interactions 
between group, type of harm and proximity (F(1,38)=.04; p=.852), group, type of harm and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=.14; p=.713), or group, proximity and utilitarian option 
(F(1,38)=.14; p=.705). There were no interactions between group and type of harm, 
(F(1,38)=.01; p=.926), group and proximity (F(1,38)=2.93; p=.095), or group and utilitarian 
option (F(1,38)=3.55; p=.067). However, there was a main effect of group (F(1,38)=5.27; 
p=.027), such that the high trait group reported feeling less uncomfortable overall.  
 
There was no significant three-way interaction between type of harm, proximity and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=3.41; p=.072). There was a significant interaction between type of 
harm and proximity (F(1,38)=7.80; p=.008), such that both groups were more uncomfortable 
in personal dilemmas than impersonal, but only in situations involving social harm. There 
was also a significant interaction between proximity and utilitarian option (F(1,38)=32.48; 
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p<.001), such that both groups were more uncomfortable in relation to the utilitarian option, 
particularly in personal dilemmas. There was no significant interaction between type of harm 
and utilitarian option (F(1,38)=1.55; p=.220). There was a main effect of type of harm 
(F(1,38)=56.77; p<.001), such that both groups reported greater discomfort in situations 
involving physical harm than social harm. There was also a main effect of utilitarian option 
(F(1,38)=91.64; p<.001), such that both groups were more uncomfortable in relation to the 
utilitarian option than the non-utilitarian option. Finally, there was no main effect of 
proximity (F(1,38)=.12; p=.728). 
 
11.3.4 Reasoning about characters    
In order to compare the high and low psychopathic trait groups with respect to their 
reasoning about the scenario characters affected by the agent’s decision, a similar 2 x 2 x 2 x 
2 ANOVA was conducted (group [high/low PPI] by type of harm [social/physical] by 
proximity [personal/impersonal] by utilitarian option (non-utilitarian/utilitarian). 
 
There was no significant four-way interaction between group, type of harm, proximity and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=.45; p=.507). There were also no significant three-way interactions 
between group, type of harm and proximity (F(1,38)=.24; p=.629), group, type of harm and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=.44; p=.463), or group, proximity and utilitarian option 
(F(1,38)=1.39; p=.246). There were no interactions between group and type of harm, 
(F(1,38)=.05; p=.831), group and proximity (F(1,38)=.60; p=.444), or group and utilitarian 
option (F(1,38)=2.40; p=.130). There was no main effect of group (F(1,38)=2.63; p=.113).  
 
There was no significant three-way interaction between type of harm, proximity and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=.24; p=.629). There was no significant interaction between type 
of harm and proximity (F(1,38)=.13; p=.725). There was a significant interaction between 
proximity and utilitarian option (F(1,38)=5.36; p=.026), such that both groups used more 
sophisticated reasoning about the scenario characters in relation to the utilitarian option, and 
this was exacerbated for the impersonal dilemmas.  
 
There was also a significant interaction between type of harm and utilitarian option 
(F(1,38)=33.20; p<.001), such that both groups used more sophisticated reasoning about the 
scenario characters in relation to the utilitarian option, but only for physical dilemmas. There 
was no main effect of type of harm (F(1,38)=1.13; p=.294). There was a main effect of 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=14.69; p<.001), such that both groups used more sophisticated 
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reasoning about the scenario characters in relation to the utilitarian option than the non-
utilitarian option. Finally, there was a main effect of proximity (F(1,38)=17.19; p<.001), such 
that both groups used more sophisticated reasoning about the scenario characters in 
impersonal dilemmas than personal dilemmas. 
 
11.3.5 Reasoning about agent 
The high and low psychopathic trait groups were also compared with respect to their 
reasoning about the agent in the scenarios using a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA: (group [high/low 
PPI] by type of harm [social/physical] by proximity [personal/impersonal] by utilitarian 
option (non-utilitarian/utilitarian). 
 
There was no significant four-way interaction between group, type of harm, proximity and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=.16; p=.696). There were also no significant three-way interactions 
between group, type of harm and proximity (F(1,38)=.01; p=.918), group, type of harm and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=.24; p=.646), or group, proximity and utilitarian option 
(F(1,38)=.17; p=.683). There were no interactions between group and type of harm, 
(F(1,38)=.41; p=.524), group and proximity (F(1,38)=.33; p=.571), or group and utilitarian 
option (F(1,38)=.93; p=.340). There was no main effect of group (F(1,38)=.48; p=.494).  
 
There was no significant three-way interaction between type of harm, proximity and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=1.09; p=.303). There was no significant interaction between type 
of harm and proximity (F(1,38)=1.23; p=.274). There was a significant interaction between 
proximity and utilitarian option (F(1,38)=5.05; p=.031), such that both groups used more 
agent-based reasoning in relation to the non-utilitarian option, and this was exacerbated for 
the personal dilemmas. There was also a significant interaction between type of harm and 
utilitarian option (F(1,38)=33.91; p<.001), such that both groups used more agent-based 
reasoning in relation to the non-utilitarian option, and this was exacerbated for the physical 
dilemmas. There was a main effect of type of harm (F(1,38)=6.75; p=.013) such that both 
groups used more agent-based reasoning in situations involving physical harm than those 
involving social harm. There was a main effect of utilitarian option (F(1,38)=83.15; p<.001), 
such that both groups used more agent-based reasoning in relation to the non-utilitarian 
option than the utilitarian option. Finally, there was a main effect of proximity (F(1,38)= 
7.97; p=.008), such that both groups used more agent-based reasoning in personal dilemmas 
than impersonal dilemmas. 
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11.3.6 Ethics Position Questionnaire  
The high and low psychopathic trait groups were compared with respect to their ‘idealism’ 
and ‘relativism’ scores on the EPQ. Adopting a strict p value of .025 (.05/2), the high trait 
group was less idealistic than the low trait group, but this difference only approached 
significance (t=2.18; p=.036). The high trait group was significantly more relativistic than the 
low trait group (t=2.76; p=.009).  
 
11.3.7 Moral Behavior Inventory 
The high and low psychopathic trait groups were compared with respect to their judgments 
of various moral misdemeanours. The high trait group judged these misdemeanours to be 
significantly less ‘wrong’ than did the low trait group (t=4.18; p<.001).  
 
11.3.8 Gender 
In order to ensure that any group differences were due to PPI group membership rather than 
gender, these analyses were repeated using ANCOVAs with gender as a covariate. The effect 
of gender did not reach significance for any of these analyses (p>.05) and did not change the 
overall pattern of results.  
 
11.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The present study was designed to investigate utilitarian decision-making in people high and 
low in psychopathic traits. The Utilitarian Judgments Task described situations in which a 
main character or ‘agent’ was required to decide between two courses of action. The first 
was a non-utilitarian course of action that prioritised the needs of an individual scenario 
character over the needs of a group of characters. The second was a utilitarian course of 
action that prioritised the needs of the group over those of the individual. When asked to 
decide which course of action they would choose, the psychopathic trait groups did not differ 
in their preferences for the utilitarian or non-utilitarian options. The groups also did not 
differ with respect to their verbal reasoning about the scenario characters affected by the 
decision or about the agent making the decision. However, the high trait group reported that 
they would experience less discomfort when making such decisions.   
 
A range of studies have found that the proximity of the agent to the situation is a relevant 
factor in utilitarian decision-making (e.g. Greene et al., 2001). For instance, in the classic 
trolley/footbridge problems, pulling a lever that kills one person to save five people is 
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considered an impersonal action, whereas pushing the fat man to his death to save five 
people is considered a personal action, and the evidence suggests that people are less 
utilitarian in personal dilemmas than in impersonal dilemmas. Thus, proximity was included 
as a manipulation in the present study. The current results corroborated the findings from 
the literature, since both groups were less utilitarian in personal dilemmas. In addition, both 
groups tended to give a higher proportion of sophisticated responses to impersonal 
dilemmas than to personal dilemmas; sophisticated responses were those that gave greater 
consideration to the ethical issues and perspectives or internal states of the scenario 
characters. With respect to the role of the agent, the groups tended to make reference to the 
agent less often in impersonal versus personal dilemmas. This is likely to reflect the fact that 
the agent’s proximity to the situation was greater in personal dilemmas than in impersonal 
dilemmas, and thus the part they played in the situation may have been more salient.  
 
The traditional trolley problem and other research tests (e.g. Greene et al., 2001; Moore et 
al., 2008) examine utilitarian decision-making in extreme dilemmas involving physical harm. 
These are unlikely to be representative of the types of dilemmas people more typically face 
in everyday life. In order to examine this further, the present study included both extreme 
dilemmas involving physical harm and everyday dilemmas involving social harm. With 
respect to this manipulation, both groups were significantly more utilitarian and reported 
greater discomfort in relation to situations involving physical harm than those involving 
social harm. This suggests that people may be more likely to resolve moral dilemmas on the 
basis of black and white principles such as utilitarianism in extreme, life-or-death contexts 
than in everyday contexts. For instance, in the trolley problem, the action that leads to the 
greatest number of people surviving (i.e. pulling the lever) is clearly the most optimal solution 
from a utilitarian perspective. By contrast, people may use more nuanced, complex reasoning 
when resolving everyday social problems. In the break-up example above, it is difficult to 
quantify the disappointment experienced by the group and weigh this against Amir’s hurt 
feelings, and effectively decide which is the lesser of the two evils.  
 
In order to examine how the groups reasoned about both non-utilitarian and utilitarian 
courses of action, in the current study, participants reported how uncomfortable they would 
feel in relation to both courses of action, and had to explain why each course of action might 
be the right thing to do. Participants across both groups reported that they would experience 
greater discomfort in relation to the utilitarian option than to the non-utilitarian option. This 
may reflect the fact that although the utilitarian course of action maximized benefit across 
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all the scenario characters, these actions tended to require the participants to actively choose 
for the agent to intervene. By contrast, choosing the non-utilitarian option may have 
somewhat absolved the participants of guilt, since they had not deliberately put the agent in 
a position where their actions led to a character being harmed. Another possible explanation 
for the difference in ‘uncomfortable’ ratings between the utilitarian options may relate to 
how the scenario characters in the Utilitarian Judgments Task were described. In order to 
ensure the scenarios were clear, the individual was given a name (e.g. Darren/Amir) and the 
members of the group were not. This may have made the participants more likely to 
sympathise with the individual, and resulted in greater discomfort when faced with the 
prospect of sacrificing that individual for the sake of the majority. In order to investigate this 
further, future research could examine the potential influence of named versus unnamed 
characters in utilitarian dilemmas.  
 
How did the psychopathic trait groups compare in their performance on the Utilitarian 
Judgments Task? Firstly, the groups did not differ with respect to the frequency with which 
they made utilitarian choices, which was contrary to the prediction that the high trait group 
would make more utilitarian choices than the low trait group. Several lines of evidence 
pointed to this prediction. Firstly, this prediction was consistent with the dual-process theory 
of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001), which posits that utilitarian decisions are associated 
with cognitive processes and non-utilitarian decisions are associated with emotional 
processes. However, there is research to suggest that this model is somewhat simplistic, and 
unable to adequately account for complex emotion-cognition interactions (Moore et al., 
2008), since some studies have found that utilitarianism is impeded by cognitive processes 
(Moore et al., 2008) and others have found that utilitarianism is facilitated by cognitive 
processes (Greene et al., 2008; Bartels, 2008). Group differences in utilitarian choice were 
also predicted in view of two previous studies that have found people with psychopathy to 
be more utilitarian than control participants (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2011). 
However, these studies were conducted in prison populations, and the extent to which moral 
reasoning is impaired in incarcerated populations is unclear (e.g. Blair et al., 2005). The 
findings may therefore not translate into the general population. 
 
Although the findings relating to utilitarian choice did not support the predictions, it is 
unlikely that the trait groups’ emotional reactions to the scenarios were comparable, 
especially since psychopathy has been commonly linked to deficits in emotional 
processing(Blair, 2008). Moreover, the participants completed an empathy measure (reported 
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in Chapter 10 above); the groups scored similarly with respect to the cognitive aspects of the 
measure, but the high trait group scored lower than the low trait group with respect to 
emotional aspects. The lack of group differences in utilitarian choice may have instead related 
to the particular demands of the task: in previous studies, participants were asked the extent 
to which they would endorse the non-utilitarian and utilitarian courses of action (e.g. Bartels 
& Pizarro; 2011). However, the concept of ‘endorsement’ may conflate what choice people 
would actually make with how they might feel about their choice. These two aspects were 
thus deliberately separated in the current study, with participants reporting both on their 
choice and on how uncomfortable they would feel in relation to both utilitarian and non-
utilitarian courses of action. Despite the lack of group differences in utilitarian choice, the 
high trait group was less uncomfortable overall than the low trait group, which was in line 
with predictions. This discrepancy between choice and discomfort may suggest that the high 
trait group had the capacity to reason and make decisions to a similar extent to the low trait 
group. The high trait group simply felt less personally affected by the decision than the low 
trait group. This is consistent with evidence suggesting that psychopathy is associated with 
the ability to judge appropriately what actions constitute moral violations, but is also 
associated with a lack of emotional investment when such violations occur (Cima et al., 
2010).  
 
An intact cognitive ability in spite of impaired emotional ability in the high trait group may 
also account for the pattern of findings relating to verbal rationales, whereby participants 
were compared with respect to their reasoning about why each course of action would be 
the right thing to do. The trait groups were equally sophisticated in their reasoning about the 
scenario characters; they were similarly able to consider their internal states and cite guiding 
ethical principles when providing an explanation. Both groups were also similarly able to 
consider the agent’s perspective and refer to the agent’s role or responsibility in the situation. 
This suggests that the high trait group not only made similar choices to the low trait group, 
they were also able to provide similar rationales for these choices.   
 
Although the present findings suggest the trait groups had a similar capacity to reason about 
utilitarian dilemmas, this does not necessarily imply that moral reasoning is uncompromised 
in those high in psychopathic traits. The additional measures administered in the present 
study (the EPQ and MBI) gave some credence to this, suggesting that the groups differed in 
their ethical views. The high trait group placed greater emphasis on contextual factors than 
absolute moral rules, and judged various misdemeanours less harshly, as compared to the 
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low trait group. The dilemmas in the Utilitarian Judgments Task tap into a very specific 
aspect of moral reasoning, and both the current study and previous research suggests that it 
is a strategy that is most typically adopted in relation to extreme, life-or-death situations 
rather than in day-to-day life, such as in the social dilemmas of the present study. Another 
consideration is that there was no incentive in the present study for participants to make a 
choice one way or the other; they had nothing to gain or lose irrespective of their chosen 
course of action. Psychopathy is associated with a tendency to prioritise one’s own needs 
over the needs of others, and with a propensity for significant moral transgressions (Hare, 
1993), which did not apply in the present study. Future research could be conducted to 
examine whether group differences in utilitarian decision-making emerge more clearly when 
the participants are personally affected by the decisions they make.  
 
The pattern of results in the present study was consistent with the findings discussed in the 
previous two chapters. In the Competitiveness Task (reported in Chapter 9), the groups did 
not differ when deciding whether other people should succeed or fail. However, in 
comparison with the low trait group, the high trait group did experience greater pleasure 
when others failed and less pleasure when they succeeded. In the Counterfactual Thinking 
Task (reported in Chapter 10), participants read about a series of counterfactual alternatives 
that would have prevented them from experiencing a negative outcome (for instance, being 
unable to attend their graduation ceremony). These negative outcomes were caused by a 
scenario character’s negligence (for instance, a sibling using the wrong fuel in the family car). 
The groups did not differ when deciding which counterfactual alternative they preferred. 
However, in comparison with the low trait group, the high trait group did experience less 
guilt in relation to the counterfactual alternatives. Finally, in the present study, the trait 
groups did not differ when deciding on a course of action, but the high trait group did 
experience less discomfort than the low trait group. This further supports the notion that 
those high and low in psychopathic traits may not differ in their active preferences for others, 
but that those high in psychopathic traits may be unlikely to experience negative emotions 
when others suffer as a result of their decision.  
 
11.4.1 Summary  
In summary, the present study employed a novel experimental task to compare utilitarian 
decision-making in people high versus low psychopathic traits. The findings suggested that 
the trait groups did not differ when choosing between a non-utilitarian and utilitarian course 
of action. Moreover, when asked to provide a verbal rationale as to why each course of action 
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might be the right thing to do, the groups were similarly sophisticated in their reasoning 
about the scenario characters affected by the decision and about the agent making the 
decision. However, irrespective of the course of action, the proximity of the agent to the 
situation or type of harm involved in the situation, the high trait group reported that they 
would experience less discomfort than did the low trait group.  
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Part 3: Discussion 
 
Chapter 12: General Discussion  
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The present thesis aimed to explore the ways in which psychopathic personality traits 
translate into everyday social functioning. The findings of the experimental studies presented 
in this thesis will now be described together. Firstly, this chapter will discuss the 
contributions of the methodological approach adopted and describe the novel aspects of the 
studies’ experimental design. Secondly, the potential limitations of this approach will be 
considered. Thirdly, the findings will be considered in relation to the prominent aetiological 
models of psychopathy (reviewed in Chapter 2). Fourthly, the contributions of the current 
findings to understanding the influence of psychopathic traits on prosocial behaviour and 
moral judgment will be discussed. The clinical implications for expanding on the 
conceptualisation of psychopathy and for remediation will also be presented. Finally, the 
implications of the current findings for future research work will be discussed.   
 
12.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND NOVEL ASPECTS OF 
THE DESIGN  
 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, psychopathy is a disorder characterised by emotional dysfunction, 
deficits in interpersonal relationships and antisocial behaviour (e.g. Hare, 1991; Blair, 
Mitchell & Blair, 2005). People with psychopathy tend to be manipulative, coercive and 
intimidating in their interactions with others. However, they are often also capable of being 
charming, funny and likeable (Cleckley, 1976). This paradoxical set of characteristics is 
thought to have consequences both for individuals and for society (Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011). 
Psychopathy therefore has significant implications for everyday social interactions. However, 
there is a paucity of work examining how the deficits associated with psychopathy translate 
into the more commonplace aspects of social functioning.  
 
A substantial body of empirical work has investigated social and emotional difficulties in 
psychopathy using relatively abstract laboratory tasks. Studies have been conducted using 
neuroeconomic games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a measure of social cooperation 
(e.g. Mokros, Menner, Eisenbarth et al., 2008) and other classic tools such as lexical decision-
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making tasks as measures of emotional processing (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002). The 
findings of these studies have led to important and fundamental conclusions about 
psychopathy, demonstrating for instance that it may be characterised by emotional 
dysfunction, with relatively preserved cognitive functioning (e.g. Blair, 2008). However, 
limited work has been carried out in order to understand more subtle social and emotional 
difficulties. Thus, the present thesis aimed to address this gap in the literature by designing 
novel experimental tasks that tapped into specific aspects of everyday social performance.  
 
The studies presented in the current thesis made a number of broad methodological 
contributions. Firstly, the participants were recruited from the general population. The vast 
majority of psychopathy research recruits participants from institutional settings, which may 
be problematic since many people with psychopathy are non-institutionalised and are 
thought to function successfully outside of prison (Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995; 
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). Conducting research within the general population is therefore 
important, since criminality is commonly viewed as a correlate of psychopathy without being 
a central component (Skeem & Cooke, 2010), and can in fact be a confounding factor 
(Kirkman, 2002).  
 
Secondly, in the present thesis, a continuum approach was adopted. Thus, large groups of 
participants were screened with a self-report measure of psychopathic traits. Those scoring 
in the upper and lower ranges formed the high and low psychopathic trait groups and 
participated in the experimental tasks. This addressed a limitation of much of the existing 
psychopathy research whereby participants are classified as either psychopathic or non-
psychopathic. This traditional approach is somewhat inconsistent with recent views that 
conceptualise psychopathy as the extreme end of a range of personality traits lying on a 
continuum (e.g. Hare & Neumann (2008); Marcus, John & Edens, 2004).  
 
Thirdly, the experimental tasks presented herein were designed to achieve a balance between 
ecological validity and laboratory control. As described above, this was an important 
contribution since an understanding of the everyday difficulties faced by those high in 
psychopathic traits is lacking in the literature. Therefore, the present studies involved 
scenario-based tasks that described social interactions with friends, family members and 
colleagues. Moreover, many of the studies included an analysis of participants’ verbal 
responses. Thus, this research examined not only participants’ decisions and numerical 
ratings but also the language used to convey their decisions and the strategies involved in 
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their reasoning. Whilst the current research aimed to examine psychopathic traits and 
everyday social behaviour using ecologically valid methods, the fundamental principles of 
laboratory control were upheld. For instance, all participants were administered identical sets 
of materials, in counterbalanced orders, in a carefully controlled experimental environment.  
 
Taken together, the present thesis aimed to address many of the broad methodological 
limitations that are pervasive in psychopathy research: the focus on institutionalised 
populations, the conceptualisation of psychopathy diagnosis as binary rather than 
continuous, and the lack of ecological validity.  
 
The primary novel contribution of the current research was the range of manipulations 
designed to tap into specific, fine-grained aspects of social behaviour.  The first study in the 
present thesis (reported in Chapter 5) involved the use of the Social Strategy Task, which has 
previously been used to examine everyday social performance. In this study, the high and 
low psychopathic trait groups’ responses to awkward requests were compared, and the high 
trait group was found to be less prosocial. The next set of studies was designed to follow up 
on this finding, by investigating what factors might differentially influence the 
groups’prosocial responding. Thus, a revised version of the Social Strategy Task was 
developed. In this version, the type of cost incurred by responding prosocially was 
manipulated. In one scenario, an unwelcome relative either made a request for a favourable 
opinion (“Do you like having me to stay?”) or for a practical favour (“Can I come stay with 
you this weekend?).  
 
In addition to the type of cost incurred, it was thought that the value of the cost might 
influence prosocial responding. As a result, the Social Exchange Task (described in Chapter 
6) was designed in order to compare the groups’ willingness to reciprocate. The value of the 
reciprocal favour was manipulated, such that it was either less costly or more costly than the 
original favour.  One scenario in this task described an interaction in which the participant 
and a friend went for lunch, and the friend paid for the participant’s sandwich. At a later 
date, they either go for coffee or for an evening meal, presenting the participant with an 
opportunity to reciprocate. In this scenario, paying for the coffee was less costly than the 
sandwich; paying for the evening meal was more costly than the sandwich. By manipulating 
the cost of prosocial behaviour, these studies systematically varied external, situational 
aspects of the interaction.  
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It was thought that internal, dispositional factors relating to the person in need of help might 
also influence prosocial responding. Thus, the next pair of studies investigated whether the 
trait groups were differentially influenced by the extent to which scenario characters were 
deserving. The Favours Task (reported in Chapter 7) involved characters making requests of 
the participants. One scenario involved a neighbour requesting that the participant carry a 
heavy parcel. The strength of justification for this request, and therefore the extent to which 
the character deserved help, was manipulated. In one variant, the neighbour provided a good 
reason; they had sustained a back injury. In the second variant, they provided a bad reason; 
they did not wish to get their shirt dirty. The Favours Task therefore focused on the extent 
to which the characters’ deservingness would influence participants’prosocial behaviour.  
 
The Deservingness Task (reported in Chapter 8) also examined the influence of 
deservingness, but from a different perspective. In this task, participants read scenarios in 
which a main character had experienced either a positive or a negative outcome. In order to 
manipulate the characters’ deservingness, the events leading to positive and negative 
outcomes were varied. Accordingly, characters experienced a positive outcome, such as 
passing a driving test, either as a result of their own good actions and efforts (they worked 
hard and made few errors) or as a result of bad actions or by cheating (they made many errors 
but flirted with the driving instructor). In other scenarios, characters experienced a negative 
outcome, such as being reprimanded in front of a class. This outcome resulted either directly 
from their own bad actions (they failed to do the work) or from misfortune (the teacher was 
in a bad mood). Taken together, deservingness was manipulated in relation to both prosocial 
responding and reasoning about positive and negative outcomes affecting other people.  
 
How might the groups’ responses have differed in situations where they themselves 
experienced positive or negative outcomes? In order to address this question, next two 
studies focused on interactions with scenario characters that had direct consequences for the 
participants. The Competitiveness Task (reported in Chapter 8) investigated whether or not 
one’s own personal success or failure differentially influenced groups’ competitiveness. One 
scenario involved both the participant and the character taking an important exam. In one 
variant, the participant passed with a top grade and in a second variant, they failed. The 
Counterfactual Thinking Task (reported in Chapter 9) described situations where negative 
consequences for the participant resulted directly from the characters’ negligent actions. In 
one scenario, a sibling inadvertently filled the family car with the wrong fuel, which caused 
the participant to miss their graduation ceremony. Thus, this task described scenarios in 
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which the characters had ‘done the wrong thing’. Participants had to reason about the ethical 
actions of other people.  
 
In order to examine how the groups reasoned about their own ethical actions, the final study 
involved the development of a task in which participants had to reason about utilitarian 
moral dilemmas. In this study, the degree of proximity to the decision and the type of harm 
resulting from the decision were both manipulated. One scenario involved an adaptation of 
a classic moral dilemma in which participants chose whether or not a character should 
sacrifice one person in order to save five. The proximity of the character to the decision was 
manipulated, such that in one variant the decision was whether or not to pull a lever that 
would result in a man’s death, and in the second variant, the decision was whether or not to 
physically push the man to his death. The type of harm was manipulated by including 
scenarios describing both physical harm, such as injury or death, and scenarios describing 
social harm, such as social exclusion or hurt feelings.  
 
Taken together, the key contribution of the present thesis was to assess how psychopathy 
translates into various subtle aspects of social functioning, using innovative and highly 
nuanced tasks.   
 
12.3 LIMITATIONS 
 
In spite of the novel contributions described above, there were some methodological 
limitations in the current thesis. With respect to the screening strategy adopted, the 
drawbacks of self-report measures should be considered. The PPI was used for screening 
psychopathic traits in all the studies reported herein. Self-report has been criticised on the 
grounds that people may be dishonest or inaccurate when assessing their own personality or 
behavioural tendencies. This may be due to a lack of insight, or due to a desire to present 
oneself in a positive light (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). However, it was unfeasible to screen 
for psychopathic traits without relying on self-report. The only other screening tools that 
have been developed for use in non-institutionalised settings are also self-report 
questionnaires (e.g. Levenson Primary and Secondary Psychopathy Scale, Levenson, Kiehl 
& Fitzpatrick, 1995; Self-report Psychopathy Scale; Hare, 1985). Despite their limitations, 
studies have found that self-report measures tend to cohere with observer report (Lilienfeld 
& Fowler, 2006). Moreover, the PPI itself has been found to correlate with Hare’s 
Psychopathy Checklist, with psychiatric interview, with observer ratings and with family 
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history data (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). Taken together, although there are a number of 
drawbacks to self-report measures, the weight of the evidence suggests that the use of the 
PPI in the present thesis was a sufficient measure of psychopathic personality traits.  
 
Another potential limitation of the current studies concerns their statistical power. It should 
be noted that the sample sizes reported in the present studies were modest and may thus 
have failed to detect subtle group differences in some cases. Sample sizes were determined 
in accordance with the guidelines set out by Cohen (1992), indicating that a sample size of 
20 participants per group is necessary to detect a large effect size, with power set at 80% and 
alpha at 10%. These sample sizes were also comparable with other research work involving 
groups with high and low PPI scorers (Long & Titone, 2007). Nevertheless, future studies 
could increase statistical power by recruiting larger sample sizes. This may reveal additional 
or stronger group differences.   
 
Another methodological limitation in the present thesis was the lack of normative data. 
Whilst the development of new experimental tasks permitted more nuanced examination of 
psychopathic traits and social behaviour, it was unclear how most people in society (who 
were not selected on the basis of their psychopathic trait scores) would perform on these 
tasks. For instance, it was unclear whether the performance of the low trait groups or the 
high trait groups was closer to the population mean. Future research work could therefore 
attempt to validate the experimental tasks in larger samples.  
 
One conceptual limitation of the present thesis is that it is unclear how the current findings 
might translate into more extreme, clinical populations. Whilst these studies were deliberately 
conducted within the general population for the reasons discussed above, psychopathy is 
associated with criminal activity and antisocial behaviour. It may thus be important in the 
future to administer these tasks to those with psychopathy within institutional settings. This 
may help to determine whether they represent the extreme end of the psychopathy 
continuum, showing a similar but more exaggerated pattern of performance, or whether their 
social performance is qualitatively different to those high in psychopathic traits.  
 
Finally, the scenario-based tasks presented in this thesis were ecologically valid in some 
respects but not in others. They did describe everyday contexts and some offered participants 
the opportunity to respond as they would in conversation. This represented a move away 
from traditional laboratory tasks and towards ecological validity. However, genuinely 
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naturalistic environments are likely to be much more complex and multifaceted than those 
described in vignettes. Moreover, participants’ responses in ‘real-life’ may differ substantially 
from their responses to hypothetical scenarios. Nonetheless, these studies did reveal 
interesting findings in relation to the more subtle aspects of social performance. Given that 
this had not been examined previously, it was important to do so in a controlled experimental 
setting in order to vary specific features systematically whilst limiting the influence of 
alternative environmental confounds. 
 
12.4 FINDINGS IN RELATION TO PROMINENT AETIOLOGICAL MODELS  
 
A range of aetiological models of psychopathy have been proposed (for an extensive review, 
see Salekin, 2002; Blair, et al., 2008; Patrick, 2006). These have mainly focused on the role of 
cognition and emotion. Turning to models of cognition, Chapter 2 reviewed the particularly 
prominent theoretical frameworks by highlighting the potential roles of executive 
dysfunction and cognitive bias.  
 
Executive function refers to the regulation and control of cognitive processes (Elliott, 2003). 
Executive capacities include cognitive flexibility, working memory, and inhibition or 
behavioural control (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson et al., 2000). Psychopathy is characterised 
by features such as impulsivity and poor behavioural control (e.g. Hare, 1993), and lesions in 
the prefrontal cortex have been linked to both executive difficulties (Stuss & Knight, 2003) 
and to psychopathy (Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz, & Levkovitz, 2010). In the 
present thesis, the high psychopathic trait participants were consistently found to be less 
prosocial than the low trait group. This could be explained by deficits in inhibition and 
behavioural control. The high trait group may have been unable to suppress any instinctive, 
selfish urges, or to consider the potential consequences of their responses before answering. 
However, research has generally found those with psychopathy to be unimpaired on a range 
of tasks measuring executive function (Pham, Vanderstukken, Philippot & Vanderlinen, 
2003; Selbom & Verona, 2007; Hiatt, Schmitt & Newman, 2004), and deficits in inhibition 
may relate to emotional rather than executive dysfunction. This theoretical framework is 
therefore unlikely to account fully for the current findings.  
 
The deficits seen in psychopathy have also been linked to cognitive bias. This refers to the 
process of distorting expectations, beliefs and values following subjective personal 
experiences (Blackburn, 2006). Within this framework, psychopathy is thought to arise from 
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maladaptive beliefs about the self and the world. In relation to the current findings, the high 
trait group may have held distorted views in relation to the characters; they may have believed 
that the characters were weak, stupid, and did not deserve their help, or that their own needs 
were more important that the characters’ needs. However, there is very little empirical work 
in support of the role of cognitive bias in psychopathy, and the primary assumption that 
emotional responses result from cognitive appraisals has been called into question (Haidt, 
2001).  
 
Taken together, some of the current findings could have been explained by cognitive deficits. 
However, the literature suggests that the cognitive deficits seen in people with psychopathy 
(such as disinhibition) may in fact derive from emotional dysfunction, particularly since 
cognitive problems tend to be selectively in response to emotional stimuli.   
The findings may therefore be better interpreted in light of emotional models of 
psychopathy. 
 
Psychopathy has consistently been described as characterised by emotional dysfunction, and 
a range of different models has been proposed focusing on aspects of emotional functioning. 
The most prominent theoretical frameworks (as reviewed in Chapter 2) have emphasised the 
role of fear, responsivity to distress, and emotional empathy.  
 
With respect to the role of fear, it has been posited that psychopathy arises as a result of 
deficiencies in the processing and modulation of fear (e.g. Lykken, 1995). According to this 
fear dysfunction hypothesis, people experience a fear response following punishment and 
are subsequently motivated to avoid whichever action led to the punishment. By contrast, 
people with psychopathy are thought to lack this aversive reaction (e.g. Peschardt, Morton 
& Blair, 2003). In the current thesis, the findings indicated reduced prosocial responding in 
the high psychopathic trait group. Thus, in relation to the fear dysfunction hypothesis, one 
possible explanation of group differences is that the high trait group may have been less 
averse to the prospect of any negative consequences resulting from a failure to behave 
prosocially. The low trait group may have been more likely to comply with requests for 
favours and behave reciprocally because they did not wish to damage the social relationship 
with the character or to damage their own reputation. However, the present tasks did not 
explicitly investigate what types of consequences the groups anticipated following their 
responses. It is therefore difficult to provide firm empirical support for the notion that the 
groups differed in their aversion to potential negative future consequences.  
198 
 
 
A criticism of the fear dysfunction hypothesis is that it overemphasises the role of 
punishment in moral socialisation. The evidence suggests that the role of empathy is much 
more important for moral socialisation than punishment (e.g. Hoffman, 2000). If this is the 
case, it implies that the low trait group was motivated to behave prosocially because they 
empathised with the characters, rather than because they feared reprisal. In view of the 
limitations of the fear dysfunction hypothesis, other prominent emotional models have 
emphasised the role of empathy.  
 
One such model focused on the role of responsivity to distress. Blair (1995) noted that 
animals often suppress or withdraw aggression in response to distress or submission cues 
and posited a functionally similar mechanism in humans, the violence inhibition mechanism 
(VIM). According to VIM, people experience an empathic, emotional response when others 
are in distress. It has been postulated that VIM is impaired in psychopathy, resulting in a lack 
of responsiveness to others’ distress cues (Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997). Thus, in the 
present thesis, prosocial responses may have involved perceiving or anticipating the 
characters’ difficulties and being motivated to suppress selfish urges and/or to act in their 
best interests in order to alleviate their suffering. The high trait groups may have been less 
responsive to the characters’ needs and therefore unmotivated to intervene.  
 
In order to assess the extent to which the groups were responsive to distress cues, the nature 
of the distress cues provided in the current studies should be considered. In some studies, 
the characters’ distress was implied. In scenarios such as the one describing a character being 
reprimanded in front of their class, the subtext may have been that they experienced 
humiliation or sadness. In others studies, the scenarios explicitly described consequences 
such as injury, death, or hurt feelings. This may have spelled out the characters’ distress more 
clearly. However, VIM is thought to describe empathic reactions to non-verbal distress cues. 
These could include facial expressions or distress sounds, such as crying or screaming. In the 
present thesis, all studies involved vignette descriptions of interactions, and non-verbal 
distress cues were therefore not included. It is not clear whether VIM also embraces non-
verbal cues derived implicitly from verbal descriptions. If so, the VIM model should be 
clarified to account for these issues. Taken together, whilst a lack of responsiveness to 
distress cues could plausibly account for the current findings, VIM may be unsuitable to 
explain group differences on scenario-based tasks. Future work might be able to examine 
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VIM more directly, by using images or videos of social interactions, or by setting up live role-
plays.   
 
Another model that focuses on empathy draws a distinction between cognitive and 
emotional aspects (e.g. Blair, 2008). According to this proposed dissociation, empathy 
consists of the capacity to understand the internal states of others (cognitive empathy) and 
to resonate with others’ internal states by experiencing a corresponding emotional reaction 
(emotional empathy). A range of studies has linked psychopathy with impaired emotional 
empathy. For instance, people with psychopathy tend to lack physiological responsivity to 
emotionally salient stimuli (e.g. Lykken, 1957; Blair, 1999). By contrast, it is thought that they 
have intact cognitive empathy, since they tend to perform as well as control participants on 
tasks that examine understanding the perspectives and intentions of others (e.g. Dolan & 
Fullam, 2004).  
 
A number of the current findings might be accounted for by a selective impairment in 
emotional empathy. For instance, in the Social Strategy Task (reported in Chapter 5), the 
high trait group was able to use sophisticated strategies that involved negotiating with the 
scenario characters, but nonetheless were more likely to refuse requests outright and less 
likely to comply with requests outright as compared to the low trait group. Moreover, as 
compared to the low trait group, the high trait group tended to rely less on emotional, 
empathic language that made references to the characters’ positive attributes and highlighted 
the importance of treating them fairly. Conversely, they referred more frequently to practical 
reasons relating to saving time and money than did the low trait group. Finally, the present 
studies consistently found differences in the groups’ ratings of their own emotional reactions 
to each situation. Thus, as compared to the low trait group, the high trait group found 
difficult situations to be less awkward, felt less satisfied when reciprocating and more 
satisfied when failing to reciprocate, experienced less pleasure when others did well and more 
pleasure when others did badly, had lower guilt ratings, and experienced less discomfort 
when resolving difficult moral dilemmas.  
 
Despite the differences in their emotional responses, the groups often made similar choices. 
For instance, despite the high trait group experiencing more pleasure than the low trait group 
when others failed, they did not choose for others to fail more frequently. Arguably, if the 
high trait group had nothing to gain by behaving antisocially, their active preferences were 
in line with whatever was most socially appropriate. Alternatively, reduced prosocial 
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behaviour and emotional responding may suggest that the high trait group did not resonate 
with the characters’ needs and feel motivated to sacrifice their own personal resources in 
order to preserve the characters’ best interests.  
 
Taken together, an explanation in terms of impaired emotional empathy, with intact 
cognitive empathy, accounts for the broadest range of current findings. In particular, this 
theoretical framework explains why the performance of the high trait groups in this thesis 
was comparable to that of the low trait groups in relation to some response variables but not 
in relation to others. The specific contributions of the present research for understanding 
the influence of psychopathy on prosocial behaviour and moral judgment will now be 
considered in turn. 
 
12.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF FINDINGS TO UNDERSTANDING THE 
INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOPATHIC TRAITS ON PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR  
 
Prosocial behaviour refers to actions that are intended to benefit others (Fiske, 2004). These 
actions are thought to be advantageous, both for those in receipt of help and for those 
providing help. There are various manifestations of prosocial behaviour. For instance, 
altruism refers to actions that are motivated primarily by concern for others, and involve 
self-sacrifice without any obvious external rewards (Batson & Powell, 2003). Prosocial 
behaviour may also manifest in the form of reciprocity, whereby people take turns, return 
favours and engage in ongoing social exchanges. These exchanges are considered to be “two-
sided, mutually contingent and mutually rewarding processes” (Emerson, 1972). As reviewed 
in Chapter 3, evolutionary theories state that these prosocial behaviours may have emerged 
as an evolutionary strategy. Collaborating with members of one’s own tribe in order to gather 
resources or raise children was important in order to tackle instabilities such as unpredictable 
climate and competing tribes (Richardson & Boyd, 2005). By contrast, it is thought that an 
alternative evolutionary strategy led to psychopathy (Glenn & Raine, 2009). According to 
this alternative strategy, people engaged in tactics such as coercion or deception. These 
tactics were developed as a means to gather the maximum benefits or resources, whilst 
incurring the fewest costs. This suggests that when navigating their social world, people high 
versus low in psychopathic traits may employ different strategies, or may respond differently 
to various aspects of social situations. The present thesis aimed to investigate fine-grained 
social performance in those high versus low in psychopathic traits. 
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In order to design experimental paradigms that would tap into specific aspects of prosocial 
behaviour, it was important to consider what factors might influence people’s decision to 
behave prosocially. It was thought that this decision may depend on both situational, external 
factors relating to the person providing help, and dispositional, internal factors relating to 
the person in receipt of help. With respect to situational factors, deciding to provide help 
may partially depend on the costs incurred. When acting in somebody else’s best interests, 
people may need to sacrifice their own personal resources. Consider an example in which a 
friend needed help moving from their home. Offering to help them might have involved a 
range of practical consequences or costs. For instance, the friend might have lived far away, 
which would incur a cost of time and money; they might own a cat which triggers the helper’s 
allergies; the helper might have intended to spend the day with their parents, and would have 
to sacrifice the experience in order to help the friend. Helping the friend might also involve 
more intangible costs. For instance, they might frequently make bad jokes which the helper 
feels obliged to laugh at; they might have a partner who often expresses strong opinions that 
the helper disagrees with and finds offensive. In addition to the different types of costs, 
prosocial behaviour may involve different levels or values of the same cost. In relation to the 
example above, the friend might require help for two hours or for the whole weekend. In 
order to reflect the types and values of cost involved in prosocial behaviour, these were 
systematically manipulated in the present thesis.   
 
It was unclear whether or not the psychopathic trait groups would be differentially influenced 
by cost. It was thought that the high trait group may have been unwilling to incur a cost of 
any type or magnitude. Thus, they may not have differentiated between situations that 
incurred lesser costs and those that incurred greater costs to the same extent as the low trait 
group. For instance, in the Social Strategy Task: Revised (reported in Chapter 5), the high 
trait group may have been unwilling to tell an unwelcome relative that they enjoyed their 
company or to allow them to visit, despite the fact that the former involved very little effort. 
In the Social Exchange Task, one scenario described a character buying the participant a 
sandwich. The high trait group may have been unwilling to return the favour, regardless of 
whether the returned favour involved buying the character a cheaper coffee or buying them 
a more expensive meal. However, this was found not to be the case. Whilst the high trait 
group was less likely to comply with requests or to reciprocate overall, the implied cost 
influenced both groups in similar ways. Thus, prosocial responding was reduced in relation 
to more effortful favours, regardless of psychopathic trait group membership.  
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Turning away from cost, what other situational factors might influence prosocial responding? 
The personal circumstances of the individual providing help might play a role. For instance, 
people may be unwilling to help others if they have had a bad day; if somebody were to ask 
their friend to loan them money, the friend might be more compliant if they had recently 
won the lottery and less compliant if they had recently been mugged. In order to examine 
the influence of personal circumstances, the Competitiveness Task (described in Chapter 9) 
described competitive contexts and manipulated the ending such that participants had either 
succeeded or failed.  
 
It was thought that any increased competitiveness in the high trait group may have been 
exacerbated when they themselves failed. They may have preferred a character to fail their 
exam to a greater extent than the low trait group, particularly if they themselves failed the 
exam. However, in practice, the success/failure manipulation influenced both groups in 
similar ways. Moreover, since people with psychopathy tend to be antisocial, and to feel an 
indiscriminate need to win at any cost (Ross & Rausch, 2001), it was expected that the high 
trait group would behave more competitively than the low trait group. However, this was 
not the case; the high trait group did not actively prefer the character to fail the exam more 
frequently than the low trait group. This seems surprising, but may relate to the fact that the 
resources in question were independent. The character’s success or failure had no bearing 
on whether or not the participant passed or failed the exam. This suggests that those high in 
psychopathic traits may not be indiscriminately vindictive; they may only be more 
competitive when limited resources are available. This is consistent with the research 
evidence suggesting that people with psychopathy tend to behave antisocially in order to 
achieve a specific goal, rather than as an instinctive emotional reaction (Glenn & Raine, 
2009). Nonetheless, as compared to the low trait group, the high trait group did feel more 
pleased when the participant failed and less pleased when the participant succeeded. Thus, 
the groups differed in their emotional responses, but not in their active preferences. In order 
to investigate whether the same pattern of findings emerges when the participants have 
something to personally gain or lose, a future study could examine competitiveness in 
situations where the participant could only succeed if the character were to fail. Taken 
together, the current findings revealed that external factors relating to the person providing 
help, such as the effort required or one’s own success or failure, did not differentially 
influence the psychopathic trait groups.  
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Dispositional factors that relate to the person in need of help are also thought to influence 
prosocial responding. This might involve appraising a person’s need on the basis of their 
physical appearance (e.g. Batson & Powell, 2003); thus, a young girl in rags might be more 
likely to elicit a charitable response than a middle-aged man in a business suit. People may 
also view a philanthropist more kindly than a philanderer, and they may be more likely to 
lend money to somebody who was made redundant than somebody who was fired for 
misconduct. Essentially, people may appraise the characteristics of others in order to 
determine whether or not they deserve help. However, it was unclear whether those high 
and low in psychopathic traits would make similar judgments about whether others deserved 
help, since it was thought that those high in psychopathic traits might be likely to transgress; 
they might themselves engage in the very behaviours that would render them undeserving of 
help from others.  
 
In order to investigate deservingness more systematically, the Favours Task (reported in 
Chapter 7) described situations in which a character asked the participant for help. Their 
justification for needing help was manipulated such that they provided either a good reason 
or a bad reason. For instance, in one scenario, a neighbour asked the participant to carry a 
parcel upstairs for them, either because they had injured their back or because they did not 
wish to get their shirt dirty (see Chapter 7). The high trait group judged reasonable requests 
for favours (i.e. due to bad back) to be as acceptable as the low trait group. However, the 
high trait group judged unreasonable requests for favours (i.e. due to dirty shirt) to be more 
acceptable than did the low trait group. This may have related to the extent to which the 
character’s request conformed to social rules. When the neighbour made an unreasonable 
request, he may have been taking advantage and behaving inconsiderately, and therefore in 
violation of social rules. People often impose sanctions when others violate social rules (Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2004). By contrast, those with psychopathy are thought to be less bound by 
these rules (e.g. Dolan & Fullam, 2010). Thus, the high trait group may have been less 
shocked or frustrated by the neighbour’s unreasonable request and judged them less harshly 
than the low trait group, possibly because they themselves were more likely to violate social 
norms.   
 
Despite the high trait group’s reduced discrimination between reasonable and unreasonable 
requests, they did not view both types of requests to be equally acceptable. They also did not 
judge unreasonable requests to be more acceptable than reasonable ones. Returning to the 
data, additional post-hoc tests were conducted and revealed that both the low and the high 
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psychopathic trait groups judged unreasonable requests to be significantly less acceptable 
than reasonable requests (p<.001). The high trait group thus still differentiated on the basis 
of deservingness; they simply did so to a lesser extent than the low trait group.  
 
Taken together, the studies designed above examined specific situational and dispositional 
factors in relation to prosocial responding. Those presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 9 held the 
characteristics of the person requiring help constant and varied the context of the person 
providing help. By contrast, Chapter 7 held the helper’s effort constant and varied 
characteristics relating to the person in need. For both types of manipulations, the high trait 
groups were less prosocial than the low trait groups, but only when they had something to 
gain or lose. Moreover, although the high trait group differentiated less on the basis of 
deservingness than the low trait group, the direction of the findings was comparable. This 
suggests that both groups were influenced by situational and dispositional factors in similar 
ways, but that the high trait group had a different threshold at which they were willing to 
incur a cost in order to help others. 
 
This postulated difference in threshold may be linked to the fact that for the low trait group, 
the prospect of disappointing somebody else or causing them to suffer may have in itself 
been a cost. They may have had a particular interest in preserving the social relationship. 
Thus, when weighing up the costs and benefits of helping, the low trait groups considered 
both the preservation of personal resources and of other peoples’ best interests to be 
potential benefits. By contrast, the high trait group may have been primarily concerned only 
with personal resources, leading to reduced prosocial responding.  
 
Prosocial actions such as self-sacrifice, reciprocity and cooperation are intended to minimise 
the harm caused to others. As a result, these actions are typically judged to be morally right 
(Krebs & Denton, 2005). There is therefore a relationship between prosocial behaviour and 
moral judgment. The contribution of the current findings to understand the ways in which 
psychopathic traits translate into moral judgment will now be discussed.  
 
12.6 CONTRIBUTION OF FINDINGS TO UNDERSTANDING THE 
INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOPATHIC TRAITS ON MORAL JUDGMENT  
 
Moral judgment refers to the processes by which people differentiate between right and 
wrong (Fiske, 2004). As reviewed in Chapter 4, both cognitive and emotional factors can 
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contribute towards moral judgment. Cognitive aspects of moral judgment include the 
development of moral rules, reasoning about actions, intentions and outcomes, and 
discriminating between moral and conventional transgressions. Emotional aspects of moral 
judgment include moral emotions such as empathy, guilt and shame (Eisenberg, 2000) and 
judgments made on the basis of intuition (Haidt, 2001). Thus, moral judgment is thought to 
rely on both slow, controlled, deliberative reasoning processes that weigh up the costs and 
benefits of a particular course of action, and fast, instinctive responses that are sensitive to 
the potential distress for victims of moral transgressions (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley 
& Cohen, 2004).  
 
People with psychopathy are characterised by a propensity for immoral behaviours. 
However, the literature pertaining to moral judgment in psychopathy is somewhat mixed. 
Although there is some work suggesting deficits in moral reasoning, many studies suggest 
that this is preserved in psychopathy. By contrast, the evidence points to impairments in the 
emotional aspects of moral judgment (Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 2005). A selective impairment 
in moral judgment is consistent with the dissociation between cognitive and emotional 
empathy discussed above, and has led researchers to conclude that “psychopaths know right 
from wrong, but don’t care” (Cima, Tonnaer & Hauser, 2010).  
 
How might the findings of this thesis expand on previous work focusing on moral judgment 
in psychopathy? Moral judgment was examined from two perspectives, firstly by looking at 
how people reason about the actions of others and secondly by seeing what choices they 
make when asked to decide on the  most ethical course of action themselves. With respect 
to the actions of others, one study examined reasoning about whether people deserved a 
particular outcome.  
 
As discussed above, deservingness was thought to play a role in prosocial responding; it may 
also play a role in moral judgment. For instance, is it morally wrong to cheat in order to get 
ahead, rather than to work hard? In order to address this question, the Deservingness Task 
(reported in Chapter 8) systematically manipulated the extent to which people deserved good 
and bad outcomes. In one scenario, a character passed their driving test, either because they 
worked hard and made few errors, or because they flirted with their driving instructor. In 
another scenario, a character was reprimanded in front of their class, either because they 
failed to complete the work or because the instructor was in a bad mood. The high trait 
group judged the people who cheated to be more deserving of their good outcome than did 
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the low trait group. Conversely, they also thought that victims of misfortune were more 
deserving of their bad outcome than did the low trait group. However, the implications of 
this finding were unclear. On the one hand, the groups may have shown opposite patterns 
of moral judgment, such that the cheaters and victims of misfortune were judged to be 
undeserving by the low trait group and deserving by the high trait group. On the other hand, 
the high trait group’s judgments of deservingness may have been in the same direction as the 
low trait group; they may have simply differentiated less between deserved and undeserved 
outcomes. Additional post-hoc analysis revealed that this was indeed the case; the high trait 
group was narrower in their differentiation (p<.001). Thus, both groups judged that good 
outcomes linked to merit were more deserved than those linked to cheating, and judged that 
bad outcomes linked to deliberate transgression were more deserved than those linked to 
poor fortune. The low trait group was simply more extreme in their differentiation between 
the two variants. This may have been because they judged the cheaters more harshly and 
they felt more sympathy for the victims of misfortune than did the high trait group.    
 
The above study of deservingness described deliberate moral transgressions, since one 
variant of the scenarios described people cheating in an attempt to get ahead. Another study 
in the present thesis investigated how the groups differed with respect to their reasoning 
about accidental moral transgressions. Rather than deliberately transgressing in order to gain 
an unfair advantage, the characters in the Counterfactual Thinking Task (reported in Chapter 
10) performed accidental, negligent actions that had negative consequences for the 
participant.  
 
For example, in one scenario, a sibling accidentally filled the car with the wrong fuel, causing 
the participant to miss their graduation ceremony. The high trait group felt that the sibling 
would regret their mistake less than did the low trait group. This was consistent with the 
view that if the high trait group had transgressed, they themselves may have experienced 
limited regret (Hare, 1993; Glannon, 2008). Participants also evaluated different 
counterfactual alternatives that could have prevented the negative outcome. These 
alternatives were practical, emotional or extreme in nature. In relation to the above example, 
one practical counterfactual alternative involved the sibling checking the fuel more carefully. 
An emotional alternative involved the sibling being more considerate or less selfish. One 
extreme alternative involved the sibling being too ill to attend the ceremony in the first place. 
Surprisingly, when choosing which of these alternatives they would prefer, no group 
differences emerged. This suggested that the high trait group was not actively vengeful or 
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vindictive, even when the characters had caused them to suffer. This may have been because 
all of the counterfactual alternatives were equally effective and therefore that any option 
would suffice. Thus, the high trait group may not have been motivated to choose extreme 
alternatives that would have resulted in the character experiencing harm. Nonetheless, the 
high trait group reported that they experienced less guilt in relation to these extreme 
alternatives. This echoed the findings from the Competitiveness Task (reported above). Both 
studies found that the groups differed in their emotional responses, even when they did not 
differ in their choices. A future study could examine whether introducing an incentive would 
make the high trait group more likely to choose the extreme counterfactual alternatives. The 
alternative could be manipulated, such that for some scenarios, they are all equally effective, 
and for others, choosing the extreme alternative achieves the best result for the participant.  
 
The present thesis also examined moral judgment in relation to the choices people make 
when deciding on the most ethical course of action themselves. Thus, Chapter 11 described 
a study of utilitarian decision-making. Participants read scenarios in which the needs of an 
individual had to be weighed against the needs of a group. In each scenario, one decision 
would prevent harm for the individual at the expense of the group, and the other decision 
would prevent harm for the group at the expense of the individual. The type of harm was 
manipulated such that both physical harm and social harm were included. One scenario 
involved preventing the death of one versus many; another scenario involved preventing one 
versus many from experiencing hurt feelings. The proximity of the character making the 
decision to the situation was also manipulated. When making a decision that would lead to 
the death of one versus five, participants in the low proximity variant had to decide whether 
or not to pull a lever. In the high proximity variant, participants had to decide whether to 
physically push a man to his death.  
 
The findings revealed that the groups did not differ in terms of their chosen course of action. 
They also did not differ in terms of the reasoning used to justify why each course of action 
might be the right thing to do. Nonetheless, the groups did differ in their emotional 
responses to utilitarian dilemmas. The high trait group reported that they would experience 
less discomfort in response to both the utilitarian and non-utilitarian course of actions. What 
might have accounted for the lack of group differences in chosen course of action and in 
verbal reasoning? One explanation is that the scenarios made it clear that the consequences 
were for the characters at risk of harm. The character making the decision would not be 
punished, nor would they benefit from either course of action. Previous tasks that involve 
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utilitarian decision-making have included scenarios in which the character making the 
decision was personally affected; in some scenarios, their life was in danger. However, this 
was not varied systematically. (Greene, Somerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001). The 
utilitarian study in the present thesis focused on situations where the decision-maker 
themselves was not at risk of harm. Future work could examine whether the extent to which 
they stood to gain or lose differentially influences the groups. A future study could therefore 
include a manipulation whereby in some scenarios, the decision-maker was at risk and in 
others they were not.  Alternatively, a future study could include a manipulation such that 
the participant would personally benefit by prioritising the individual in half the scenarios 
and by prioritising the group in the remaining scenarios.  
 
The findings reported in Chapter 11 were consistent with earlier findings, whereby 
manipulating aspects of the social situations (such as the costs incurred or the characters’ 
deservingness) influenced both groups’ responses in similar ways. The utilitarian study was 
also consistent with the findings from the competitiveness task, since the groups did not 
differ with respect to their chosen course of action, but did differ in their emotional reaction. 
Taken together, the studies presented in Chapters 8 and 10 examined moral judgment in 
relation to the actions of others. By contrast, Chapter 11 examined moral judgment in 
relation to people’s own actions. The evidence suggests that factors relating to moral 
behaviour, such as the type of action involved or the type of harm resulting from the action, 
influenced both groups in similar ways. The findings also suggest that the tendency for 
people high in psychopathic traits to behave immorally may be primarily driven by potential 
gains. Despite a proclivity for immoral behaviour, the findings suggest that their capacity for 
moral reasoning is unimpaired. Nonetheless, their emotional reactions to moral dilemmas 
may be diminished in comparison to those low in psychopathic traits. This is consistent with 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 4, suggesting that people with psychopathy are likely to 
have intact moral reasoning and but a reduced experience of moral emotion (e.g. Blair, 1995; 
Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong & Kiehl, 2012).Thus far the current findings have elucidated 
some of the ways in which psychopathic traits translate into prosocial behaviour and moral 
judgment. The implications for broadening the conceptualisation of psychopathy will now 
be considered.   
 
12.7 CONTRIBUTIONS OF FINDINGS TO CONCEPTUALISATION OF 
PSYCHOPATHY  
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As reviewed above, psychopathy is associated with a range of characteristics, including 
deficits in empathy and a propensity for antisocial behaviour. The findings have been 
considered in relation to these characteristics. Another characteristic relates to gender. The 
evidence suggests that psychopathy is more common in men than in women (e.g. Verona & 
Vitale, 2006), and that psychopathic traits may manifest differently in men and women 
(Forouzan & Cooke, 2005). To what extent do the findings in the present thesis cohere with 
this evidence? In view of the posited gender disparity, all of the studies (with the exception 
of the initial one) deliberately balanced gender across psychopathic trait groups. Gender was 
also included as a covariate in the analysis, and did not change the pattern of results. This 
implies that any group differences reported in the current studies were more likely to be 
attributable to psychopathic traits than to gender. Nevertheless, low-scoring male 
participants and high-scoring female participants were the most challenging to recruit. This 
is evidenced by the fact that there were a disproportionate number of female participants in 
the low trait group in the first study, before the decision to deliberately select participants 
according to both PPI score and gender was undertaken. Moreover, low-scoring men tended 
to have higher PPI scores than low-scoring women. Conversely, high-scoring women tended 
to have lower PPI scores than high-scoring men. Thus, although the findings were not 
primarily attributable to gender differences, they were consistent with the conceptualisation 
of psychopathy as more common in men.  
 
However, it is important to recognise that by deliberately selecting the groups on the basis 
of both psychopathic traits and gender, the PPI scores of the high and low trait groups across 
this thesis were less differentiated than they would have been without adjusting for gender. 
It is therefore possible that the present findings underestimated any differences in social 
performance between those high and low in psychopathic traits in the general population. 
 
The present chapter has thus far examined the ways in which the current findings cohere 
with the existing conceptualisation of psychopathy. These findings also offer two novel 
contributions. One such contribution relates to the fact that in many of the current studies, 
the pattern of findings was in the same direction for the high and low psychopathic trait 
groups, but the high trait group responded at a different threshold. For instance, as discussed 
above, both groups were more likely to reciprocate when doing so incurred a low cost than 
when it incurred a high cost. Nonetheless, the high trait group was less reciprocal than the 
low trait group overall. Another study found that both groups judged people who 
experienced positive outcomes after cheating to be less deserving than those who worked 
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hard. Both groups also judged people who suffered negative outcomes as a result of 
misfortune to be less deserving than those who deliberately transgressed. Nonetheless, the 
high trait group differentiated between deserved and undeserved outcomes to a lesser extent 
than the low trait group. This evidence suggests that there may be quantitative differences, 
or a different threshold, in the behaviours of those high and low in psychopathic traits. Thus, 
people high in psychopathic traits may behave less prosocially, or experience weaker 
emotional responses. However, their behaviours are not necessarily qualitatively different, 
since people high and low in psychopathic traits are likely to be influenced by various 
contextual factors in similar ways. This is consistent with the current conceptualisation of 
psychopathy as a number of traits lying on a continuum rather than as ‘psychopaths’ and 
‘non-psychopaths’ being qualitatively different groups.  
 
The current findings also suggest that the high trait group may show some sensitivity to 
others’ distress, albeit at a higher threshold to the low trait group. This was evidenced by the 
studies that deliberately manipulated the salience and legitimacy of others’ needs. These 
studies found that the high trait group did feel that victims of misfortune were less deserving 
of negative outcomes than those who had brought their problems upon themselves. The 
high trait group also felt that it was more acceptable for people to ask for help, and was more 
likely to comply with requests for help, when they were in genuine need or were suffering, 
as compared to when they were taking advantage. However, the implication that those high 
in psychopathic traits may have been somewhat sensitive to the characters’ distress in relation 
to the present tasks does appear to be in contradiction with much of the existing literature, 
whereby people with psychopathy have been conceptualised as lacking in responsiveness to 
distress cues (e.g. Blair et al., 1997). 
 
What might underpin this apparent contradiction? It could be due to the fact that the present 
thesis adopted a relatively novel recruitment strategy; the high and low psychopathic trait 
groups were thus formed of subclinical participants, or ‘successful psychopaths’. 
Experimental work has found some qualitative differences between successful and 
unsuccessful psychopaths (e.g. Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga & Narr, 2010). It is possible that 
if the psychopathic traits were extreme enough to register as clinically significant, any putative 
sensitivity to distress may disappear. Future studies could clarify this by comparing the 
everyday social performance of low-scoring participants, high-scoring, ‘successful 
psychopaths’ and high-scoring ‘unsuccessful psychopaths’. However, this design might be 
problematic, since the low-scoring and ‘successful psychopath’ groups would need to be 
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recruited from non-institutional settings, whereas the ‘unsuccessful psychopaths’ would by 
definition be institutionalised. The potentially confounding effects of institutionalisation may 
be difficult to control for, and would not be distributed evenly across all three groups. 
Regardless of any putative differences between ‘successful psychopaths’ and ‘unsuccessful 
psychopaths’, the fact that the present findings do point at some sensitivity to others’ distress 
may have important implications for remediation; these are outlined below.  
 
The current findings offer another novel contribution to the conceptualisation of 
psychopathy, since they drew a distinction between participants’ active preferences and their 
emotional responses. Specifically, for many of the studies, the groups did not differ with 
respect to their chosen course of action or preferred outcome. However, the groups did 
consistently differ with respect to how they would feel. Thus, in comparison with the low 
trait group, the high trait group reported that they would feel more pleased in response to 
others’ failure, less pleased in response to others’ success, and that they would experience 
less guilt and discomfort. Notably, this distinction between action and emotion was only 
found in the studies where the consequences resulting from the various possible courses of 
action differed for the characters but not for the participant. For instance, in the 
Competitiveness Task (reported in Chapter 9), deciding that the character should pass or fail 
their exam did not change the fact that the participant had already passed or failed. Moreover, 
in one scenario in the Counterfactual Thinking Task (reported in Chapter 10), the participant 
had to choose the best way of preventing their negligent sibling from inadvertently using the 
wrong fuel in the family car and causing them to miss their graduation ceremony. The 
alternatives had different consequences for the characters, since some were practical and had 
no negative impact on them, whereas others resulted in them experiencing emotional harm 
or physical injury. However, each alternative was equally effective from the participants’ 
perspective; any of them would have sufficed and allowed them to attend their graduation 
ceremony. Finally, in the Utilitarian Judgments Task (reported in Chapter 10), different 
decisions had negative consequences for either an individual or a group. However, the person 
making the moral decision did not personally stand to gain or lose, regardless of what they 
chose.  
 
In situations where the groups were not personally incentivised by any particular course of 
action, the high trait group may have chosen whichever option was most socially acceptable. 
This may have been motivated by the prospect of potential future benefits. For instance, in 
the study reported in Chapter 10, the participant did not gain any particular advantage by 
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choosing an extreme alternative that would cause the negligent sibling harm as opposed to a 
simpler, practical alternative. Similarly, in the study reported in Chapter 9, the participant did 
not gain any particular advantage by choosing for the friend to fail their exam. Thus, the high 
trait group may have felt that there was no point in angering or alienating the character. 
Instead, by choosing the more prosocial options, the participant may have been able to 
maintain the social relationship and thereby retain the possibility of taking advantage in the 
future, if an opportunity were to present itself. To paraphrase Harvey Cleckley’s seminal 
work, by choosing the same courses of action as the low trait group, the high trait group may 
have been able to continue wearing “the mask of sanity” (Cleckley, 1941).  
 
Taken together, the findings in the present thesis suggest that those high in psychopathic 
traits may behave in the same fashion as those low in psychopathic traits, but at a different 
threshold. Moreover, in situations where they did not stand to gain or lose, the high trait 
group made the same choices as the low trait group. These novel contributions suggest that 
those high in psychopathic traits may demonstrate the capacity for prosocial behaviour if 
sufficiently motivated. This evidence may provide some interesting implications for 
remediation. These implications will now be reviewed in turn.  
12.8 IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT FINDINGS FOR REMEDIATION 
 
Psychopathy treatment programmes have typically achieved mixed success. Whilst those 
targeting juvenile offenders with psychopathy (Caldwell, Skeem, Salekin & Van Rybroek, 
2006) or children with callous-unemotional traits (e.g. Viding, Fontaine & McRory, 2012) 
have led to modest improvements, the treatment of adults with psychopathy has traditionally 
been met with ‘therapeutic pessimism’ (Salekin, 2002). This is because psychopathic 
criminals are thought to be able to understand the illegality and the impact of their actions, 
without experiencing guilt or remorse. Moreover, there is some evidence suggesting that 
treatment may not only be largely ineffective, it may in some cases increase recidivism rates 
(Harris & Rice, 2006). This may be because treatment programmes that highlight the 
thoughts and feelings of the victims of crimes may make it easier for people with 
psychopathy to manipulate them. Fundamentally, offenders with psychopathy are thought 
to lack the motivation to change their behaviour (Hemphill & Hart, 2003). Thus, increasing 
motivational factors may be the key to successful remediation.   
 
How might the current findings illuminate ways of increasing the motivation for those with 
psychopathy to behave prosocially? The experimental studies reported herein systematically 
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manipulated a range of factors relating to everyday social behaviour. It was found that varying 
situational characteristics relating to the person providing help and dispositional 
characteristics relating to the person requiring help influenced those high and low in 
psychopathic traits in similar ways, but at different thresholds. Although the high trait group 
tended to be less prosocial overall, both groups were more prosocial in situations requiring 
little effort, and in situations where people had good reasons for needing help. Thus, one 
approach to remediation could be to increase the salience of the factors that were found to 
promote prosocial behaviour in the present thesis. In other words, increased prosocial 
responding in those high in psychopathic traits may be achieved by “raising the signal”.  
 
One method of raising the signal might be via an ‘other-route’, by focusing on the internal 
states of other people. This is supported by the findings from the deservingness manipulation 
discussed above (Chapters 7 and 8), whereby the high trait group demonstrated some 
sensitivity to the characters’ distress. They felt that people who were genuinely in need of 
help were more deserving than those who were taking advantage. They also felt that people 
who were the victims of misfortune deserved to suffer less than those who had brought their 
troubles upon themselves. Treatment approaches could therefore focus on the victims of 
crime and emphasise their distress, their innocence, their positive attributes or any factors 
that highlight the extent to which their suffering was undeserved. The findings from the 
utilitarian study reported in Chapter 11 may provide another way to raise the signal via the 
other-route. The findings revealed that both groups felt more uncomfortable in situations 
involving physical harm than in those involving social harm. Thus, treatment approaches 
could place greater emphasis on any physical harm resulting from the perpetrator’s actions. 
The utilitarian study also found that both groups were influenced by the proximity to the 
situation. When deciding whether or not to sacrifice one person to save a group, the decision 
was either low-proximity, and involved pulling a lever, or high proximity, and involved 
physically pushing a man to his death. Both groups used more sophisticated reasoning about 
the scenario characters in relation to high-proximity decisions. Highlighting the perpetrator’s 
proximity and involvement in the crime may also aid remediation.  
 
Taken together, the findings from the present thesis offer some promising options in relation 
to promoting prosocial behaviour via the other-route. However, this approach might be 
particularly challenging, since it depends on the capacity to experience an empathic response. 
This is thought to be severely diminished in people with psychopathy (e.g. Blair et al., 2005; 
Blair, 2008). Moreover, previous remediation efforts that have focused on highlighting the 
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distress of crime victim have typically failed (Harris & Rice, 2006). It may therefore be 
impractical to ‘raise the signal’ enough to elicit an empathic response.  
 
An alternative method of raising the signal might be via a ‘self-route’, by focusing on the 
aspects of the situation that affect people with psychopathy themselves rather than those 
that affect other people. This method acknowledges that those with psychopathy are likely 
to be primarily motivated by self-interest. Approaching treatment from a ‘self-route’ is also 
consistent with the current findings, whereby the groups only chose different courses of 
action when these had different consequences for the participants. Doing favours for the 
characters was in their best interests, but required the participants to incur a cost. In these 
situations, the high trait group was less prosocial. By contrast, choosing for the characters to 
succeed rather than fail was also in their best interests, but the participants had already 
succeeded or failed and therefore did not stand to gain or lose. When their decision 
benefitted the characters but did not affect them personally, the groups made similar choices. 
 
The current findings therefore offer some options for raising the signal via the self-route, 
and thereby for motivating prosocial behaviour. The studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6 
provide one such option. In these studies, the cost of prosocial behaviour was manipulated. 
Both groups were more likely to comply with requests for favourable opinions than with 
requests for favours. Both groups also behaved more reciprocally when the cost of doing so 
was low (e.g. paying for a friend’s coffee) than when the cost of doing so was high (e.g. 
paying for a friend’s meal). In view of this evidence, treatment approaches could make 
prosocial behaviour appear to be less effortful, by highlighting how easy it might be to 
provide help. A more direct way of motivating prosocial behaviour might be to make the 
advantages clearer. People may derive a range of personal benefits by behaving prosocially. 
By forming prosocial relationships with others, people may be able to gain resources from 
them in the future. They may also be able to elevate their personal status. Suppressing 
antisocial behaviour may also lead to significant benefits. For instance, avoiding incarceration 
may be in people’s best interests, since they may be better able to make money, travel widely, 
or engage in other enjoyable behaviours that are not possible when their freedom is restricted. 
An approach to treatment that focuses on the benefits of behaving prosocially (rather than 
the drawbacks of behaving antisocially) is also consistent with the research literature 
demonstrating that people with psychopathy are receptive to prospective rewards but not to 
prospective punishment (e.g. Peschardt, Morton & Blair, 2003). Moreover, this approach 
may make those with psychopathy more likely to want to engage in treatment programmes 
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in the first place; research suggests that mandating treatment may preclude people from fully 
engaging in the therapeutic process (Hemphill & Hart, 2003).  
 
Incentivising change via this ‘self-route’ is also consistent with the findings from remediation 
studies focusing on children with callous-unemotional traits (e.g. Dadds & Rhodes, 2008), 
who often go on to meet the criteria for psychopathy as adults (Frick & Viding, 2009). These 
studies have shown that these children are more responsive to reward-oriented strategies (i.e. 
treats for good behaviour) than to punishment-oriented strategies (i.e. disciplinary action for 
bad behaviour; Viding, Fontaine & McCrory, 2012). Focusing intervention strategies on 
antisocial children may be the most effective form of psychopathy remediation, since 
‘nipping it in the bud’ might help to reduce the risk of future antisocial acts and subsequent 
institutionalisation. Thus, the ‘self-route’ approach to treatment could be applied to youth 
interventions, for instance, by highlighting the rewards provided by teachers following good 
behaviour in the classroom or playground, or those provided by parents following good 
behaviour in public or when interacting with siblings.  
 
The current findings could also prevent the emergence of psychopathic traits in childhood 
by contributing to a broader education strategy. The UK national curriculum currently 
includes personal, social, health and economic (PSHE) education (Department for education, 
2013). This was designed to teach children about topics such as sex and relationships, drug 
and alcohol abuse, financial responsibility, and social, cultural and moral values. Psychopathy 
has been extensively linked with problems in these areas (e.g. Cleckley, 1941; Hare, 1993; 
Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 2005). Presenting children with age-adapted versions of the types of 
social and moral dilemmas developed in this thesis might help to advance PSHE education 
and thereby identify and assist children with callous-unemotional traits. 
 
Taken together, the current findings suggest that people high in psychopathic traits may 
behave more prosocially if doing so is in their best interests; this may have important 
implications for remediation in clinical settings and for youth intervention programmes.  
 
12.9 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The present Chapter and the experimental chapters presented in this thesis have made 
specific suggestions for possible ways that the tasks could be extended and manipulated 
further to follow up the findings to date. Broadly speaking, there are a number of key 
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methodological implications for future research that could be explored.  As discussed above, 
a number of the current findings supported a distinction between action and emotion 
whereby the trait groups did not differ in their active preferences for the type of action they 
chose, but did differ in their emotional responses. The lack of group differences was thought 
to relate to the fact that in the hypothetical scenarios used in the present studies, the 
participants did not personally stand to gain or lose. Thus, future studies could compare 
respondents’ active preferences in situations where their choices personally affect them. This 
may help to elucidate the point at which the high trait groups judge the potential gains to be 
sufficient, and therefore to feel that responding antisocially is worth risking potential negative 
consequences.  
 
The types of social scenarios described in the present thesis also could have accounted for 
the lack of group differences in active preferences. Specifically, since people with 
psychopathy are thought to have a significant negative impact upon the individuals with 
whom they interact (Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011), the scenarios in the present thesis described 
interactions with characters known to the participant. However, the prospect of continual 
interactions with these characters and future potential opportunities to take advantage of 
them may have motivated the high trait groups to behave prosocially. Thus, the high trait 
groups may have been motivated by strategic considerations such as long-term gains rather 
than because they felt that acting in order to benefit others was intrinsically rewarding 
(Gervais, Kline, Ludmer, George & Manson, 2013). In order to investigate this further, 
future studies could focus on one-off interactions with strangers.  
 
Another methodological implication for future research relates to the range of behavioural 
responses described in the present thesis. In response to real-life situations where people’s 
choices have consequences for others, they may choose to behave prosocially, they may 
choose to do nothing in order to avoid incurring a cost, or they may choose to behave 
antisocially and to actively harm others in order to gain resources. The studies described 
herein focus on whether the high and low trait groups behave prosocially and act in others’ 
best interests or choose to do nothing and retain their personal resources. Future studies 
could examine how people high and low in psychopathic traits differ with respect to everyday 
examples of antisocial behaviour. Research could focus on the extent to which they are 
willing to cheat, lie, steal or criticise others in order to gain an advantage over others. 
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Another future direction might be to administer the current research tasks in more extreme, 
clinical populations. This may help to identify subtle differences between ‘successful’ 
and‘unsuccessful’ psychopaths. This may also help to resolve whether ‘successful’ and 
‘unsuccessful’ psychopaths are qualitatively different groups, or whether they represent 
different points at the extreme end of a continuum of psychopathic traits. Finally, as 
discussed earlier, the methodological approach adopted in the present thesis aimed to 
balance ecological validity against laboratory control. The current findings offer some 
insights into the aspects of social performance that might be particularly pertinent in 
psychopathy. Thus, future research work could expand on these findings by conducting 
studies in more naturalistic settings. For instance, constructing role-play paradigms may offer 
a more realistic environment in which to investigate social performance, and recent work 
investigating social functioning in Autism Spectrum Disorder has involved the use of virtual 
reality paradigms (e.g. Georgescu, Kuzmanovic, Roth, Bente & Vogeley, 2014).  
 
Taken together, these directions for future research work may help to develop a richer, more 
nuanced understanding of the ways in which deficits associated with psychopathy translate 
into everyday social performance.  
 
12.10 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The present thesis aimed to investigate how psychopathic personality traits influenced 
everyday social behaviour. In order to address this question, a range of novel tasks was 
developed that manipulated specific aspects of social performance, particularly in relation to 
prosocial behaviour and moral judgment. The findings revealed that the high psychopathic 
trait groups were less prosocial than the low trait groups, but only when they stood to gain 
or lose. The findings also suggested that the high trait participants’ capacity for moral 
reasoning was unimpaired. However, the groups consistently differed in their emotional 
reactions.  The high trait groups reported lower levels of emotions such as awkwardness, 
guilt, and discomfort than the low trait groups in relation to difficult social situations. One 
particularly interesting finding was that the range of experimental manipulations included in 
the present studies did not result in the two groups demonstrating opposite patterns of 
behaviour. Although the high trait groups were broadly less prosocial and less emotional 
than the low trait groups, they still demonstrated some sensitivity to others’ distress. This 
finding was in contradiction to much of the previous literature suggesting that psychopathy 
is characterised by a lack of responsiveness to distress cues. Taken together, these findings 
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may contribute to the conceptualisation of psychopathy and ultimately to novel approaches 
to remediation.  
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